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PREFACE 
 The study of memory has been called the ultimate “study in social psychology.” (Bartlett, 
1932). The ability to store, retrieve, and apply previously learned information is vital to human 
functioning; without it, navigating the myriad physical, cultural, and social contexts in which 
humans operate would be overwhelming (Schacter & Addis, 2009). A form of memory that is 
especially critical is autobiographical memory—the memories of one’s personal past. One’s past 
experiences can serve as important reminders of what to do or not to do, or they can shape 
predictions about the future (Schacter & Addis, 2009). Thus, understanding the many purposes 
for which human have developed and use autobiographical memory is an important line of 
research.  
 Although autobiographical memory has long been known to support the human action of 
reminiscence—i.e., the act of recollecting a previously experienced event (e.g., Ballard, 1913; 
Bartlett, 1932)—to suppose that “re-experiencing” (Tulving & Markowitsch, 1998) the past is 
autobiographical memory’s primary purpose is to take a one-dimensional view. Recent theory 
and evidence from the cognitive, evolutionary, developmental, and neuroscience domains 
contend that one’s personal storehouse of knowledge and experiences are invaluable aids for 
predicting, navigating, and coping with unknown future situations (Atance & O’Neill, 2005; 
Barsalou, 1988, 2003; Okuda, Fujii, Ohtake, Tsukiura, Tanji, Suzuki, et al., 2003; Wheeler, 
Stuss, & Tulving, 1997) or even reframing personal past events (Roese, 1997; Roese & Olson, 
1995). Thus, it is unlikely that the human ability to “re-live” past events is for the sole purpose of 
reminiscence. Rather, it has been argued that memories of an autobiographical nature inform 
such capacities as autonoetic consciousness—the human ability for self-awareness (e.g., 
Baddeley, Eysenck, & Anderson, 2009; Tulving, 1984, 1985, 2005; Wheeler et al., 1997) that 
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permits one to mentally place one’s self within a recollected past event, an envisioned future 
scenario, or in counterfactual situations (e.g., Atance and O'Neill, 2001; Baddeley et al., 2009; 
Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Schacter & Addis, 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007), as well as 
mental time travel—the mental projection of one’s self through conceptual time (Suddendorf & 
Busby, 2003; Tulving, 2002a1; Wheeler et al., 1997). Together, these capacities provide a sense 
of self-continuity across time, and ensure that actual past experience is distinguishable from 
beliefs, imaginings, and dreams (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; Klein, Cosmides, 
Tooby, & Chance, 2001).  
 To project one’s self back in time for the purpose of reminiscing, or “re-experiencing,” a 
past event requires only that the rememberer activate and recollect a stored autobiographical 
episode (e.g., Ballard, 1913; Bartlett, 1932). However, when one wishes to travel forward in 
time, one cannot simply “re-experience” the past as is the case with reminiscence. Instead, 
autobiographical memory content2 must be imaginatively changed such that a future scenario 
that has not yet occurred—and thus for which direct autobiographical memory content has not 
yet been stored—can be “pre-experienced” with details appropriate and relevant to future 
purposes (Schacter & Addis, 2007; Shanton & Goldman, 2010; Szpunar, 2010). The projecting 
of one’s self forward in time by imaginatively changing autobiographical memory content is 
referred to as prospection (Schacter & Addis, 2007). Similarly, the tendency to go back in time 
to imaginatively modify or augment a stored autobiographical episode for the purpose of 
supposing how things could have turned out differently than what actually occurred—i.e., to 
                                                
1 Tulving (2002a) proposed the term chronesthesia for the conscious awareness of subjective time possessed by 
humans. The current paper will refer to this phenomenon as mental time travel. 
2 The current paper uses the phrase “memory content” to denote the information, or internal representation (Dudai, 
2007), that is stored in the brain during encoding. This conceptual understanding, rather than the biophysiological 
properties of memory content—e.g., “memory trace” or “engram (e.g., Dudai, 2004)—is used throughout. 
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“reframe”3 the past—is referred to as counterfactual thinking (Roese & Olson, 1995).  
 How humans actually engage in mental time travel is largely unknown. It has been 
suggested that mental time travel is not only motivated by current goals, but is shaped and 
constrained by the past (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; Johnson & Sherman, 1990). 
What is known from brain evidence is that such “experiential” cognitions as self-projection (e.g., 
Buckner & Carroll, 2006), autobiographical memory retrieval (e.g., Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & 
Schacter, 2008), prospection (e.g., Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, 2009; De Brigard, Addis, 
Ford, Schacter, & Giovanello, 2013; De Brigard, Spreng, Mitchell, & Schacter, 2015; Schacter, 
2012; Schacter & Addis, 2007; Zheng, Luo, & Yu, 2014), counterfactual thinking (e.g., Addis et 
al., 2009; De Brigard et al., 2013; De Brigard & Giovanello, 2012; De Brigard et al., 2015; 
Schacter, Benoit, De  Brigard, & Szpunar, in press; Van Hoeck, Ma, Ampe, Vandekerckhove, & 
Van Overwalle, 2013), and perspective taking (Dodell-Feder, DiLisi, & Hooker, 2014; Knox, 
2010; Perry, Hendler, & Shamay-Tsoory, 2011), all share neural circuitry in the default network 
(e.g., Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, & Spreng, 2014). This suggests that capacities underlain by 
the default network evolved together to produce an efficient, synergistic system. However, no 
single theory has emerged to explain how exactly these functionalities work together and why. 
 One reason for this may be that the cognitive mechanism that enables autobiographical 
memory content to be used for mental time travel and counterfactual thinking has not been 
definitively identified. However, one possible explanation comes by way of simulation theory. 
Simulation theory by Goldman (2006) was originally developed to explain the social behavior of 
perspective taking—the inferring of others’ thoughts and feelings. But in light of a growing body 
                                                
3 Although the counterfactual thinking literature prefers the term “reconstruct” when describing the alteration of 
actual memory content (e.g., Roese & Olson, 1995), the current paper uses the term “reframe” so as not to confuse 
the modifying of actual memory content with the “reconstruction” that occurs to memory content during memory 
consolidation (e.g., Schacter, 1989). 
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of brain evidence showing that the brain areas associated with autobiographical memory 
retrieval, perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking are neurally connected, 
Shanton and Goldman (2010) revised simulation theory to explain both perspective taking and 
mental time travel. Thus simulation, per this revision, has two corresponding forms. When the 
goal prompting mental simulation is perspective taking—i.e., when the goal of simulation is 
other-directed4— the form of simulation employed is interpersonal. When the goal prompting 
simulation is mental time travel—i.e., when the goal is self-directed—the form of simulation 
employed is intrapersonal.  
 Whether one’s goal is to perspective take (via interpersonal simulation) or to travel 
through time (via intrapersonal simulation), simulation theory posits that the simulation process 
is triggered upon the activation and retrieval of relevant stored information from “background 
information” (Goldman, 2006; Shanton & Goldman, 2010) that could include content retrieved 
from storage in long-term memory. Long-term memory is a broadly defined, taxonomically 
superordinate memory form comprising memory content that has been stored for a long period—
possibly over the course of one’s life (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968). Per simulation theory’s 
simulation process model, memory content retrieved in response to a perspective taking or 
mental time travel goal serves as “input” for interpersonal or intrapersonal simulation, 
respectively. Yet, despite the wealth of brain evidence linking autobiographical memory retrieval 
to the actions of perspective taking (e.g., Dodell-Feder et al., 2014; Knox, 2010; Perry et al., 
2011), prospection (e.g., Addis et al., 2009; De Brigard et al., 2013; De Brigard et al., 2015; 
Schacter, 2012; Schacter & Addis, 2007; Zheng et al., 2014), and counterfactual thinking (e.g., 
Addis et al., 2009; De Brigard et al., 2013; De Brigard & Giovanello, 2012; De Brigard et al., 
                                                
4 Perspective taking can be from a first-person perspective (1PP)—i.e., one’s own perspective—or a third-person 
perspective (3PP)—i.e., from another’s perspective. Unless otherwise indicated, this paper is concerned with the 
3PP that occurs between a perceiver and a target other. 
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2015; Schacter et al., in press; Van Hoeck et al., 2013), research asserting the use of 
autobiographical memory specifically, rather than long-term memory generally, for such 
purposes is, at least at present, less widespread. 
 If simulation is the mechanism by which autobiographical memory is used for 
perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking, then it should reasonably follow 
that mental time travel is a function of autobiographical memory. Such a conclusion would be 
important to the line of research concerned with autobiographical memory functions, which 
seeks the everyday purposes for which autobiographical memory is used (Baddeley, 1988). A 
recent study by Ranson and Fitzgerald (in preparation) did find evidence that autobiographical 
memory is used for the purpose of perspective taking. And although no study of autobiographical 
memory functions to date has reported direct evidence of the functions mental time travel, 
prospection, or counterfactual thinking, it has long been assumed that autobiographical memory 
facilitates such actions as predicting future outcomes (e.g., Williams, Conway, & Cohen, 2008), 
and coping with past events (e.g., Bluck, Alea, Habermas, & Rubin, 2005; Roese, 1997). As 
such, the idea that perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking could be 
functions of autobiographical memory is plausible enough to warrant further investigation.  
 To explore whether perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking are 
functions of autobiographical memory, the current paper comprises four chapters. Chapter 1 is an 
independent paper proposing the Expanded Simulation Model—an adaptation of the cognitive 
process models proposed originally by Goldman (2006), and later by Shanton and Goldman 
(2010). The Expanded Simulation Model is meant to provides a framework by which the 
existence of the autobiographical memory functions of perspective taking, prospection, and 
counterfactual thinking are theoretically substantiated. Chapter 1 argues that autobiographical 
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memory specifically, rather than long-term memory generally, is a store from which background 
information is activated and retrieved in response to a perspective taking, prospection, or 
counterfactual thinking goal5. Chapters 2 and 3 present empirical findings from Study 1 and 
Study 2, respectively, both of which aimed to substantiate the theoretical claims of Chapter 1. 
Study 1 was a validation study of a self-report instrument—the Autobiographical Memory 
Functions of Simulation (AMFS) scale—that was developed to measure the extent to which 
individuals use autobiographical memory for the hypothesized functions of perspective taking, 
prospection, and counterfactual thinking. Study 2 was an empirical study that used the AMFS to 
discern the role of autobiographical memory in interpersonal and intrapersonal simulation, and to 
determine whether perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking could be 
considered functions of autobiographical memory. Chapter 4 explores the broader impacts of the 
ideas and findings presented in Chapters 1, 2, and 3. 
  
                                                
5 Of course, it could be argued that stored memory content that is not strictly autobiographical could serve as input 
for interpersonal and intrapersonal simulation. The current paper acknowledges this possibility, but will not attempt 
to describe or explain such possibilities. The current paper is concerned only with whether or not the claim that 
autobiographical memory content specifically, rather than long-term memory content generally, can be used for 
perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking is plausible.  
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CHAPTER 1 MENTAL SIMULATION AS THE MECHANISM BY WHICH 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY INFORMS INTERPERSONAL AND 
INTRAPERSONAL SIMULATION: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
1.1 Introduction and Background 
 Researchers of autobiographical memory functions—the purposes for which we use 
memories of our personal past (Baddeley, 1988)—have long theorized three broad uses: Social 
(the use of autobiographical memory to foster relationships and social bonding),  Self (the use of 
autobiographical memory to maintain self-identity and self-continuity), and Directive (the use of 
autobiographical memory to aid emotion regulation, behavioral control, problem solving), (e.g., 
Baddeley, 1988; Bruce, 1989; Neisser, 1982; Bluck, Alea, Habermas, & Rubin, 2005). Once the 
Social, Self, and Directive functions were empirically validated (Bluck et al., 2005; Bluck & 
Alea, 2011), the concern became whether the long-standing focus on the three-function model 
was inadvertently discouraging the search for other possible functions. Researchers therefore 
began seeking evidence for an expanded set of functions (e.g., Kulkofsky & Koh, 2009; Ranson 
& Fitzgerald, in preparation; Webster, 1995, 1997). 
 A recent study exploring an expanded set of autobiographical memory functions found 
evidence for a function of “perspective taking” (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation). 
Perspective taking occurs when an individual mentally puts oneself into another’s shoes in order 
to infer the other’s thoughts and feelings (e.g., Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997; Ickes, 2003). 
Perspective taking is thought to be essential to social harmony and altruism (Ickes, 2003). Early 
humans competent in reading and predicting others’ mental states are thought to have had the 
adaptive and selectional advantage (Barresi & Moore, 1996; Decety & Hamm, 2009; Goldman, 
2006). Some have postulated that human intelligence itself arose from the need to discern others’ 
intentions and attitudes (Barresi & Moore, 1996; Reader & Laland, 2002; van Schaik & 
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Burkhart, 2011; Whiten & van Schaik, 2007; Wilson, 1991). This likely explains why 
perspective taking occurs spontaneously during social interactions, but also why perspective 
taking occurs in times of solitude, when private thoughts can turn to recollections of past social 
situations, or imagined predictions about future interactions (Ickes, 2003; Winner, 2000). 
Perspective taking is thus an everyday behavior and a vital social skill (Ickes, 2003; Winner, 
2000). Such factors give weight to substantiating the use of autobiographical memory to 
facilitate it.  
 To date, only one study, by Ranson and Fitzgerald (in preparation), has reported an 
autobiographical memory function of perspective taking. As for why the function of perspective 
taking emerged in this study but was undetected by others may have to do with the design of the 
self-report instrument used by Ranson and Fitzgerald to measure autobiographical memory use. 
The Ranson and Fitzgerald instrument employed the social context of joint reminiscence, which 
was meant to prompt respondents to consider the frequency with which they recall, share, and 
discuss personal and shared past events with others. As such, instruments lacking a similar social 
context may not be sensitive enough to detect all the potential functions associated with the use 
of autobiographical memory for social behaviors and/or interactions—of which perspective 
taking is an example.  
 However, the instrument used by Ranson and Fitzgerald was adapted from an existing 
autobiographical memory functions instrument that did not yield evidence of a perspective taking 
function. The original instrument, the Child-Caregiver Reminiscence Scale (CRS) (Kulkofsky & 
Koh, 2009), was designed in response to related research indicating that the development of the 
autobiographical memory system, as well as socialization of autobiographical memory content 
and use, occurs in early life (Nelson & Fivush, 2002, 2004). The CRS asks parents of young 
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children aged three to seven years to rate the frequency with which they engaged in various 
reminiscence behaviors with their child. Of interest to Ranson and Fitzgerald was whether the 
expanded set of autobiographical memory functions found by the CRS to emerge during early 
childhood were sustained through adulthood. Thus, that the perspective taking function was 
unique to adults is more likely do to differences in cognitive capacities than in instrument design. 
The young children to whom the CRS is administered have not yet developed—the 
understanding that others have mental states—e.g., beliefs intents, desires, perspectives—
different from one’s own (Beck, Riggs, & Burns, 2011; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003) As theory of 
mind does not develop until around the age of four years (Goldman, 2006), and ToM is essential 
to perspective taking (McHugh & Stewart, 2012), the children targeted by the CRS would not 
have yet developed the ability to use autobiographical memory for this purpose. And although 
the social context of joint reminiscence may have enhanced the ability of the self-report 
instrument used by Ranson and Fitzgerald to detect the perspective taking function, it is more 
likely that, absent a cohesive theory recommending its existence, researchers simply did not 
think to look for it. 
 A crucial first step in theoretically substantiating the existence of the autobiographical 
memory function of perspective taking is to identify and delineate the mechanism through which 
autobiographical memory might inform perspective taking. One possible mechanism is mental 
simulation as proposed by simulation theory. Simulation theory was developed by Goldman 
(2006) to explain how individuals infer other minds. Simulation theory posits that to “simulate” 
for the purpose of perspective taking is to create imagined or pretend states in one’s own mind 
that corresponds to those of the target. Such “pretend” states are informed by “background 
information,” which can include content from past experiences that is activated and retrieved 
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from long-term memory storage in response to a perspective-taking goal. Such background 
information can serve as “input” for simulation processing—i.e., the mingling of memory 
content with imagination to produce a simulated outcome, such as a target other’s inferred 
thoughts and feelings.  
 Although simulation theory by Goldman (2006) offers the mechanism of mental 
simulation as the means by which memory can be used for perspective taking, simulation theory 
does not explicitly state that the background information drawn from long-term memory stores is 
autobiographical in form. However, simulation theory does not preclude such an interpretation 
either. Rather, the fact that “background information” is only superficially defined by simulation 
theory makes it possible for the current paper to exploit this deficiency and . One, taxonomically 
speaking, autobiographical memory is a form of long-term memory (Tulving, 1972). That is, the 
long-term memory comprises various memory “systems” that reflect the type of information 
stored.  
 One such system is the autobiographical memory system, which comprises both episodic 
autobiographical memory (personal past events experienced at particular times and places) and 
semantic autobiographical memory (general knowledge and fact-based information) (Conway, 
2001). Because simulation theory postulates only that mental simulation employs memory 
content drawn from the long-term memory system—but does not explicitly exclude any long-
term memory subsystems—simulation theory makes possible the specification of 
autobiographical memory as the source of simulation input. Two, a growing body of brain 
evidence indicates that the neural pathways underlying the functions of autobiographical 
memory retrieval (e.g., Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008) and perspective taking 
(Dodell-Feder, DiLisi, & Hooker, 2014; Knox, 2010; Perry, Hendler, & Shamay-Tsoory, 2011) 
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are shared. Such findings suggest that these brain areas co-evolved to ensure a functional 
mutualism. And three, simulation theory was recently augmented to account for both perspective 
taking and mental time travel—the mental projection of one’s self through conceptual time 
(Suddendorf & Busby, 2003; Tulving, 2002a6; Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997). The revised 
simulation theory by Shanton and Goldman (2010) addresses the use of memory in mental time 
travel; specifically; the “re-experiencing” of a personal past event—i.e., the vivid imagining of a 
prior event in order to subjectively re-live it (e.g., Reber, 2013; Tulving & Markowitsch, 
1998)7—and the “pre-experiencing” of past experience in order to imaginatively envision future 
scenario. However, in order to “re-experience” or “pre-experience” a memory, the relevant 
content must be activated and retrieved from memory storage. That Shanton and Goldman 
specify the “re-experience” and “pre-experience” of personal past events implies the specific 
activation and retrieval of autobiographical memory content. Additionally, Shanton and 
Goldman’s characterization of simulated mental time travel as involving “episodic memory” 
likewise implies the involvement of the episodic memory system—where episodic memory 
content is stored for later potential activation and retrieval. A subsystem of the episodic memory 
system is the autobiographical episodic memory system, where autobiographical episodic 
memory content is stored (Conway, 2001). Thus, just as simulation theory broadly defined long-
term memory, so has it defined the involvement of “episodic memory.” As such, simulation 
                                                
6 Tulving (2002a) proposed the term chronesthesia for the conscious awareness of subjective time possessed by 
humans. The current paper will refer to this phenomenon as mental time travel. 
7 The distinctions between the terms “episodic memory system,” “episodic memory content,” and “episodic 
memory”—specifically the connotation of the latter by Shanton and Goldman (2010)—is critical to a full 
understanding of the arguments of the current paper. The “episodic memory system” comprises memories of past 
events, a subset of which involve the self—i.e., are “personal”—and which are thus by definition autobiographical 
(Williams et al., 2008) “Episodic memory content” is the stored details of an event, including the people, places, 
object, and its general and specific contexts. A subset of episodic memory content is “personal,” and is thus 
autobiographical. Shanton and Goldman (2010) use the term “episodic memory” when referring to the subjective 
“re-experiencing” of stored episodic memory content that has been recalled for re-living. The current paper is 
ultimately interested in whether autobiographical content specifically, rather than long-term memory content 
generally, is used for simulation-based perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking.  
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theory does not preclude the specification of autobiographical memory content as a form of 
long-term memory “background information” that could be used in simulation-based perspective 
taking and mental time travel. Given that this idea is conceptually plausible, but to date, 
unexplored, further investigation is warranted.  
1.2 Goals and Hypotheses 
 The overarching objective of the current paper is to theoretically substantiate the 
existence of the autobiographical memory function of perspective taking per the evidence 
reported by Ranson and Fitzgerald (in preparation). By extension, a secondary objective is to 
theoretically argue for the existence of the autobiographical memory functions of prospection 
and counterfactual thinking. To accomplish these objectives, the following four goals and seven 
hypotheses are extended. 
Hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2 in Support of Goal 1.1 
 Goal 1.1 is to substantiate the functional link between autobiographical memory and 
perspective taking. To support, Hypothesis 1.1 states that the mechanism by which long-term 
memory content is used for the purpose of perspective taking is mental simulation as defined by 
simulation theory (Goldman, 2006; Goldman & Shanton, in press; Shanton & Goldman, 2010).  
 Although simulation theory (Goldman, 2006) may be the mechanism by which memory 
content informs perspective taking, simulation theory only explicitly identifies content from 
long-term memory, rather than content from autobiographical memory, as simulation “input.” 
Hypothesis 1.2 states that autobiographical memory content in particular—rather than long-term 
memory in general—can be used as simulation output for simulation-based perspective taking. 
To support, the long-term memory “background information” component of simulation theory’s 
process model will be “unpacked” to show how autobiographical memory content could be 
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preferentially activated and retrieved for this purpose. If it can be shown that autobiographical 
memory could be a specific form of long-term memory content used for perspective taking, then  
Hypotheses 1.3 and 1.4 in Support of Goal 1.2 
 Goal 1.2 is to “unpack” the long-term memory component of the simulation process to 
illustrate how autobiographical memory content might be activated and retrieved for simulation-
based perspective taking. Exploring possible levels of organization “within” the long-term 
memory component is necessary because simulation theory does not address two operations vital 
to the extraction and deployment of memory content for simulation purposes. The first is the 
operation responsible for the activation and retrieval of memory content for simulation use. The 
second is how the need to imaginatively simulate extracted memory content—or not—is 
determined. Regarding the first omission, Hypothesis 1.3 states that the “search and retrieval” 
procedure that operates “within” the long-term memory component could be explained by the 
self-memory system (SMS) as detailed in Conway (2005) and Conway and Pleydell-Pearce 
(2000). The SMS will be adapted to comply with the simulation process model operations 
postulated by simulation theory. 
 To address the second omission, Hypothesis 1.4 states simulation occurs in response to 
heightened neural activation of predominantly episodic memory content as predicted by the 
source activation confusion (SAC) model per Reder, Donavos, & Erickson (2002) and Reder, 
Park, and Kieffaber (2009). When used to support the “search and retrieval” of autobiographical 
memory content specifically as delineated by the SMS (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000), the SAC can explain how, at the neural level, autobiographical episodic memory 
content specifically, rather than episodic long-term memory content generally, can be used for 
simulation-based perspective taking. The SAC is a computational model that asserts that memory 
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content is stored in nodes within a neural network, the elements of which are activated according 
to functional equations. As such, the SAC also offers a protocol that illustrates how the retrieval 
of some memory would lead to simulation, whereas the retrieval of other memory content would 
not. The SAC will be adapted to conform to both the SMS and the simulation process model per 
simulation theory.  
Hypotheses 1.5 and 1.6 in Support of Goal 1.3 
 Goal 1.3 is to show that the current paper’s adaptation of the simulation process model—
the Expanded Simulation Model—which has been augmented in the current paper to include the 
SMS and SAC, has the potential to explain other psychological phenomena. Consistent with a 
recent revision of simulation theory by Shanton and Goldman (2010), Hypothesis 1.5 states that, 
in addition to perspective taking, the Expanded Simulation Model can also be used to explain 
mental time travel. To support, the current paper will operationalize mental time travel in three 
ways: the “re-experiencing” of (predominantly episodic) autobiographical memory content for 
the purpose of reminiscing (e.g., Casey, 2009); the “pre-experiencing” of (predominantly 
episodic) autobiographical memory content for the purpose of prospection (imagining future 
scenarios) (Schacter & Addis, 2007); and the “reframing” of (predominantly episodic) 
autobiographical memory content for the purpose of counterfactual thinking (mentally 
reconstructing memories of past events to include new details and/or outcomes) (Epstude & 
Roese, 2008; Gavanski & Wells, 1989).  
 If the Expanded Simulation model can plausibly account for how autobiographical 
memory is used for perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking, such will justify 
proceeding to Hypothesis 1.6. Hypothesis 1.6 states that, because perspective taking, 
prospection, and counterfactual thinking are purposes for which autobiographical memory is 
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used, then perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking are functions of 
autobiographical memory.  
Hypothesis 1.7 in Support of Goal 1.4 
 Shanton and Goldman (2010) argue that, although simulation theory can explain both 
perspective taking and mental time travel, these outcomes are behaviorally distinct and driven by 
different goals. Shanton and Goldman therefore proposed that the simulation processes 
underlying perspective taking and mental time travel were also distinct, resulting in two 
hypothesized simulation forms. When the goal is to perspective take, which Shanton and 
Goldman describe as an other-directed goal, the ensuing simulation form is interpersonal 
simulation. When the goal is to mental time travel, which Shanton and Goldman characterize as 
self-directed, the ensuring simulation form is intrapersonal simulation. Goal 1.4 is to frame the 
Expanded Simulation Model accordingly. Hypothesis 1.7 states that, the autobiographical 
memory function of perspective taking reflects interpersonal simulation, whereas the 
autobiographical memory functions of prospection and counterfactual thinking reflect 
intrapersonal simulation. Table 1 summarizes Chapter 1’s seven hypotheses. 
1.3 Expanding the Simulation Model  
 The next five sections will summarize the following. First, simulation theory will be 
presented and critiqued. Second, the characteristics, theories, and empirical findings with respect 
to simulation processes and long-term memory will be reviewed. The third section will present 
evidence that supports autobiographical memory content as the long-term memory content most 
applicable to simulation-based perspective taking. The fourth section will describe the SMS, then 
adapt it to explain the inner workings of the long-term memory component. The fifth section will 
present the features of the SAC, then propose how it can be integrated into the simulation 
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process model. The SAC will then be mapped onto the SMS to more specifically illustrate the 
neural activation patterns within the long-term memory component that could explain how  
simulation is or is not initiated. 
Simulation Theory  
 A simulator can be thought of as a mechanism that constructs a variety of conditions and 
outcomes tailored to situational constraints and goals (Barsalou, 2003). The ability to simulate is 
considered essential to human evolutionary fitness: Being able to imagine “non-present” 
situations informs decisions and actions when encountering novel environments and 
circumstances (Barsalou, 2003, p. 515). Therefore, to simulate proficiently is a skill. It is the 
ability to successfully integrate contextualized and dynamic “background” (remembered) 
information with imagination to result in appropriate actions or reactions (Barsalou, 2003, p. 
521).  
 Simulation theory by Goldman (2006) posits that simulation is the mechanism through 
which perspective taking is accomplished. Simulation as a means of understanding other minds 
quickly gained traction since it was first proposed by Gordon (1986), and then Heal (1986), and 
again later by Harris (1989), and Goldman (1989, 1992). Around this same time, rival 
“observational” approaches arose in response to critics of simulation theory’s “experiential” 
approach. There are currently two leading observational views: “theory-theory” and “rationality-
teleology theory.” Theory-theory (e.g., Carruthers, 1996; Gopnik & Wellman, 1992) is a folk 
psychology holding that people hypothesize about and logically deduce other minds 
(Churchland, 1991). Although to engage in theory-theory is to mentally manipulate knowledge, 
these manipulations are thought not to involve simulation (Goldman & Shanton, in press). 
Rationality-teleology theory, or just rationality theory, is also a folk psychology that assumes 
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that people are “rational” agents whose observed behaviors can be rationally explained (e.g., 
Dennett, 1987). Rationality theory asserts that people infer others’ mental states through 
simulation, but instead deduce other minds based on social facts and other knowledge (Dennett, 
1987; Goldman & Shanton, in press). One of the criticisms of both theory-theory and rationality 
theory is that to engage in either necessitates considerable conscious mental effort (Goldman, 
2006). Given that perspective taking is assumed to occur frequently in everyday life, the amount 
of psychological and metabolic resources needed to carry out multiple successive thoughtful 
deductions is untenable (Ickes, 2003). Another concern is how and when the “rules and laws” 
that guide such deductions are initially learned, which neither theory has attempted to fully 
explain (Goldman & Shanton, in press). Also, a main premise shared by both theory-theory and 
rationality theory is that self-experience is extraneous to understanding other minds (Goldman & 
Stanton, in press). This assumption is challenged by experimental findings from the 
developmental literature (Goldman & Shanton, in press). For example, although studies show 
that young children can and do conduct simple attributional deductions in line with both theory-
theory and rationality theory (e.g., Goldman, 2006; Nichols & Stich, 2003; Perner, 1996), other 
findings suggest the use of simulation. That is, children who have acquired first-person 
experience in producing a goal behavior are more likely to attribute those same goals to others 
than are children who have not acquired that first-person experience (Sommerville & Woodward, 
2005). Put another way, children who have developed the skill to “re-experience,” or reflect 
upon, a past episode in which he or she met a past goal are more likely to attribute those same 
goals to others than are children who cannot yet reflect on their past episodes. Children who have 
developed the ability to take a first-person perspective are also more proficient in theory of mind 
tasks (Goldman, 2006). However, even though young children are acquiring the skills necessary 
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for simulation—specifically, to self-reflect on past episodes—those younger than four years of 
age are not yet proficient perspective takers (Fuchs, 2012; Selman, 2003). While this is due to 
some extent to children’s nascent neural development, it has been proposed that it is also due to 
deficits in language skills (Fuchs, 2012). Per this hypothesis, for children to become skilled at 
inferring other minds first requires that they engage in real-life interactions—particularly social 
conversation (Fuchs, 2012).  
 The neural pathways associated with both simulation (e.g., Buckner, et al., 2008; Spreng 
& Mar, 2012), autobiographical memory retrieval (e.g., Buckner et al., 2008), and perspective 
taking (Knox, 2010; Perry et al., 2011) are found in the brain’s “default mode network.” The 
default mode network is a system of brain regions responsible for dynamic mental simulations 
that also involve memory and imagination (Buckner et al., 2008; Goldman & Shanton, in press; 
Shanton & Goldman, 2010; Spreng & Grady, 2010; Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009). Neuroimaging 
studies in which subjects are asked to engage in reminiscing (“re-experiencing” the past), 
prospection (“pre-experiencing” the future), counterfactual thinking (“reframing” the past with 
new details), or perspective taking (“recalling” past experiences relevant to inferring an other’s 
mental states), show greater activation across default mode network structures compared to 
baseline, at which time general daydreaming or “mind-wandering” is assumed to occur (Buckner 
et al., 2008). But while the default network appears to be the locus of these related 
functionalities, the recall of event-specific information also activates sensory-response brain 
areas, especially the visual cortex. Decety and Grèzes (2006) recorded brain activation patterns 
of participants who were first exposed to an actual visual experience, then were tasked with 
recollecting a past event. In both cases, the resulting activation patterns in the visual cortex were 
identical. These findings give weight to the idea that simulating a past event results in a 
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subjective, but nonetheless experientially realistic, re-living of that event (Goldman, 2006; 
Decety & Grèzes, 2006; Klein, Cosmides, Tooby, & Chance, 2004; Shanton & Goldman, 2010).  
 To align with recent brain imaging findings, simulation theory posits two experiential 
forms of simulation-based perspective taking: “low-level mind reading” and “high-level mind 
reading.” Low-level mind reading (see Figure 1) is a bottom-up process automatically activated 
when a target triggers an observer’s mirror neuron system, or the human equivalent thereof8 
(Shanton & Goldman, 2010). This preferential activation of motor-perceptual areas reflects the 
sort of responsivity widely characterized as “emotional” empathy⎯i.e., emotional concern and 
personal distress (Davis, 1980, 1983; Decety & Grèzes, 2006; Goldman, 2006). Low-level mind 
reading thus reflects a mechanism by which to infer others’ emotional states, employing stored 
knowledge, but no incorporation of imagination (Goldman, 2006; Shanton & Goldman, 2010). 
Because the objective of the current paper is to expound autobiographical memory’s role in 
perspective taking, low-level mind reading will not be further discussed.  
 In contrast, simulation theory’s high-level mind reading (Goldman, 2006) aligns with the 
Davis (1980, 1983) multidimensional empathy model’s “cognitive” forms of empathy: fantasy 
(the transposing of one’s self imaginatively into the mental states of a fictional character) and 
perspective taking (the ability to adopt the mental state of another). Like low-level mind reading, 
high-level mind reading occurs in response to another or others (Goldman, 2006). However, 
high-level mind reading is a “top down,” rather than “bottom up” process that also involves such 
executive functions as working memory, planning, and decision-making (Buckner & Carroll, 
2006; Decety & Grèzes, 2006; Goldman, 2006). High-level mind reading begins when a 
perspective-taking goal prompts the retrieval of relevant “background information” in the form 
                                                
8 Although some support for human mirror neurons has been reported (e.g., Mukamel, Ekstrom, Kaplan, Iacoboni, 
& Fried, 2010), evidence for human mirror neuron system is almost exclusively generalized from primate study 
findings. 
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of long-term memory content9 (Goldman, 2006; Shanton & Goldman, 2010). The extracted 
memory content can be thought of as “input” for imaginative simulation10—the process by which 
memory content is “re-experienced” as a “genuine” (of the self)  state, then as a “simulated” (“of 
the self on behalf of another) state. From there, a decision about the fitness of the simulated state 
is made, resulting in the attribution (or not) of the simulated state to the other. The completion of 
this attribution is the behavioral outcome of perspective taking. (Shanton & Goldman, 2010). 
The simulation process model for high-level mind reading is depicted in Figure 2.  
 To illustrate11, let us suppose that Zelda feels that Ziggy has been distant in their 
relationship lately, but, out of concern that Ziggy might consider her to be overreacting, decides 
not to bring it up for discussion. Instead, she searches her personal past for episodes in which she 
herself has felt distant in her relationship with Ziggy or others. Having activated the relevant 
memory content in response to her goal (to understand why Ziggy might be distant based on her 
own experiences), the memory is “re-experienced.” As Zelda imaginatively considers both her 
memory and current information about Ziggy’s behavior, Zelda then considers whether any of 
the reasons for which she felt distant and why could also be the source of Ziggy’s distance. She 
realizes that she has most often felt distant in her social relationships when stressed at work. By 
mingling this information of the self imaginatively with information about Ziggy’s behavior, 
                                                
9 Figure 2 depicts the retrieval of content from long-term memory as the initial component in the simulation process 
as proposed by Shanton & Goldman (2010). Because initiation of the simulation process originates from the 
individual about to simulate, this first component is categorized as a “genuine mental state.” In contrast, a 
“simulated mental state” is one that mingles information from the genuine mental state with imagination.  
10 Although the process components that follow the long-term memory component are collectively referred to as 
simulation proper by Goldman (2006) and Shanton & Goldman (2010), for clarity, this paper will use the term 
imaginative simulation to make clear that the simulation process components that follow the long-term memory 
component incorporate imagination. This is in contrast to the simulation proper that occurs during low-level mind 
reading (see Figure 1), which does not make use of imagination. 
11 Note that the narrative example suggests a seriality of events and that are not likely to occur in reality. Rather, 
one might retrieve, then reject, multiple past events before proceeding to the attribution stage. Thus the example is 
meant only to illustrate one of several possible cognitions that could occur at the various stages of the simulation 
process. 
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Zelda has simulated and then attributed a mental state—that he is stressed about work and 
therefore distant—to Ziggy. 
 Simulation theory by Goldman (2006) provides a suitable model in support of Hypothesis 
1⎯that the mechanism underlying perspective taking is mental simulation. However, simulation 
theory only superficially defines the role of long-term memory content in the simulation process. 
Thus, in order to support Hypothesis 1.2—that autobiographical memory content, a sub-form of 
long-term memory content, is more specifically used for perspective taking—the long-term 
memory “component” must be “unpacked” and explained. The following section reviews the 
characteristics of long-term memory that are relevant to its use in simulation-based perspective 
taking. 
Long-Term Memory Component  
  Memory content characterized as “long-term” is assumed to be stored for long periods of 
time (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968). Almost from its beginning as a topic of study, long-term 
memory has been conceptualized as comprising multiple autonomous systems (Willingham & 
Goedert, 2001). Early studies of long-term memory focused on defining taxonomical subsystems 
that supported experimental findings. One of the earliest multisystem theories explained why 
amnesiacs’ motor memory remained intact while memories of facts and events were lost 
(Willingham & Goedert, 2001). The result was the dichotomization of long-term memory into 
“declarative” and “nondeclarative” systems (Cohen & Squire, 1980; Squire & Zola-Morgan, 
1991). Declarative memory was said to be located in the medial temporal lobe, the damage of 
which explained the loss of knowledge-based and episodic memories (Willingham & Goedert, 
2001). Nondeclarative memory, or “skills” memory, was content stored independent of the 
medial temporal lobe, which explained why memories for procedural skills, emotion 
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conditioning, and priming effects were retained (Willingham & Goedert, 2001). Declarative 
memory was later also classified as explicit memory to reflect its use of conscious attention (Graf 
& Schacter, 1985). Nondeclarative memory’s unconscious automaticity led to its further 
classification as implicit memory (Graf & Schacter, 1985). 
 The effects of amnesia prompted other memory researchers to explain the experiential 
properties of declarative memory (Tulving, Schacter, McLachlan, & Moscovich, 1988). The 
primary ways in which a memory can be differentially “re-experienced” recommended the 
“semantic” and “episodic” subsystems (Tulving, 1972, 1983, 1987, 1993, 2002b). Although 
precise definitions have varied over the years, in general, semantic memory content includes 
decontextualized factual knowledge. Episodic memory content includes contextualized 
information that, when remembered, leads to the “re-experiencing” of that memory content. 
Thus, episodic memory prompts the “mental reliving,” or recollection of an event, whereas the 
fact-based nature of semantic autobiographical memory content leads instead to the 
identification, or recognition of that content (Reder et al., 2009). Recent research suggests that, 
although semantic autobiographical memory content reflects general, objective information 
about one’s past and one’s self, if its neural associations with episodic content is strong enough, 
its recall can simultaneously elicit the activation of more specific episodic autobiographical 
memory content (Abrams, Picard, Navarro, & Piolino, 2014).  
Neuroimaging evidence also supports these distinctions. For example, in a study by Rajah 
and McIntosh (2005), subjects who were tasked to retrieve either semantic or episodic memory 
content showed differential patterns of activation depending on which task they were 
performing. However, the interregional correlations between those functional areas were not 
significantly different. This supports the generally accepted account that semantic and episodic 
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memory systems are not so much discrete as they are the end-points of a semantic-episodic 
“continuum,” which allows them to function interdependently (Burianova, McIntosh, & Grady, 
2010; Fitzgerald & Broadbridge, 2012; Greenberg & Verfaellie, 2010; Kihlstrom, 1984; Tulving 
et al., 1988; Tulving, 2001). The interdependence of semantic and episodic memory explains 
why memories have semantic and episodic content “overlap” (Gilboa, 2004). For example, 
traditional taxonomies would deem the concept of “coffee cup”—absent any temporal, 
attributional, or contextual constraints—to be purely semantic information. However, that such 
retrieved content would be fully decontextualized is unlikely (Greenberg & Verfaellie, 2010). If 
asked to recall a “coffee cup,” a number of episodic properties would likely be elicited. Reasons 
why corresponding episodic information would be incorporated in the recall include recency 
(e.g., recalling the cup used that morning), saliency (e.g., recalling the cup dropped and shattered 
that morning), and availability (e.g., recalling a cup that is always sitting on your desk) 
(Greenberg & Verfaellie, 2010). Such findings suggest that the semantic-episodic boundaries are 
blurred. 
 In terms of what form of long-term memory might be activated in response to 
perspective-taking goals, both theory and research, albeit mostly indirect, implicate a reliance on 
declarative memory (Spreng et al., 2009). This is largely because declarative memories can be 
brought into conscious awareness (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997), where the reliving of such 
memory content can be imaginatively applied to the inferring of other minds (Hassabis, Spreng, 
Rusu, Robbins, Mar, & Schacter, 2013). The assumed use of declarative versus nondeclarative 
memory is also something of a default, given that no known findings to date implicate the use of 
nondeclarative memory in perspective taking. That is, with the exception of studies that indicate 
links between perspective taking and implicit attitudes—e.g. that perspective taking can 
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attenuate explicit expressions of implicit racial bias (Todd, Bodenhausen, Richeson, & Galinsky, 
2011). However, such findings provide little evidence for the use of nondeclarative memory 
content to perspective taking for three reasons. One, researchers disagree as to whether implicit 
attitudes should be even characterized as nondeclarative (Roediger, Nairne, Neath, & Surprenant, 
2003). Two, the use of perspective taking as a means of exerting “top-down” control over 
implicit attitudes gives greater weight to the argument that perspective taking involves 
consciousness awareness, which suggests a greater dependency on declarative long-term 
memory. And three, the research that does attempt to understand the relation between 
perspective taking and memory focuses almost exclusively on the involvement of episodic and 
semantic memory forms, both of which are sub-forms of declarative memory (e.g., Rajah & 
McIntosh, 2005; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997).  
 Having summarized the leading views on the sub-forms of long-term memory, some of 
which are with respect to perspective taking specifically, the next section presents and critiques 
findings from theoretical and empirical research that are used to support Hypothesis 1.2⎯that 
autobiographical memory content in particular—rather than long-term memory in general—can 
be used as simulation output for simulation-based perspective taking.  
Autobiographical Memory as a the Long-Term Memory Form 
 Early researchers recognized the role that memories about the self played in defining the 
self (Tulving, 1972). These self memories, or autobiographical memories, when considered in 
aggregate, serve as “resources” of and about the self (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; 
Robinson, 1986). Because autobiographical memory content can be retrieved for conscious re-
experience, it is a sub-function of declarative memory, and thus long-term memory. 
Developmental studies show that the autobiographical memory system emerges in early 
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childhood concurrent with the development of self, language, and other memory forms (Nelson 
& Fivush, 2004). Evolutionarily, the capacity for autobiographical memory provided an adaptive 
advantage (Spreng et al., 2009). Just as selection pressures promoted the evolution of abilities 
that fostered prosocial behaviors—e.g., perspective taking (e.g., Barresi & Moore, 1996; Decety 
& Hamm, 2009; Goldman, 2006)—the ability to recall one’s personal interactions with others 
could also be used to cultivate social accord.  
 Conceptualized initially as something of a “storehouse” for life narratives (Fivush, 
Habermas, Waters, & Zaman, 2011), early theories presumed that autobiographical memory 
content was wholly episodic in nature (Tulving, 1983, 1993). However, as the complexities and 
composition of the self became better understood, it was recognized that autobiographical 
memories feature the same semantic-episodic overlap that general declarative memories do 
(Burianova et al., 2010; Tulving, 2001). The modern take on autobiographical memory is less 
about the taxonomical definitions of semantic versus episodic content, and more about the 
phenomenal experience of remembering (Baddeley, 2001; Brewer, 1996; Tulving, 2001). 
 Although autobiographical memory has been comprehensively studied with respect to 
self, it has been less so with respect to social behaviors (Spreng, 2013). However, interest in this 
area has grown, as has the body of evidence linking the use of autobiographical memory to 
perspectivity—the ability to take both observational and experiential perspectives of the world 
(Fuchs, 2012). For example, a variety of brain studies implicate a shared neuroanatomy located 
within the default network as underlying the capacities of autobiographical memory retrieval and 
first- and third-person perspectivity (Buckner & Carroll, 2006; Spreng et al., 2009; Spreng & 
Grady, 2010; Rabin, Gilboa, Stuss, Mar, & Rosenbaum, 2010). Additionally, those same neural 
pathways are also linked to the ability to mentally integrate the personal (subjective) and 
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interpersonal (objective) information—i.e., the mental simulation of perspectivity (Spreng & 
Mar, 2012). A recent neuroimaging study by Perry et al., (2011) found compelling evidence that 
the hippocampus—a default network memory structure linked to the use, encoding, and 
consolidation of autobiographical memory—is involved in emotional attributions regarding both 
the self and others. After recalling a personal past event, subjects were asked to ascribe to 
themselves an ensuing mental state. Subjects were then asked to attribute mental states to first a 
similar other, then a dissimilar other, both of whom subjects were told also experienced that 
same event. Results showed greater hippocampus activation when subjects inferred the mental 
states of a similar other than when inferring the mind of a target who was dissimilar. This not 
only suggests that perspective takers integrate their internal self-knowledge and personal past 
experiences with knowledge of others onto others, but that a perceived similarity between the 
self and the other elicits an even greater reliance on autobiographical memory content to inform 
the mental attribution than if the perspective taker perceives a dissimilarity between him or 
herself and the target. 
 Evidence that autobiographical memory and perspective taking share the same neural 
architecture supports other phenomenological links between self and other. Autobiographical 
memories can be recalled from a “first-person” or “third-person” perspective. A first person or 
“field” perspective reflects the viewpoint of the individual who experiences an event, whereas . 
A third-person or “observer” perspective reflects the viewpoint of the individual who observes 
the event (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006). It is known that rememberers can fluidly move between 
first- and third-person perspectives within the same recollection either spontaneously or when 
experimentally compelled (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; McIsaac & Eich, 2002; Decety & Grèzes, 
2006). A brain imaging study by Decety and Hamm (2009) showed that when individuals 
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assume others’ perspectives, the neural circuitry underlying both third- and first-person 
experiences are simultaneously activated. But despite the structural overlap that facilitates this 
functional mutuality, the two pathways are nonetheless distinct. These findings help to explain 
how the self “detaches” from simulated states in order to project them onto another (Shanton & 
Goldman, 2010). If the neural circuitry were one and the same for both first- and third- person 
experiences, perspective takers would be unable to “quarantine”—i.e., differentiate—their own 
mental states in order to process those of another (Decety & Hamm, 2009; Shanton & Goldman, 
2010). The neural link between first- and third-person perspectivity capacities, however, also 
suggests that these substrates co-developed (Decety & Hamm, 2009). Such reciprocal 
functionality allows one to re-experience self-knowledge and past events for the purpose of 
predicting the states and behaviors of social others (Perry et al., 2011). Evidence from a variety 
of related literatures shows that a collaborative neural circuitry underlies autobiographical 
memory retrieval (e.g., Buckner et al., 2008), self-projection (e.g., Buckner & Carroll, 2006), 
subjective awareness (e.g., Demertzi, Soddu, Faymonville, Bahri, Gosseries, et al.,  2011), 
simulation (e.g., Buckner, et al., 2008; Spreng & Mar, 2012), and perspective taking (e.g., 
Dodell-Feder et al., 2014; Knox, 2010; Perry et al., 2011). Thus this network of brain regions, 
which support the recollection of personal past experiences, also facilitates imaginatively 
simulating the experiences of other people (Hassabis et al., 2013).  
 The evidence summarized in this section implicating the use of autobiographical memory 
for perspective taking supports Hypothesis 1.2, that autobiographical memory content 
particularly, rather than long-term memory content generally, can be used for perspective taking. 
The current paper has also met Goal 1.1, which was to demonstrate the suitability of mental 
simulation as the mechanism by which autobiographical memory content could be used for 
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perspective taking. To address Goal 1.2, the next section “unpacks” the long-term memory 
component of the simulation process model to illustrate how autobiographical memory content 
might be activated and retrieved for simulation-based perspective taking. Also presented is 
evidence in support of Hypothesis 1.3, which states that the “search and retrieval” procedure 
responsible for activating and extracting autobiographical memory content in response to a  
perspective-taking goal could be explained by an adapted version of the self-memory system 
(Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). 
Self-Memory System  
 For a mechanism to effectively link input to output, its processes must be interlocking 
and synergistic (Klein et al., 2001). Simulation theory by Goldman (2006) and Shanton and 
Goldman (2010) proposes that long-term memory content is imaginatively simulated to produce 
an attribution of another’s mental states. However, simulation theory provides no explanation as 
to how memory content is selected and retrieved in order to serve as simulation input. In support 
of Hypothesis 1.3, the current paper proposes that the extraction of relevant autobiographical 
memory content for simulation purposes can be illustrated with the self-memory system (SMS) 
(Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).  
 The SMS is a conceptual model that was proposed by Conway and Pleydell-Pearce 
(2000), and later Conway (2005) as a means of elucidating how autobiographical memories 
maintain the self. The SMS is comprised of two subsystems⎯the “working self” and the 
“autobiographical knowledge base.” The working self is also a subsystem of working 
memory⎯the memory system responsible for maintaining transitory mental information until 
manipulated, consolidated, and/or discarded (Baddeley, 1988). The working self maintains one’s 
repertoire of self-concepts that ensue from experience. The autobiographical knowledge base 
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stores content encoded as “autobiographical” and makes this content available in support of self-
related goals. The working self and autobiographical knowledge base are independent, but 
reciprocal mechanisms. The working self prompts the autobiographical knowledge base to make 
available those memories associated with a goal-driven, active self-concept. The content of the 
autobiographical knowledge base in turn informs the self-concepts regarding the working self. 
This inherent interdependence of the SMS components allows for the self to be both experiencer 
of experience and the product of the remembered aspects of experience, making the self a 
composite of autobiographical memories (Williams, Conway, & Cohen, 2008). Figure 3 
illustrates the SMS with respect to traditional long-term, declarative, and autobiographical 
memory systems.  
 The subjective evaluation of experience is thought to be the mechanism by which general 
semantic and episodic information is transformed into autobiographical content (Klein, German, 
Cosmides, & Gabriel, 2004). Per Conway & Pleydell-Pearce (2000), once transformed, the SMS 
manages the autobiographical content’s storage and retrieval. Autobiographical memory 
information is organized in the autobiographical knowledge base according to one of three levels 
of specificity: “lifetime periods,” “general events,” and “event-specific knowledge”. Lifetime 
periods are abstract, thematic, and temporal (e.g., high school years; time worked at “X” 
company). Lifetime period content is evaluative information that informs various broad self-
concepts (e.g., “woman,” “student,” “instructor”) (Williams et al., 2008). General events are 
more specific than lifetime periods but still more thematic than detailed (e.g., “learning to drive a 
stick shift car”). Event-specific knowledge is highly detailed and time specific (e.g., “that sunny 
afternoon last August when Ziggy tried to teach me how to drive a stick-shift and I could not get 
the car out of first gear”).  
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 Although levels of specificity is the scheme by which autobiographical content is stored, 
autobiographical information is retrieved in response to goals (Conway, 2005). Goals have been 
shown in a number of experimental studies to be excellent memory cues (Barsalou, 1988). 
According to Conway (2005), goals that cue the retrieval of autobiographical memory content 
are managed by the goal hierarchy of the working self. Per the SMS, an active goal triggers the 
goal hierarchy, which prompts the working self to activate a self-concept that in some way 
corresponds to that goal. The activation of the self-concept triggers the autobiographical 
knowledge base to make available for retrieval content consistent with the active self-concept 
(Williams et al., 2008). Such content may consist of semantic self-knowledge, episodic 
experiences, or hybrid mixtures of both (Conway, 2005; Williams et al., 2008). For example if an 
individual has the goal of being a socially acceptable “friend,” the goal hierarchy will activate 
the individual’s “friend” self-concept. This will then prompt pertinent semantic and episodic 
content linked to the “friend” self-concept. In theory, complex goals can elicit multiple self-
concepts, each linked to autobiographical content featuring different levels of specificity and 
myriad semantic-episodic blends (Williams et al., 2008).  
 Related research suggests that the self-concept activated by a perspective-taking goal 
might be the product of those experiences that the perspective taker presumes are being 
experienced by the target other; that is, the perspective taker’s perceived similarity to the target 
other will inform self-concept selection. For example, Ickes (2003) reported that men were more 
accurate perspective takers when the target other was a friend of at least a year and was 
perceived to possess a similar level (low, moderate, or high) of trait sociability. Likewise, Perry 
et al. (2011) found that individuals making emotional attributions of others’ mental states had 
greater hippocampal activation when perspective taker perceived the target other as being similar 
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to him- or herself, and less activation when the target was perceived as dissimilar. It therefore 
follows that the more similar a perspective taker perceives him- or herself to be to the target 
other, the more that perspective taker relies on autobiographical memory content to inform 
attributions. This appears to be the case when the perspective taker perceives the target other to 
be similar to themselves characteristically—as was found by Ickes and Perry et al.—or even 
experientially (Gaesser & Schacter, 2014). Although external factors like social context and 
knowledge about the other certainly inform perspective-taking goals (Ickes, 2003), simulation-
based perspective taking relies preferentially on autobiographical memory content to inform 
inferences about others’ minds. 
 Thus, in support of Hypothesis 1.3, the current paper argues that the SMS (Conway, 
2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) provides a possible account of what occurs “”within the 
long-term memory component to both activate and retrieve relevant autobiographical memory 
content in fulfillment of a perspective-taking goal. Thus, Goal 1.2—the “unpacking” of the long-
term memory component to reveal the SMS—has been met. Hypothesis 1.3 is further supported 
by having demonstrated that the SMS explains how autobiographical memory of various form 
and detail is preferentially retrieved in service of a perspective-taking goal. The next section 
further “unpacks” the long-term memory component to reveal the memory activation protocol 
driving simulation activation or inhibition. 
Source Activation Confusion Model 
 Although never explicitly asserted, simulation theory implies that the retrieval of long-
term memory “background information” initiates simulation. The high-level mind reading model 
(see Figure 2) shows that the simulation process requires content from long-term memory, which 
is imaginatively reframed such that one’s own “re-experience” of that content is, to some degree, 
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then attributed to the target other (Shanton & Goldman, 2010). Because the current paper argues 
that the most plausible form of long-term memory content used for perspective taking is 
autobiographical memory content, the SMS (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), 
which explains both how and why autobiographical memory content could be activated and 
retrieved, was used to support this contention. However, the SMS was not designed to explain 
the “search and retrieve” procedure that might occur at the neural level: Missing are the 
cognitive “commands” that could prompt the instigation of simulation upon the extraction of 
autobiographical memory content. Such commands could be provided by a computational 
cognitive mode. 
 The purpose of computational cognitive modeling is to expound the details of conceptual 
cognitive models via algorithmic descriptions (Sun, 2008). These algorithmic descriptions 
typically include such elements as variables, mathematical equations, and power functions (e.g., 
f(x) = xa) (Sun, 2008). Imputing a set of computer-like rules onto a conceptual model enables the 
quantification of the conditions and constraints that govern the model’s operation (Sun, 2008). 
Computational models are meant to figuratively describe these operations at the neural level 
(Reder et al., 2009). 
 Candidate computational models for the current paper needed to be able to explain how 
the extraction of autobiographical memories relevant to a perspective-taking goal could be 
extracted by the SMS to instigate (or not instigate) the simulation process. An effective exemplar 
for this purpose is the source activation confusion (SAC) model as proposed in Reder et al. 
(2002) and Reder et al. (2009). The SAC is a nodal network model of memory encoding and 
retrieval. Originally designed to explain the interdependence between explicit and implicit 
memory systems, it has also been used to model a variety of memory phenomena driven by 
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neural activation (e.g., Buchler & Reder, 2007; Cary & Reder, 2003; Diana, Peterson, & Reder, 
2004; Diana & Reder, 2005; Reder, Angstadt, Cary, Erickson, & Ayers, 2002; Reder et al., 2002; 
Reder, Oates, Dickison, Anderson, Gyulai, Quinlan, & et al., 2007; Reder, Nhouyvanisvong, 
Schunn, Ayers, Angstadt, & Hiraki, 2000; Reder & Ritter, 1992; Reder & Schunn, 1996; 
Schunn, Reder, Nhouyvanisvong, Richards, & Stroffolino, 1997). Especially important to the 
current paper is the SAC’s ability to account for the functional interdependence known to occur 
between semantic and episodic memory systems.  
 Reder et al. (2002) and Reder et al., (2009) posit that, based on the subjective experience 
at the time of encoding, memory content is neurally instantiated in either a concept (semantic) 
node or an episode node. Each concept node contains the features and qualities—i.e., content—
of a single concept (e.g., “dog”), whereas each episode node contains content about a single 
event (e.g., “purchasing Rover from the pound”). Every episode node is connected to both 
“general” or “specific” context nodes. General context nodes contain generic, gist-like 
information common to multiple events (e.g., “school,” “home”). General context nodes are 
bound to multiple episodes. The array of bindings attached to any single episode nodes is 
referred to as that episode node’s contextual fan. Specific context nodes embody high detail and 
emotional valence; but because their content is unique to a single event, they are bound only to 
its corresponding episode node. Concept and episode nodes can also be bound such that 
semantic-episodic overlap can occur. However, no direct connections occur between concept and 
context nodes, even if the content of the concept node is relevant to the content housed in a 
connected episode node. Rather, episode nodes serve as intermediaries through which concepts 
and contexts are linked. Although concept and context nodes have no direct connections, they 
can influence the activation of one another by way of spreading activation through the 
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intermediary episode nodes—but only if the spreading activation is strong enough to facilitate 
such.  
 Reder et al. (2002) and Reder et al. (2009) posit that the activation of a network’s nodes 
and bindings can be predicted by three equations meant to computationalize the SAC’s primary 
processes. Equation 1 (B = BW + cNΣti−dN) reflects the activation strength or activation decay 
from the baseline activation of the implicated nodes and bindings. According the SAC, B = 
baseline activation, BW = base-level activation of the node; cN = strength of node; dN = decay of 
activation of node (by constant); and ti = time since the ith presentation. Equation 1 states that 
nodal activation is the summation of both the strength of the direct activation and the strength of 
the node’s baseline level. Factors that can impact baseline activation include the repetition of an 
experience or a recall of the memory over time.  
 Equation 2 (Ss,r = cLΣti−dL) reflects the binding strength or binding decay of the 
connections between nodes over time. Per the SAC, Ss,r = strength of link from node s to node r; 
ti is time since ith association between the two nodes; cL = strength of link; and dL = decay of 
link strength. Similar to what occurs with the activation of nodes, binding strength increases with 
repeated experiential exposure, but decays from disuse as a function of time. Equation 2 asserts 
that, even if nodal baseline and direct activation levels are high, binding strength can promote or 
inhibit subordinate activation. The strength of the network’s spreading activation is dictated by 
 Equation 3 (ΔAr = Σ(As × Ss,r/ΣSs,I). Per the SAC, ΔAr = change in activation of the 
receiving node; As = activation of each source node s; Ss,r = strength of the link between nodes r 
and s; and ΣSs,I = sum of strengths of all links emanating from the node s (the fan). Thus the 
more radiating bindings a general context node has, the more its attendant episode nodes will 
“compete” for subordinate activation. For example, if the general context is “school,” multiple 
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and varied episodes such as, “having taken the stats test last week,” having lunch with classmate 
Zelda yesterday,” and “riding the bus to campus” are linked. Per spreading activation (Equation 
3), episode nodes that have higher baseline activation levels (per Equation 1) and/or stronger 
bindings (per Equation 2), will be preferentially activated.  
 The SAC (Reder et al., 2002; Reder et al., 2009) equations permit predictions about what 
memory content will be activated, and thus whether or not a memory will be “re-experienced.” 
Per Reder et al. (2009), the SAC posits that nodal activation elicits one of two assessment 
processes leading to either “recognition” or “recollection.” When a goal necessitates the 
activation of factual, knowledge-based, conceptual (semantic) content, a concept node is 
preferentially activated, which results in the assessment process of recognition. The recognition 
assessment process leads to such outcomes as identification, knowing, or believing. Because the 
nature of a concept node’s content is informational, recognition does not lead to “re-
experience”—for example, one cannot “re-experience” a friend’s name.  
 However, when a goal requires that memory content be “re-experienced” for its event and 
contextual properties—for example, to “re-experience one’s own mental states during the 
arranging of a funeral in order to understand a target other’s grief during a similar event—an 
episode node is preferentially activated. The assessment process that ensues from the activation 
of an episode node is called recollection. The recollection assessment process results in the 
outcomes related to remembering—or what the current paper has termed elsewhere as 
reminiscence. The computational rules of the SAC ensure that the triggering of an assessment 
processes is a result of either direct, or predominant, activation of the relevant node type. That is, 
if the activation of a concept node containing a friend’s name information has, as a result of 
experience (for example, having recently helped the friend through a crisis), also caused the 
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development of strong bindings to particular episode nodes, the activation of the “name” concept 
node could prompt activation of the episode node. If a goal then became a need to understand the 
friend’s mental states, the activated episode node could result in recollection. In this way, the 
SAC model and equations account for the occurrence of semantic-episodic overlap. Figure 4 
depicts the elemental components of the SAC’s nodal network.  
 In addition to the SAC explaining the semantic-episodic overlap known to occur with 
respect to the “re-experience” of autobiographical memory content (Burianova et al., 2010; 
Gilboa,  2004; Fitzgerald & Broadbridge, 2012; Greenberg & Verfaellie, 2010; Kihlstrom, 1984; 
Tulving, 2001; Tulving et al., 1988), the current paper argues that the SAC’s assessment 
processes align with the need for  imaginative simulation in order to fulfill a goal—or not. 
Simulation theory by Goldman (2006) and Shanton and Goldman (2010) for perspective taking 
posits that extracted memory content serves as “input” for the “re-experiencing” of a “genuine” 
(of the self)  state, which is then as a “simulated” (“of the self on behalf of another) state. When 
the goal is identification—e.g., remembering someone’s name—the nature of the relevant 
memory content is semantic. Thus the concept node housing the relevant semantic memory 
content is activated, which prompts the assessment process of recognition. The current paper 
argues that recognition does not necessitate the use of imagination because semantic information 
cannot be “re-experienced”—thus such goals do not utilize imaginative simulation. Rather, the 
extraction of the semantic information results in such non-experiential behavioral outcomes as 
identification, knowing, or believing. Figure 5 illustrates the simulation process model (into 
which the SMS and SAC have been incorporated) when an identification goal triggers the 
assessment process of recognition. 
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 Contrarily, when a goal is to use one’s past experiences in the service of understanding 
another’s mental states, the memory content needed is episodic, which is required in order to “re-
experience” a past experience. Because episodic memory content is housed in an episode node 
(and its corresponding context nodes),  the assessment process that ensues, according to the SAC, 
is recollection. The current paper posits that recollection in response to a perspective-taking goal 
does require simulation, thus employing imaginative simulation. Figure 6 illustrates the 
simulation process model (with the SMS and SAC components) when a perspective-taking goal 
triggers the assessment process of recollection. The current paper specifies the recollection 
process further by arguing that, when perspective taking is the goal, the specific form of episodic 
long-term memory content subject to the recollection assessment process—and thus the memory 
content that undergoes simulation—is autobiographical. As argued in the previous section, the 
search and retrieval of autobiographical memory content in response to a perspective-taking goal 
follows the procedures outlined by the SMS (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). 
 Although no other known study has adapted the SAC (Reder et al., 2002; Reder et al., 
2009) for a purpose similar to that of the current paper, indirect evidence from related lines of 
research advocates its integration into the simulation theory process model (Goldman, 2006; 
Shanton & Goldman, 2010) for perspective taking. For example, a recent observational study by 
Gaesser and Schacter (2014) investigated the cognitive mechanisms underlying prosocial 
tendencies, perspective taking, semantic retrieval, episodic remembering, and episodic 
simulation (constructive imagining). Results showed a link between the willingness to infer the 
thoughts and feelings of others and episodic remembering and simulation, but not to semantic 
retrieval. Although this study did not examine the role of memory in the facilitation of 
perspective taking explicitly, it aligns with brain data showing these same cognitions are 
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underlain by shared neural systems (Buckner et al., 2008; Decety & Hamm, 2009; Saxe & 
Kanwisher, 2003; Shanton & Goldman, 2010). Additionally, in a study by Saxe and Kanwisher 
(2003), participants were tasked to infer a target other’s thoughts and feelings. Brain scans of the 
participants showed concurrent neural activation in the overlapping pathways associated with 
episodic memory retrieval and theory of mind. However, during a task in which participants 
were asked to retrieve strictly semantic memory content, the pathway associated with memory 
retrieval was again activated, but the pathway associated with theory of mind was not. Although 
these studies do not rule out the use of semantic episodic memory content in fulfillment of a 
perspective-taking goal, findings do suggests a predominance episodic memory content.  
 Thus in support of Hypothesis 1.4—that simulation occurs in response to heightened 
neural activation of predominantly episodic memory content as predicted by the SAC—the 
augmentation of the simulation process model with the incorporation of the SAC can be used to 
explain how episodic memory content is activated and retrieved in response to a goal 
necessitating the “re-experience” of a personal past event. When used to support the “search and 
retrieval” of autobiographical memory content specifically as delineated by the SMS (Conway, 
2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), the SAC can explain how, at the neural level, 
autobiographical episodic memory content specifically, rather than episodic long-term memory 
content generally, can be used for simulation-based perspective taking.  
1.4 Expanded Simulation Model 
 Figure 6 illustrates the integration of simulation theory’s simulation process model, the 
SMS, and the SAC, which together yields the current paper’s proposed Expanded Simulation 
Model of perspective taking.  (see Figure 6). The Expanded Simulation Model was developed for 
the current paper to demonstrate how autobiographical memory content specifically, rather than 
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long-term memory content generally, could be used for perspective taking. In so doing, the 
Expanded Simulation Model provides a potential theoretical framework for the autobiographical 
memory function of perspective taking, for which empirical evidence was reported by Ranson 
and Fitzgerald (in preparation). The development of the Expanded Simulation Model was 
necessary because, although indirect evidence implicating the use of autobiographical memory 
for perspective taking has been reported in a variety of related literatures, to date, no direct 
theoretical model predicting the existence of the autobiographical memory function of 
perspective taking has been extended. The Expanded Simulation Model proposes that the 
mechanism by which autobiographical memory is used for perspective taking is mental 
simulation as presented by simulation theory (Goldman, 2006; Shanton & Goldman, 2010). 
 A recent revision to simulation theory for perspective taking by Shanton and Goldman 
(2010) posited that simulation could also serve as the mechanism by which long-term memory 
content is used for mental time travel. If, by extension, the Expanded Simulation Model could be 
adapted to show how autobiographical memory content could be used for mental time travel, 
then the Expanded Simulation Model would provide theoretical justification for the existence of 
the autobiographical memory function of mental time travel. The following sections explore the 
utility of the Expanded Simulation Model by using it to explain how autobiographical memory 
content could be used for simulation-based mental time travel.  
Using the Expanded Simulation Model to Explain Other Simulation Phenomena 
 Shanton and Goldman (2010) recently proposed a revision to simulation theory to include 
not only the “re-experience” of long-term memory content for the purpose of perspective-taking, 
but to posit that the “re-experiencing” of long-term episodic memory content was itself was a 
form of mental time travel. That is, when one simulates episodic memory content in order to “re-
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experience” that content, one is essentially traveling back through conceptual time to 
subjectively re-live that memory. Contingently, in keeping with theory and findings from various 
literatures regarding mental time travel (e.g., Schacter & Addis, 2007; Schacter & Addis, 2009; 
Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2008), Shanton and Goldman also posited that simulation is the 
mechanism by which long-term episodic memory content is “pre-experienced.” That is, when 
one uses episodic memory content in order to imagine a future scenario, one is subjectively 
projecting oneself forward through conceptual time.  
 As such, simulation theory appears to explicitly support three simulation-based 
behavioral outcomes: reminiscence (to “re-experience” long-term episodic memory content in 
order to give the remember the sense that the past events are veridical accounts of the original 
experience) (Tulving & Markowitsch, 1998), perspective taking (to “re-experience” long-term 
episodic memory content in order to imaginatively reframe it to reflect another’s perspective), 
and prospection (to “pre-experience” long-term episodic memory content for the purpose of 
imagining future scenarios) (e.g., Schacter & Addis, 2007; Schacter et al., 2008). However, the 
current paper posits that a fourth behavioral outcome occurs as a result of imaginatively 
simulating episodic long-term memory content: counterfactual thinking. Counterfactual thinking 
is the act of imaginatively “reframing” past episodes such that the conditions and outcomes of 
the simulated counterfactual are contrary to those that actually occurred (Gavanski & Wells, 
1989; Roese & Olson, 1995).  
 In addition to proposing a fourth behavioral outcome of the simulation of long-term 
episodic memory content, Hypothesis 1.5 of the current paper states that autobiographical 
episodic memory content specifically, rather than long-term episodic memory content generally, 
can also be used when the goal is to mentally travel back through time to reminisce and generate 
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counterfactuals, and forward through time when engaging in prospection. Thus the incorporation 
of the procedures outlined by the SMS (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) and 
the SAC (Reder et al., 2002; Reder et al., 2009) for the simulation process of perspective taking 
can be likewise incorporated when the simulation process results in reminiscence, prospection, 
and counterfactual thinking.  
 Further, just as evidence of the use of autobiographical memory content for perspective 
taking supports the existence of an autobiographical memory function of perspective taking, 
Hypothesis 1.6 states that, should autobiographical memory content be shown to inform 
prospection and counterfactual thinking, then such would be evidence for the existence of the 
autobiographical memory function of prospection and the autobiographical memory function of 
counterfactual thinking. Because research on autobiographical memory functions has,  to date, 
focused largely on the various reminiscence behaviors believed to be reflected in  
autobiographical memory functions (e.g., Bluck et al., 2005; Bluck & Alea, 2001; Kulkofsky & 
Koh, 2009; Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation; Webster, 1995, 1997), the current paper is not 
concerned with yielding evidence for an autobiographical memory function of reminiscence. 
 The contention that mental time travel involves the mental simulation of autobiographical 
memory content is well supported by brain evidence. For example, neuroimaging studies show 
that the default network is activated during autobiographical episodic memory retrieval 
(reminiscence) tasks (e.g., Buckner et al., 2008; Ino, Nakai, Azuma, Kimura, & Fukuyama,  
2011), as well as during prospection tasks (Schacter & Addis, 2009) and counterfactual thinking 
tasks (e.g., De Brigard, Addis, Ford, Schacter, & Giovanello, 2013; Epstude & Roese, 2008). 
The default network has also been broadly implicated in such directly related “experiential” 
cognitions as perspective taking (e.g., Dodell-Feder et al., 2014; Hassabis et al., 2013), 
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perspectivity (e.g., Spreng & Mar, 2012), self-projection (e.g., Buckner & Carroll, 2006); 
subjective awareness (e.g., Demertzi et al., 2011), and mental simulation (e.g., Buckner & 
Carroll, 2006; Spreng et al., 2009).  
 Figure 7 illustrates a possible simulation process model for mental time travel 
(reminiscence, prospection,  and counterfactual thinking) adapted from simulation theory’s 
process for high-level mind reading (perspective taking). The proposed simulation process model 
for mental time travel assumes that the simulation process would behave similarly to that of 
perspective taking, with the two primary differences. The first would be the goal—for example, 
to imagine a future scenario rather than infer another’s mental states. The second would be the 
behavioral outcome—for example, prospection. This assumption is plausible given related 
research. For example, studies on autobiographical planning⎯the planning and anticipation of 
personally relevant future goals⎯show that autobiographical memory is vital to this task (Baird, 
Smallwood, & Schooler, 2011). Multiple studies exploring the neural substrates involved in 
future thinking have found extensive evidence for default network activation consistent with that 
for autobiographical memory (Buckner, 2009; D’Argembeau, Renaud, & Van der Linden, 2009; 
Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007; Spreng & Grady, 2010; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; 
Tulving, 2005). In fact, no argument countering the use of autobiographical memory for 
prospection could be found. With respect to counterfactual thinking, a recent study by De 
Brigard et al. (2013) tasked participants to generate counterfactuals while undergoing functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Results showed that the more realistic the counterfactual, 
the more likely that the areas of the brain associated with autobiographical memory were co-
activated with brain areas associated with counterfactual thinking. This suggests that, the less 
37 
	
realistic the counterfactual, the more that the counterfactual depended upon, and was thus a 
product of, imaginative simulation.  
 With respect to the “unpacking” of the Expanded Simulation Model’s long-term memory 
component to show the SMS (Conway, 2005; Conway, Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) and the SAC 
(Reder et al., 2009), the current paper contends that the procedures responsible for activating and 
retrieving autobiographical memory content relevant to a perspective- taking goal would be 
applicable when the goal is mental time travel. If the goal is prospection, the activation of the 
goal prompts the activation of the self-concept most applicable to reimagining a particular future 
scenario. The autobiographical memory content form (episodic and semantic), and level of 
specificity (lifetime period, general event, and event-specific knowledge) made available by the 
autobiographical knowledge base would be that which is associated with both the activated self-
concept and in fulfillment of the prospection goal. The retrieved content thus becomes the input 
for the simulation of an imagined future scenario. The SAC then provides the equations 
necessary to predict what form of autobiographical memory content would be preferentially 
activated for prospection or counterfactual thinking at the neural level in response to the 
prospection goal (Reder et al., 2009).  
 To illustrate: If the goal necessitated the remembering of “future facts” (e.g., what a 
woman’s last name might become after marriage), or “counterfactual facts” (e.g., what a 
woman’s last name would have been if she had married James Dean), the relevant concept 
(semantic) node would be preferentially activated. The assessment process that ensued would be 
recognition. Because semantic information cannot be “re-experienced,” simulation would not 
ensue; rather, the behavioral outcome would be identification. If, however, “pre-experiencing” a 
future event (e.g., my friend’s upcoming wedding), the autobiographical memory content 
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required would be episodic, thus the prospection goal would activate the episode node(s) within 
which experiences of other attended weddings would be predominately activated. This would 
prompt the assessment process of recollection, which requires simulation. Figure 8 shows the 
complete Expanded Simulation Model, which comprises the SMS and SAC, and shows the 
shared and independent pathways of the simulation process that result in the simulation-based 
behavioral outcomes of perspective taking, reminiscence, prospection, and counterfactual 
thinking. 
 Just as evidence from the literature supports the Expanded Simulation Model, the 
Expanded Simulation Model could be used to explain other phenomena. For example, it is 
known that the phenomenological richness of memory outputs is a function of time. That is, 
greater detail is reported in recollections of the autobiographical past events when the distance 
between that past event and the present is short (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004). This 
same effect is seen with prospection in that distant future scenarios feature lower degrees of 
specificity and valence than do imaginings about near-future events (D’Argembeau & Van der 
Linden, 2004). The principles of the SMS in the context of the Expanded Simulation Model 
predict that specific events and their details are forgotten over time unless they remain relevant 
to a goal and/or its associated self-concept (Conway, 2005). Unless repeatedly re-experienced, 
details of past events will be lost, even if the general or lifetime period details remain (Conway, 
2005). As autobiographical memory content informs both the imaginative “re-experiencing” and 
“pre-experiencing” of events, the attenuated level of specificity of the distant memories 
themselves, which would then become simulation input, would be reflected in the simulated 
inferred outcomes of mental time travel. The SAC dictates that the episode node in which the 
event content is stored is activated predominately, followed by attendant context nodes. If 
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activation is sufficient, linked concept nodes will be subordinately activated. If the bindings 
between the activated episode node and its attendant concept and context nodes have decayed 
from disuse over time, the autobiographical knowledge base will have fewer detail-containing 
nodes to make available for retrieval.  
 The current paper has therefore shown how the Expanded Simulation Model might be 
used to explain not only perspective taking, but also three forms of mental time travel—
reminiscence12, prospection, and counterfactual thinking. This then supports Hypothesis 1.6—
that, because prospection and counterfactual utilize content from autobiographical memory, 
prospection and counterfactual thinking are functions of autobiographical memory.  
 Finally, the current paper contends that the Expanded Simulation Model supports the 
Shanton and Goldman (2010) assertion that perspective taking and mental time travel are served 
by two distinct forms of simulation. That is, because the goal of perspective taking is other-
directed, the form of simulation used in service of that goal is interpersonal simulation. 
Contrarily, because the goal of mental time travel is self-directed, the form of simulation used to 
meet that such goals is intrapersonal simulation. By extension, because the current paper has 
demonstrated the theoretical plausibility of the autobiographical memory functions of 
perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking, the Expanded Simulation Model 
therefore supports Hypothesis 1.7: that the autobiographical memory function of perspective 
taking reflects interpersonal simulation, whereas the autobiographical memory functions of 
prospection and counterfactual thinking reflect intrapersonal simulation. Figure 8 illustrates the 
interpersonal and intrapersonal simulation pathways within the complete Expanded Simulation 
Model. Table 1 provides a summary of Chapter 1’s seven hypotheses. 
                                                
12 As stated earlier, because reminiscence behaviors have been established elsewhere as being functions of 
autobiographical memory, the current paper is not concerned with hypothesizing the existence of an 
autobiographical memory function of reminiscence. Its inclusion is only to make clear it was not overlooked. 
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1.5 Discussion 
In Support of Goals and Hypotheses  
 The primary objective of the current paper was to theoretically substantiate the existence 
of the autobiographical memory function of perspective taking, for which empirical evidence 
was reported by Ranson and Fitzgerald (in preparation). To accomplish, four goals and seven 
hypotheses were extended in support of that objective. In support of Hypothesis 1.1, the 
mechanism by which autobiographical memory content could be used for the purpose of 
perspective taking was posited to be mental simulation according to simulation theory (Goldman, 
2006; Shanton & Goldman, 2010). Because simulation theory stipulates only that long-term 
memory content is the “input” for the simulation process, the current paper argued that episodic 
autobiographical memory content specifically, rather than long-term memory content generally, 
can be used for perspective taking.  
 The current paper proposed that the simulation process model by Goldman (2006) and 
Shanton and Goldman (2010) be integrated with two conceptual models in order to explain the 
use of autobiographical memory content for perspective taking at finer levels of organization. 
Hypotheses 1.3 was supported through the incorporation of the SMS (Conway, 2005; Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) offered a possible explanation for how episodic autobiographical memory 
content could be activated and retrieved in response to a perspective-taking goal. The 
incorporation of the SAC (Reder et al., 2002; Reder et al., 2009) computational model supported 
Hypothesis 1.4 by providing a potential account of how the activation of episodic 
autobiographical memory content occurs at the neural level.  
 The result was the proposed Expanded Simulation Model, which was then used to explain 
the current paper’s Hypothesis 1.5, that use of episodic autobiographical memory content for 
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mental time travel—operationalized herein as prospection and counterfactual thinking—in 
keeping with recent revisions to simulation theory by Shanton and Goldman. This argument 
supported the current paper’s Hypothesis 1.6, that, in addition to perspective taking, prospection 
and counterfactual thinking are also functions of autobiographical memory. Finally, in alignment 
with Shanton and Goldman’s contention that perspective taking involves interpersonal 
simulation, whereas mental time travel involves intrapersonal simulation, the current paper 
demonstrated how the Expanded Simulation Model accounts for this dual-path simulation 
process hypothesis. This supported Hypothesis 1.7, which states that the autobiographical 
memory function of perspective taking reflects interpersonal simulation, and that the 
autobiographical memory functions of prospection and counterfactual thinking reflect 
intrapersonal simulation. 
Novel Findings and Future Directions 
 That the Expanded Simulation Model supports the existence of the autobiographical 
memory function of perspective taking (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation) is important for a 
number of reasons. Perspective taking is known to be a critical social skill from both 
evolutionary (Barsalou, 2003; Barresi & Moore, 1996; Decety & Hamm, 2009) and everyday 
perspectives (Goldman, 2006; Ickes, 2003; Winner, 2000). Therefore, having a clear 
understanding of the specific form of memory content used as simulation input may guide efforts 
to determine the factors that lead to successful versus unsuccessful perspective taking. It may 
also inform theoretical investigation into the extent to which these capacities co-evolved.  
 The Expanded Simulation Model is also important in that it addresses possible remedies 
to some key deficiencies of simulation theory by Goldman (2006) and Shanton and Goldman 
(2010). For example, to provide better descriptive and explanatory power to the superficially 
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defined “background information” component of simulation theory’s simulation process model, 
the current paper proposed the integration of two conceptual models.  The current paper then 
supported the incorporation of these models with examples from such related literatures as 
neuroimaging, cognitive neuroscience, and cognitive, social, and developmental psychology. As 
a result, the current paper has offered novel applications of the SMS (Conway, 2005; Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) and the SAC (Reder et al., 2002; Reder et al., 2009), which may also 
inspire other researchers to seek innovative ways to adapt and use these conceptual models. 
 The extension of simulation theory by Shanton and Goldman (2010) to explain mental 
time travel made possible the current paper’s theoretical substantiation of new everyday uses of 
autobiographical memory by way of the Expanded Simulation Model. This suggests there may 
be other simulation-based phenomena—whether informed by autobiographical memory content 
specifically or not—for which the Expanded Simulation Model might serve as a theoretical 
framework. 
 The current paper could also encourage quests for new autobiographical memory 
functions. The CRS-A, which was the instrument with which the autobiographical memory 
function of perspective taking was found, situates its items within the social context of joint 
reminiscence. It is therefore possible that the detection of the perspective taking function 
necessitated such a context. That the scale from which the CRS-A was adapted—the CRS 
(Kulkofsky & Koh, 2009)—also employed the joint reminiscence context, but did not detect the 
perspective taking function. This is likely due to developmental differences between the target 
population for the CRS (young children) versus the target population of the CRS-A (adults), the 
former of which have yet acquired the ability to infer others’ mental states (e.g., Beck et al., 
2011; Fuchs, 2012; McHugh & Stewart, 2012; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Selman, 2003). Thus 
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future studies should develop functions scales that differentially operationalize perspective 
taking—e.g., without the joint reminiscence context—in order to discern the influence of 
situating items within a social, or other, settings.  
 There are also related lines of research that the Expanded Simulation Model might 
inform. One example is empathic accuracy—the proficiency with which one infers another’s 
thoughts and feelings (Ickes, 2003). Of interest might be whether the frequency with which 
individuals use autobiographical memory content for perspective taking predicts empathic 
accuracy. If yes, such results would suggest that the more individuals rely on their own past 
experiences to infer other minds, the better their chances of successful perspective taking. 
However, if results showed that people were more empathically accurate when using 
autobiographical memory for the purpose of perspective taking less frequently, such would 
imply that too much reliance on past experience precludes the ability to consider a target other’s 
unique circumstances, personality, and response to situations experienced by the perspective 
taker.  
 Future research might also consider the cultural effects of simulation. For example, it is 
known that the development of autobiographical memory is socialized differentially across 
cultures (Nelson & Fivush, 2002). It is also known that sharing memories with others is a prime 
social activity that varies among cultures (Nelson, 1988; Wang, 2013). Thus differences in the 
capacity or proficiency to perspective take may be influenced by memory processes and content, 
each of which varies across cultural contexts.  
Limitations 
 Although the primary objective, goals, and hypotheses of the current paper were met, 
gaps in the relevant literatures limited the support available for the Expanded Simulation Model, 
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potentially impacting both the validity of the model and the viability of the conclusions drawn 
from it. For one, besides the evidence for the perspective taking function reported by Ranson and 
Fitzgerald (in preparation), no other direct theoretical or empirical evidence corroborating the 
perspective taking function’s existence has been reported. Likewise, although some research 
characterizes the broad Directive autobiographical memory function as concerning the directing 
of present and future thoughts and actions (Williams et al., 2008)—a definition that foreshadows 
the existence of the autobiographical memory function of prospection—no study to date has 
established prospection as a self-contained function. And while some existing autobiographical 
memory functions scales measure the use of autobiographical memory for the explicit functions 
of emotion regulation and behavioral control (e.g., Kulkofsky & Koh, 2009; Ranson & 
Fitzgerald, in preparation), none specifically address the use of autobiographical memory for the 
emotion coping strategy of counterfactual thinking. As such, evidence used to support the 
Expanded Simulation Model, and thus the autobiographical memory functions of perspective 
taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking, is indirect.   
 Secondly, given the extent to which indirect evidence was necessarily used to support the 
Expanded Simulation Model, some conceptual leaps were necessary. In particular, simulation 
theory posits that simulation is triggered by the retrieval of memory input, but does not explain 
how this occurs. This seems a rather considerable omission, given that not all content retrieved 
from long-term memory is appropriate for simulation, nor is all appropriate content necessarily 
subjected to simulation. Thus the current paper attempted to address this explanatory deficiency 
with the activation protocols of the SMS (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) and 
SAC (Reder et al., 2002; Reder et al., 2009), primarily by implicating the activation of episodic 
autobiographical memory content—in response to a perspective taking or mental time travel 
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goal—as the simulation trigger. However, both the SMS and SAC models are themselves largely 
supported by indirect evidence, and had not been previously used to describe the finer levels of 
organization within a superordinate system as was done in the current paper. Thus the argument 
could be made that adaptation of either model for novel applications might attenuate the 
explanatory power of either model’s supporting evidence.  
 Another possible criticism could be that, while the SMS supports a constructivist 
approach (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), the SAC (Reder et al., 2002; Reder 
et al., 2009), which the current paper incorporates into the SMS, does not. That is, the SMS is 
founded on the idea that past episodes and their contextual details are organized as coherent 
narratives that result from the co-constructions of past events (Holland & Kensinger, 2010)—
first in early childhood with primary caregivers (Fivush & Reese, 1992; Fivush, Haden, & Reese, 
1996; Nelson & Fivush, 2002, 2004), then later through reflection and social interaction 
(Habermas & Bluck, 2000). However, although the SAC does not explicitly address episodic 
memory “co-construction,” no evidence in support of the SMS or SAC suggested a manifest 
incompatibility. But the current paper’s incorporation of the SMS and SAC into paradigms like 
the Expanded Simulation Model should prompt developers to consider other frameworks within 
which these models might be used, and expand their adaptability accordingly.  
 Finally, the Expanded Simulation Model is but a single theoretical argument for the 
existence of the perspective taking function; alternative explanations are possible. making 
empirical replication vital. 
1.6 Next Steps  
Having demonstrated the theoretical plausibility of the Expanded Simulation Model, the 
next step is to test its empirical integrity. Chapter 2 of the current paper details the first of two 
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studies designed to empirically validate Chapter 1’s Hypotheses 1.2 and 1.5—that 
autobiographical memory content in particular, rather than long-term memory content in general, 
can be used for perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking. Study 1 was a 
validity study in which a 10-item self-report Autobiographical Memory Functions of Simulation 
(AMFS) scale was developed and validated. Study 2 (Chapter 3) will utilize the validated AMFS 
scale to glean more conclusive evidence for the use of autobiographical memory content for the 
interpersonal simulation phenomenon of perspective taking, and the intrapersonal simulation 
phenomena of prospection (“pre-experiencing” the future with elements from autobiographical 
memory content) and counterfactual thinking (“re-constructing” the past with elements from 
autobiographical memory content). Evidence in support of Chapter 1’s Hypotheses 1.2 and 1.5 
will be regarded as substantiating Chapter 1’s Hypothesis 1.6—that perspective taking, 
prospection, and counterfactual thinking are therefore functions of autobiographical memory—
and Chapter 1’s Hypothesis 1.7—that the autobiographical memory function of perspective 
taking reflects interpersonal simulation, and that the autobiographical memory functions of 
prospection and counterfactual thinking reflect intrapersonal simulation. 
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CHAPTER 2 EMPIRICALLY SUBSTANTIATING THE EXPANDED SIMULATION 
MODEL: VALIDATION OF THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY FUNCTIONS OF 
SIMULATION (AMFS) SCALE 
 
2.1 Introduction & Background  
 The autobiographical memory system in humans is thought to have evolved in order to 
provide an adaptive advantage—i.e., individuals adept at retrieving and applying prior 
experience to novel situations should have a better chance of survival (Atance & O’Neill, 2001, 
2005; Barsalou, 1988, 2003; Brown & Kulik, 1977; Suddendorf & Busby, 2003). However, 
given that the direct investigation of autobiographical memory’s evolutionary basis is 
empirically untenable (Kihlstrom, 2009), one of the foci of autobiographical memory research 
became the identification of the theoretical reasons, or functions, for which autobiographical 
memory is used in everyday life (e.g., Baddeley, 1988).  
 Beginning in the 1980s, a theoretical model was proposed that featured three broad 
functions: Social,  Self, and Directive (e.g., Baddeley, 1988; Bruce, 1989; Neisser, 1982). The 
Social function was said to reflect the use of autobiographical memory to promote and maintain 
social bonds, and to provide content for conversation (Bluck et al., 2005; Bluck & Alea, 2011). 
The use of autobiographical memory for self-knowledge, self-continuity, and self-identity was 
reflected by the Self function (Bluck et al., 2005). Finally, the Directive function was thought to 
concern the use of past experience for the purpose of teaching, informing, guiding future 
thoughts and behaviors, and shaping attitudes and beliefs (Bluck et al., 2005). 
Because of its utility, the three-function model was widely accepted for several years 
despite its lack of empirical verification (Bluck et al., 2005; Bluck & Alea, 2011). It was not 
until 2005 that an instrument was developed to validate the model: The Thinking About Life 
Experiences (TALE) scale. The TALE is a self-report questionnaire featuring items informed by 
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the theoretical autobiographical memory literature (Bluck et al., 2005). Although validation of 
the TALE confirmed the existence of the Social, Self, and Directive functions, concerns were 
raised that the long-time focus on the three-function model may have precluded the search for 
additional functions that lay beyond the scope of established theory.  
Research seeking an expanded set of functions began soon after. Investigators considered 
such frameworks as life stage and contexts, within which previously overlooked functions might  
emerge. One example is the Reminiscence Functions Scale (RFS): a seven-function instrument 
that measures reminiscence behaviors relevant to adults—especially those in the later stages of 
life (Webster, 1995, 1997). Another example is the Child-Caregiver Reminiscence Scale (CRS), 
which Kulkofsky and Koh (2009) developed to capture the functions vital to autobiographical 
memory system development. The CRS was therefore designed to elicit the social context of 
joint reminiscence—i.e., the sharing of “past talk” with another or others. Kulkofsky and Koh 
argued that, by situating the CRS in the a context reflective of that within which autobiographical 
memory is socialized  in early life—around the ages of 3–4 years (Nelson & Fivush, 2004)—and 
expanded set of developmentally relevant functions could be discerned. Results of the CRS 
validation study revealed its own set of seven functions, six of which mapped as sub-functions 
onto the TALE’s broad Social, Self, and Directive functions. 
In a  recent study by Ranson and Fitzgerald (in preparation), the CRS was adapted for use 
with adults to determine whether the seven CRS functions associated with early development 
held into later life. The resultant Child-Caregiver Reminiscence Scale for Adults (CRS-A), which 
retained the CRS’s social context of joint-reminiscence, replicated six of the seven CRS 
functions and displayed only slight structural differences (see Figure 9). However, it also yielded 
evidence for the previously undetected autobiographical memory function of perspective taking. 
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Because no other study had reported such a function, nor had its discovery been predicted by any 
single theory, the Expanded Simulation Model was developed to theoretically substantiate it. The 
Expanded Simulation Model, which was adapted from the simulation process model of 
perspective taking according to simulation theory (Goldman, 2006; Shanton & Goldman, 2010), 
offers a paradigm for how autobiographical memory content could be the specific long-term 
memory form of “background information” that serves as simulation input in response to a 
perspective taking goal. Because the Expanded Simulation Model therefore illustrates the use of 
autobiographical memory in service of perspective taking, perspective taking can be thought of 
as a function of autobiographical memory. Contingently, it was argued that the Expanded 
Simulation Model could also explain the use of autobiographical memory for mental time 
travel—specifically, prospection and counterfactual thinking—which suggests that prospection 
and counterfactual thinking are also functions of autobiographical memory. The case for the 
viability of the Expanded Simulation Model was presented in Chapter 1. 
Chapter 2 concerns the current paper’s Study 1, the first of a program of studies aimed at 
empirically validating Chapter 1’s Expanded Simulation Model. The purpose of Study 1 was to 
develop an instrument for measuring the use of autobiographical memory for perspective taking, 
prospection, and counterfactual thinking. The instrument will then be used in Study 2 (Chapter 3) 
to yield evidence in support of four of Chapter 1’s hypotheses (1.2, 1.5, 1.6, and 1.7). The 
following section details Study 1’s objectives and goals.  
2.2 Objectives and Goals  
Primary Objective 
Autobiographical memory functions are, by definition, the purposes for which 
autobiographical memory is needed or used (e.g., Baddeley, 1988, Bruce, 1989; Neisser, 1982). 
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Per the Expanded Simulation Model, which was adapted for the current paper from simulation 
theory by Goldman (2006) and Shanton and Goldman (2010), simulation that occurs in response 
to a perspective taking or mental time travel goal uses “background information” drawn from 
long-term memory stores. The simulation process gives rise to the rememberer’s “re-experience” 
of that content. As discussed in detail in Chapter 1, when memory content is “re-experienced” 
for its own sake, the behavioral outcome is reminiscence. When memory content is used to plan, 
predict, or imagine a future scenario, the behavioral outcome that results from the “pre-
experience” of that content is prospection. And when memory content is “re-experienced” and 
“reframed” with different details than what actually occurred, the behavioral outcome is 
counterfactual thinking. from autobiographical memory content is contained in the long-term 
memory component to be preferentially activated, retrieved, and applied when engaging in 
interpersonal and intrapersonal simulation. If it can be shown that the specific form of long-term 
memory used as simulation’s “background information” is autobiographical, then perspective 
taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking would be functions of autobiographical memory. 
The primary objective of Study 1 was to construct and validate an instrument for measuring the 
use of autobiographical memory for those functions.  
In keeping with the established tradition of empirically substantiating autobiographical 
memory functions via self-report scales (Bluck et al., 2005; Kulkofsky & Koh, 2009; Ranson & 
Fitzgerald, in preparation; Webster, 1995, 1997, 1998), the overarching objective of Study 1 was 
to validate a self-report instrument designed to measure the frequency with which individuals use 
autobiographical memory to inform the three simulation-based behavioral outcomes of 
perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking. The result was the 10-item 
Autobiographical Memory Functions of Simulation (AMFS) scale.  
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The format of the AMFS was modeled on the CRS-A (Ranson and Fitzgerald, in 
preparation). However, the social context of joint reminiscence—which was employed for both 
the CRS-A and the scale from which the CRS-A was adapted, the CRS (Kulkofsky & Koh, 
2009)—was omitted from the AMFS. One reason was for instructional coherence. The joint 
reminiscence context is elicited in the CRS-A (and CRS) by instructing respondents to consider 
the extent to which they engage in “past-talk” with others when estimating the frequency with 
which they use autobiographical memory for various purposes. The elicitation of this context is 
reasonable for perspective taking—an inherently social behavior that occurs in response to the 
other-directed goals (Shanton & Goldman, 2010). However, although mental time travel can 
occur in the presence of and in response to “past-talk,” it occurs in response to self-directed goals 
(Shanton & Goldman, 2010), and is not necessarily a social behavior. Thus, instructions asking 
respondents to consider “past-talk” when estimating the frequency with which they use 
autobiographical memory for prospection and counterfactual thinking seemed incompatible with 
the construct, and therefore potentially confusing to respondents. Another reason was that, 
although the joint reminiscence context was important to the objective of the CRS—which was 
to determine whether the functions found by Kulkofsky and Koh (2009) as essential to 
autobiographical memory system emergence in early childhood were retained and used in 
adulthood—no previous findings were available with which to compare the adult use of 
prospection and counterfactual thinking versus use during early life. This is not to say that the 
manner in which autobiographical memory is socialized in early childhood does not influence 
individual differences in prospection and counterfactual thinking. Rather, such differences would 
be neither measureable nor discernable by the AMFS. Likewise, because it has not yet been 
empirically established that prospection and counterfactual thinking are functions of 
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autobiographical memory, to attempt to assess individual differences in the socialization of 
autobiographical memory for such purposes would be premature. Thus the current paper saw no 
need for eliciting the joint reminiscence context. 
A series of statistical procedures were performed on the AMFS to validate its structure 
and assess its reliability. Given that no previous research on which to inform specific outcomes 
exists, Study 1 was largely exploratory. As such, four goals were set in lieu of hypotheses. 
Goals 
Goal 2.1 was to use exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to verify the three-function 
structure of the AMFS. It was expected that all 10 items of the AMFS would load onto their 
respective factors to demonstrate structural validity, and that the factors would meet or exceed an 
acceptable level of reliability. Although two of the four items included in the Perspective 
TakingAMFS13 factor were taken from the CRS-A (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation), it was 
expected that the two CRS-A items and the two new items generated for the AMFS would “hang 
together” on a single factor14. 
 Goal 2.2 was to use confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) with a structural equation 
modeling approach to verify the structure found in the EFA. It was expected that the structure 
would hold and that indices would verify sufficient fit.  
                                                
13 From this point forward and unless otherwise noted, the current paper will use the convention of tacking “AMFS” 
in subscript notation to every use of “Perspective Taking” that references the AMFS Perspective Taking function or 
subscale.  Likewise, when referencing the Perspective Taking function or subscale of the AMFJR, the subscript 
“AMFJR” will be used.  
14 The validation of the CRS-A yielded evidence that the Perspective TakingAMFJR function mapped on to the broad 
Social function measured by the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011). It will be an objective of Study 2 is to examine 
whether the Perspective TakingAMFS function also maps onto the TALE’s Social function, or if this association is 
dependent on the social context of joint reminiscence. 
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Goal 2.3 was to show construct validity by way of associations15 between the three 
autobiographical memory functions and the two dimensions of the Emotion Regulation 
Questionnaire (ERQ) (Gross & John, 2003). Convergent validity was tested using the ERQ’s 
Cognitive Reappraisal dimension, which reflects how individuals “change” their thinking about 
emotion events by imagining different outcomes, details, and scenarios. Like perspective taking, 
prospection, and counterfactual thinking, cognitive reappraisal is characterized as a simulation-
based behavior (Lindeman & Abraham, 2008). This functional similarity between the three 
AMFS factors and the Cognitive Reappraisal dimension made it a suitable correlate for testing 
the convergent validity of the AMFS. However, despite this overlap, the AMFS and the ERQ 
nonetheless measure different constructs: The AMFS is concerned with the use of 
autobiographical memory whereas the ERQ is concerned with emotion coping strategies. As 
such, it was expected that the correlation coefficients between the three AMFS factors and 
Cognitive Reappraisal would be, although positive and significant, low to moderate in 
magnitude. Results supporting this expectation would suggest that, although the two scales’ 
items had mental simulation in common, the two scales were in other important ways 
characteristically distinct. It was also expected that the second of the ERQ’s two dimensions, 
Expressive Suppression—which reflects the degree to which people change their outward 
behavior in response to emotional events—would provide evidence of discriminant validity. 
Because Expressive Suppression is not a simulation-based behavior—at least not to the extent 
that Cognitive Reappraisal is thought to be—correlations between it and the three AMFS factors 
should be weak and nonsignificant.  
                                                
15 Although construct validity (comprised of convergent and discriminant validity) would ideally be conducted 
using and SEM approach to MTMM procedures (Campbell & Fiske, 1959), Study 1’s small sample size made such 
analyses untenable. Therefore, assessing correlation coefficients between the factors being validated and 
theoretically similar constructs is considered an acceptable alternative (Carlson & Herdman, 2012). 
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In addition to the evaluation of construct validity, a provisional multiple regression 
analysis was run to test the functional relation between the two ERQ dimensions and the 
functions measured by the AMFS. One of two outcomes was considered likely. The first was that 
only one of the AMFS functions would account for variance in Cognitive Reappraisal, 
supporting the contention that the AMFS functions and Cognitive Reappraisal dimension all 
reflect simulation-based behaviors. The second possible outcome aligns with Shanton and 
Goldman’s (2010) contention that perspective taking, being other-directed, reflects interpersonal 
simulation, whereas prospection and counterfactual thinking, being self-directed, reflect 
intrapersonal simulation. Support for this claim would be reflected by Perspective Taking 
(interpersonal simulation) accounting for a significant amount of variance in Cognitive 
Reappraisal, while either Prospection (interpersonal simulation) or Counterfactual Thinking 
(intrapersonal simulation)—but not both—would account for a significant amount of variance in 
Cognitive Reappraisal. Because this analysis is provisional (i.e., extraneous to scale validation), 
results will be re-verified in Study 2.  
 Goal 2.4 was to look for potential associations between the AMFS factors and 
personality dimensions as measured with the six-trait, 60-item HEXACO personality inventory 
(Ashford & Lee, 2007). The HEXACO is unique in that, along with the traditional Big Five 
dimensions (Extraversion, Openness to New Experience, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and 
Emotionality/Neuroticism), the self-report instrument measures the dimension of Honesty-
Humility. People high on the Honesty-Humility trait tend to be humble, averse to manipulating 
others, non-materialistic, and non-status seeking. Contrarily, individuals low in the Honesty-
Humility trait have a tendency toward manipulation, entitlement, dishonesty, and deception. Of 
interest to the current paper was whether the Honesty-Humility dimension would shed light on 
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whether the use of autobiographical memory for counterfactual thinking led to counterfactuals 
that were upward (i.e., engender positive outcomes like relief and satisfaction), or downward 
(i.e., engender negative outcomes such as bias, blame, and dysfunction) (e.g., Roese, 1997). 
However, no known study of autobiographical memory functions has employed the HEXACO, 
thus it was important to test its practicality (e.g., could respondents complete it in the estimated 
allotted time), as well as its suitability as an alternative to the standard Big Five indices.  
 Testing for associations between personality and autobiographical memory functions in 
general, and the AMFS functions in particular, is also important given that much of the evidence 
with respect to personality and autobiographical memory functions is inconsistent (Rasmussen & 
Berntsen, 2010), Thus, efforts to verify known relations and to search for new ones are 
warranted. And although some research exists concerning personality and the behaviors of 
perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking, it is unclear if these effects will 
replicate with respect to the use of autobiographical memory for those behaviors.  
 Because the Study 1 analyses conducted using the HEXACO were both extraneous to the 
validation of the AMFS, and were run using the same data with which the AMFS was validated, 
all analyses using the HEXACO are provisional, necessitating replication before conclusions are 
drawn16. Thus any findings yielded from these analyses in Study 1 will be investigated more 
fully in Study 2.  
 Goal 2.5 was to get a sense of whether individuals grasp the idea that autobiographical 
memory can be used for perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual to the extent that 
they can then reasonably estimate the frequency with which they use it for such behaviors. 
Respondents were presented with a series of mental time travel completion tasks that involved 
                                                
16 It is considered inappropriate to use the same data employed for scale validation to then measure and draw 
conclusions about individuals (Boslaugh, 2007). 
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the recollection, written synopsis, and phenomenological descriptions of a past event 
(reminiscence condition), an imagined future scenario (prospection condition), and reframing of 
an actual past event (counterfactual thinking condition) (see the Instruments section for details). 
The intention of this task was to test an implicit assumption common to all autobiographical 
memory functions self-report scales: That respondents grasp the idea that they use 
autobiographical memory for various behaviors to the extent that they can then estimate the 
frequency with which they use autobiographical memory for those behaviors. However, it is also 
possible that respondents are simply estimating the frequency with which they engage in the 
behaviors themselves.  While the mental time travel conditions task could not definitively rule 
out the latter, it was thought that completion of the mental time travel conditions tasks would be 
evidence that respondents 1) understood the ways in which autobiographical memory might be 
used for reminiscence, prospection, and counterfactual thinking; and 2) could therefore 
reasonably estimate their use of autobiographical memory in the service of such behaviors when 
completing the AMFS. Because the nature of Goal 2.5 was exploratory, and because the data 
collected for the mental time travel conditions qualitative, no formal analyses were conducted.  
2.3 Methods  
Participants 
 Participants were recruited through Amazon.com’s on-demand recruitment and survey 
management service, Mechanical Turk (MTurk) (www.MTurk.com). Through MTurk, eligible 
participants accessed the Study 1 online questionnaire, which was developed using Qualtrics 
(2015, Provo, UT) research software. A total of 144 participants enrolled in Study 1. However, a 
review of survey metrics after the first 34 participants had completed the survey showed that it 
was taking participant an average of 45 minutes to complete the survey. Because the 
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questionnaire’s introduction had stated an estimated survey completion time of approximately 30 
minutes, the survey was suspended until the introduction could be revised to reflect the increased 
time estimate and to increase the compensation for completed surveys to $2.00 per respondent17. 
Because there was a concern that the change in compensation could draw a systematically 
different kind of participant, data for the first 34 participants was not used. Of the remaining 110 
participants (F = 60, 54.5%), most were young to middle-aged adults (M = 39.06 years, SD = 
12.96), who ranged in age from 18 to 67 years. The ethnicity/race frequencies and proportions 
were as follows: Sixty-four participants identified as Caucasian (58.2%); 29 as African-
American/Black (26.4%); seven as American Indian/Alaskan Native (6.4%); three as Other 
(2.7%); two as Asian (1.8%); two as Multiracial (1.8%); one as Arab/Middle Eastern (0.9%); and 
one as Hawaiian/Pacific Islander (0.9%). One participant (0.9%) chose “prefer not to answer.” 
No participants identified as Hispanic. A summary of the Study 1 demographics can be found in 
Table 2. 
Instruments 
 The Study 1 online questionnaire consisted of the following six “blocks” of survey items: 
demographics, self-descriptions of current self, mental time travel components (reminiscence, 
counterfactual thinking, and prospection), the AMFS scale, the Emotion Regulation 
Questionnaire (ERQ), and the HEXACO-60 personality index. 
 Block 1: Demographic Items. Respondents were asked to answer three demographic 
items consistent with previous work in autobiographical memory functions (Bluck & Alea, 2011; 
Kulkofsky & Koh, 2009; Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation). The items and their options 
(presented in drop-down menus) were gender (male, female, prefer not to answer); age (18 to 
                                                
17 At the time the Study 1 survey was administered, MTurk metrics indicated that the average compensation across 
all studies was $1.00 for up to 30 minutes of participant time, and $2.00 for between 30 minutes and 1 hour 
(www.MTurk.com). 
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65+, prefer not to answer); and ethnicity/race (African-American/Black, American Indian/Alaska 
Native, Arab/Middle Eastern, Asian, Caucasian, Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, Hispanic, 
Multiracial, Other, prefer not to answer).  
 Block 2: Self-Descriptors of Current Self. Following the completion of the 
demographics block, respondents were presented with the following instruction: “Take a moment 
to consider what traits and characteristics describe who you are at this point in your life. For 
example, are you ambitious? A good friend? Shy? Think of 5 one- or two word descriptions that 
best reflect these characteristics and enter them in the spaces below.” The space below featured 
five open fields preceded by the statement, ‘I _______________.’ Each field allowed a total of 
60 characters. The item was adapted from the paradigms used by Wang (2001) and Shao, Yao, 
Ceci, and Wang (2010), both of which were adapted from the Kuhn and McPartland (1954) 
Twenty Statements Test (TST).  
 The purpose of the self-descriptor component was two-fold. One, it was intended to 
acclimate the respondents to the conceptual time that corresponded to the mental time travel 
condition (i.e., the past for the reminiscence and counterfactual thinking conditions; the future 
for the prospection condition) by anchoring the respondent in the self-concept that corresponded 
with that point in time (Briggs, Cheek, & Buss, 1980; Conway, 2005). Two, it was thought that 
the act of listing semantic autobiographical information about the self would facilitate activation 
of the SMS (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) and SAC (Reder et al., 2009) as 
proposed in Chapter 1. As a result, the self-descriptors could serve as primes to the activation 
and retrieval of the episodic memory content needed to complete the mental time travel 
conditions.  
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 Block 3: Mental Time Travel Conditions.  All respondents completed three mental time 
travel tasks in the order listed below. The language for all three conditions was adapted from the 
paradigm established by D’Argembeau & Van der Linden (2004). The purpose of the mental 
time travel conditions was to glean whether respondents understood the concept of applying 
autobiographical memory content for the purposes of “re-experiencing” a past episode, 
“reframing” a past episode with new details, and “pre-experiencing” an imagined future event. If 
so, the properties that respondents identified as elements of their autobiographical memories 
should align with their descriptive narratives of the mental time travel event. 
 Condition 1: Reminiscence (“Re-Experiencing” One’s Personal Past). Respondents 
were presented with the following introduction: “This next section of questions is about how 
people ‘re-experience’ personal past events recalled from memory. Take a few moments to recall 
any POSITIVE18 event from your personal past that you have thought about at least once since it 
occurred, and which has had some consequence to your life since. This event should have lasted 
at least a few minutes but not more than a day. As you mentally re-experience the event, try to 
recall as much detail as possible. Think about such characteristics as where it occurred, the 
course of events as they happened, the people and objects present and your interactions with 
them, and how you felt during the event. When you're ready, click the NEXT button to continue.” 
Upon clicking the NEXT button, respondents were presented with the following two tasks.  
Narrative Description of Re-Experienced Past Event. Respondents were next presented 
with the statement, “In the space below, please give a brief description of the positive personal 
                                                
18 The reason for requesting that respondents consider a POSITIVE past event was in response to evidence that the 
recollection of negative memories can upset psychological wellbeing (Takarangi & Strange, 2010). As such, there 
was a risk that asking participants to recall a negative memory, or allow participants the option to recall a negative 
memory, could encourage some participants to ruminate and/or experience cognitive impairment as negative affect 
increased (Takarangi & Strange, 2010). Such psychological upsets could then impede respondents’ ability to 
complete subsequent memory tasks and/or their ability to estimate the frequency with which they engage in AMF 
behaviors. 
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past event that you re-experienced for this study.” This statement was followed by an open field 
in which respondents were asked to enter a 2- to 4-sentence (up to 500 characters) description of 
the recalled event.  
 Self-Descriptors of Past Self. Respondents were presented with the following: “Take a 
moment to consider what traits and characteristics you remember yourself to have shown at the 
time of the event. Come up with 5 one- or two word descriptions that best reflect who you were 
at the time of this past event and enter them in the spaces below.” The format of this item is 
otherwise identical to that of the current self-description section. As before, the objective of this 
item is to activate the self-memory system and verify that respondents have a self-awareness of 
themselves at a time other than the present. 
 Condition 2: Counterfactual Thinking (“Reconstructing” One’s Personal Past). 
The purpose of this condition was to examine whether respondents were able to grasp the idea of 
and answer questions about the ways in which they mentally change the details about actual past 
events. Specifically, of interest was whether individuals can understand and then narratively 
describe which actual memory events were reimagined, and in what particular ways. Participants 
were tasked first with recalling and describing an actual past event that they had “reframed” as 
having different details and/or a different outcome, then recalling, describing, and listing the 
details that were changed during reframing. The corresponding self-descriptors were included to 
determine if respondents could describe characteristics of the self in each counterfactual thinking 
task. For example, if the actual memory concerned the rememberer failing a math test, and the 
narrative either explicitly or suggestively indicated that this event was perceived as negative, the 
self-descriptors should have reflected characteristics consistent with both the memory and the 
rememberer’s perception of it—e.g., “I feel stupid,” “I am ashamed,” etc. If, contrarily, the 
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“reframed,” counterfactual was of having studied and then passing that test, which the 
descriptive narrative implied was a positive outcome, then the corresponding self-descriptors 
should have been likewise consistent—e.g., “I am happy,” “I am smart,” etc. 
Participants were presented with the following section introduction: “It’s also common 
for people to ‘reconstruct’19 a past event. For example, sometimes people recall an unpleasant 
past event and imagine saying or doing something differently to produce a different outcome. 
Sometimes people will reconstruct such events to create a pleasant memory and incorporate 
imagined details that would have led to a poor outcome. Reconstructed memories are a 
combination of actual details from a personal past event and completely imagined details. Take a 
moment to recall a personal past event that you have reconstructed in some way. Recall a 
reconstructed memory that reflects an event that was personally meaningful to you or that 
continues to stand out in your mind. When you are ready, click the NEXT button to continue.” 
Note that, for the counterfactual thinking condition, respondents were not explicitly asked to 
recall a positive memory, as was the case for the reminiscence condition, for two reasons. One, 
the literature on counterfactual thinking reports that individuals tend to reconstruct negative 
memories more frequently than they do positive memories (Epstude & Roese, 2008; Roese & 
Olson, 1995). Two, counterfactual thinking research shows that, during reconstruction, negative 
memories are often given a positive spin, whereby counterfactual thinking serves as a coping 
mechanism (Epstude & Roese, 2008; Roese & Olson, 1995). Hence it was thought that 
respondents may struggle to recall a positive past event that was reframed. Further, because 
negative past events are often ameliorated during reframing (Roese & Olson, 1995), it was 
thought that the risk of causing psychological upset was lower for the counterfactual thinking 
                                                
19 Although the current paper is using “reframing” rather than “reconstructing” to describe the changing of 
autobiographical memory content for counterfactuals, the Study 1 survey instructions used “reconstruct.”  
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task than for the reminiscence task (which, as an online survey item provided no subsequent 
means of assuaging any potentially negative affect). 
 Narrative Description of Actual and Reconstructed Past Events. Respondents were 
presented with the statement, “In the space below, please give a brief synopsis of the ACTUAL 
past event.” This statement was followed by an open field into which 2- to 4-sentence (up to 500 
characters) descriptions were to be entered. Respondents were then shown the statement, “In the 
space below, please describe the characteristics of past event after RECONSTRUCTING the past 
event.” This statement was also followed by an open field for entering a 2- to 4-sentence (up to 
500 characters) description.  
 Self-Descriptors of Past Self for Actual and Reconstructed Past Events. For this section, 
respondents were asked to provide self-descriptions of their self with respect to both the 
ACTUAL past event and the RECONSTRUCTED past event. For the former, respondents saw 
the statement, “First, consider what traits and characteristics you remember yourself to have had 
at the time of the ACTUAL event. Come up with 5 one- or two-word descriptions that best 
reflect who you were during the ACTUAL event and enter them in the spaces below.” For the 
latter, respondents were given the instruction, “Now, consider what traits and characteristics you 
remember yourself to have had in the RECONSTRUCTED version of this memory. Come up 
with 5 one- or two-word descriptions that best reflect who you were during the 
RECONSTRUCTED event and enter them in the spaces below.” Each statement was followed 
by five spaces within which to complete the statement, ‘I ____________.’  
 Condition 3: Prospection (“Pre-Experiencing” One’s Potential Future Events). 
Respondents were presented with the following instruction, “This next section concerns how 
people ‘pre-experience’ a personal future by imagining possible future events. Take a few 
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moments to imagine with as much detail as possible a future event or scenario that you have not 
previously experienced but which could realistically occur. This imagined event should be one 
that could last at least a few minutes but not more than a day. As you mentally imagine this 
future event, pay attention to such characteristics as where it will occur, the course of events that 
will happen, the people and objects present and your interactions with them, and how you 
imagine you will feel during the future event. An example of an imagined future scenario: ‘Zelda 
wants to hold a yard sale in her back yard next summer. She imagines how she’ll organize her 
lush, sunny, back yard: She sees herself putting kitchenware and knick-knacks on the blue picnic 
table that sits on her patio. She pictures hanging items of clothing on a rope that she’ll string 
between her two large oak trees at the back edge of the yard. She also imagines pleasantly 
interacting with neighbors as well as strangers. Zelda also imagines what might happen if it were 
raining on the day of the yard sale. She thinks about how she might organize her garage in case 
the weather forecast predicts rain. Overall, she believes the sale could be a fun event for 
everyone, and feels happy as she looks forward to it.’ When you are ready, click the NEXT 
button to continue.” 
 Note that here, as with the counterfactual thinking condition, respondents were not 
instructed to generate an imagined future scenario of a specific emotional valence. It was thought 
that omitting this instruction would allow respondents to imagine either a positive or negative 
future as desired. However, because research shows that people tend to predict that their lives 
will inevitably take a positive turn (De Brigard et al., 2015), it was expected that most future 
imaginings would be optimistic, and the risk of upsetting respondents was low.  
 Narrative Description of Re-Experienced Past Event. Respondents were presented with 
the statement, “Use the space below to briefly describe the imagined future event.” The 
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statement was followed by an open field into which a 2- to 4-sentence (up to 500 characters) 
description could be entered.  
 Self-Descriptors of Future Self. Respondents were asked to “Consider who you are in this 
future scenario; enter the 5 most relevant one- or two-word descriptions and enter them in the 
spaces below.” 
 Elements from the Past that Inform the Future. Respondents were presented with the 
following: “Regarding the imagined future scenario you just pre-experienced, take a moment to 
consider which aspects of it are based on information or elements from actual past events. For 
example, say your imagined future scenario was about the yard sale that your friend wants the 
two of you to plan for next summer. You envision, for example, that, this time, you're going to 
do things differently. You first envision you and your friend meeting at your favorite coffee shop 
to discuss details. You see yourself suggesting to the friend that the sale be held at the friend's 
home this time. You mentally picture the bright blue picnic table that sits in your friend's back 
yard as a sales station. You compose a script of what you'll say, being careful to avoid what you 
did last time. You see yourself being more assertive but fair. You feel certain that, if this scenario 
plays out the way you imagine it, you'll feel much better than you did last year. Past information 
that informs your ‘pre-experiencing’ of the future event might include such things as details from 
last year's yard sale; your friend's yard; your friend's bright blue picnic table; your friend's 
behavior last year; your behavior last year; your feelings last year; other situations in the past 
which you've asserted yourself and felt good for doing so. In the spaces below, please list up to 
12 characteristics, elements, or aspects of your IMAGINED FUTURE SCENARIO that are 
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based on characteristics, elements, or aspects of one or more actual past event20. Try to be as 
detailed as possible.”  
Block 4: Autobiographical Memory Functions of Simulation (AMFS) Scale. The 
AMFS scale is comprised of 10 items intended to measure the three hypothesized 
autobiographical memory function of Perspective Taking (interpersonal simulation), the two 
mental time travel functions (intrapersonal simulation) of Prospection and Counterfactual 
Thinking. If validated, the AMFS could be used as a complement to the previously validated 
CRS-A scale (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation), the functions of which represent the 
autobiographical memory functions that emerge in the social context of joint reminiscence. The 
Prospection and Counterfactual Thinking factors each include three items, whereas the 
Perspective Taking function comprises four items: the two items Perspective Taking items from 
the CRS-A, plus two new items. Table 3 lists the AMFS items and their respective factors. The 
two Perspective Taking items from the previously validated CRS-A are denoted by asterisks. 
To lessen the risk skewed response data, which is a common problem with Likert-type 
scales (Jamieson, 2004; Sheng & Sheng, 2012), and which can lead to misleading factor analysis 
results (French-Lazovik & Gibson, 1984), the AMFS featured a 6-point Liker-type rating scheme 
with labels at the anchors only (i.e., 1 = almost never; 6 = almost always) (Dawes, 2008; French-
Lazovik & Gibson, 1984). This was a change from the CRS-A, which featured a 7-point Likert 
scale modeled after that used by Kulkofsky and Koh (2009), and the labeling of which was based 
on recommendations by Bass, Cascio, & O’Connor (1974). 
Upon entering the AMFS block, respondents were presented with the instruction, “The 
following section features a series of statements about the reasons why you might think about the 
                                                
20 Note that that the survey setup prohibited respondents from navigating back to previously completed sections. As 
such, respondents were not able to refer back to their narrative descriptions while listing the event’s properties.  
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past. On a scale of 1 to 6 (1 = Almost Never, 6 = Almost Always), please rate how frequently 
you engage in each of the following recollection-related behaviors and activities.” All items 
within the AMFS block were randomly ordered.  
Block 5: Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ). The Emotion Regulation 
Questionnaire (ERQ) (Gross & John, 2003) is a 10-item scale that assesses individual differences 
in the use of two emotion regulation strategies. The Cognitive Reappraisal dimension evaluates 
individuals’ strategies with respect to the internal emotional experience, while the Expressive 
Suppression dimension captures strategies that are externalized as talk, gestures, and behaviors 
(Gross & John, 2003). Because the Cognitive Reappraisal dimension is thought to involve 
mental simulation (Lindeman & Abraham, 2008), whereas the Expressive Suppression 
dimension does not, these two dimensions were used to evaluate convergent and discriminant 
construct validity, respectively. The most recent validation study of the ERQ yielded a 
Cronbach’s alpha for the Cognitive Reappraisal dimension of .79, and an alpha of .73 for 
Expressive Suppression.  
Respondents were presented with the following instruction: “We would like to ask you 
some questions about your emotional life, in particular, how you control (that is, regulate and 
manage) your emotions. The questions below involve two distinct aspects of your emotional life. 
One is your emotional experience, or what you feel like inside. The other is your emotional 
expression, or how you show your emotions in the way you talk, gesture, or behave. Although 
some of the following questions may seem similar to one another, they differ in important ways.” 
Respondents were then asked to rate how strongly they agreed (or disagreed) with each statement 
on a 6-point scale (1 = Strongly Disagree; 6 = Strongly Agree). The 10 items of the ERQ can be 
found in Table 4. 
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Block 6: HEXACO-60 Personality Inventory. The HEXACO-60 Personality Inventory 
(Ashton & Lee, 2009), a shortened version of the full 100-item HEXACO-PI (Lee & Ashton, 
2004), assesses the six HEXACO personality dimensions of Honesty-Humility, 
Emotionality/Neuroticism, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness to 
Experience21. Results of the HEXACO-60 validation study yielded Cronbach’s alpha reliabilities 
ranging from .73 to .80 for adults. The dimensions of the HEXACO-60 were found to be 
strongly correlated with their counterparts in the NEO-FFI (Costa & McCrae, 1992). The six 
dimensions of the HEXACO are further subdivided into four facets each, although facets were 
not examined for Study 1 due to the provisional nature of the Study 1 inferential analyses. 
Respondents were presented with the instruction, “The following section addresses 
various personality traits. On a 1 to 6 scale, please rate the extent to which you agree (or 
disagree) with each statement as it describes your personality.” For the online administration of 
the Study 1 instruments, the HEXACO-60 featured an attention check (see Procedures for 
details). The 60 items plus attention check can be found in Table 5. 
Procedures  
Study 1 items (see Instruments section, above) were featured in a single online 
questionnaire-type survey developed using the Qualtrics Research Survey Suite (Qualtrics, Co., 
2015, Provo, UT). The Qualtrics survey was distributed via Amazon.com’s participant 
recruitment and compensation service, Mechanical Turk or “MTurk” (www.MTurk.com). 
MTurk was chosen for the following five reasons. One, research shows that its samples tend to 
be more culturally diverse, feature equivalent proportions of men and women, and are comprised 
of a wider age range than those recruited through conventional university resources (Buhrmester, 
                                                
21 The 100-item HEXACO-PI, which will be used for Study 2, also includes the interstitial facet scale of Altruism 
(with the inverse Antagonism), the items of which are included in Table 17.  
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Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Two, MTurk gives researchers the opportunity to compensate 
participants, whereas survey systems managed by universities and other educational institutions 
often do not. Participants earn a monetary credit equal to the compensation amount that is posted 
to their Amazon.com account. This service removes the burden of acquiring, issuing, and 
managing an alternative form of payment (e.g., checks, gift certificates) from the researcher. 
Additionally, researchers do not need to have participant names, contact information, or tax 
identification details on file, ensuring that participation in an MTurk survey is fully anonymous. 
Three, MTurk guarantees quality data by allowing researchers to decline compensating any 
participant who is suspected of providing fraudulent or poor quality responses. All MTurk 
participants must, before enrolling in any study, sign a “Worker’s Agreement” (see Appendix A), 
which stipulates that researchers have the right to refuse compensating any participant whose 
responses do not meet MTurk’s quality requirements. Four, the researcher can indicate in 
advance the number and characteristics of participants desired. Only completed surveys are 
counted toward this total. Once the designated total has been reached, the survey closes 
automatically, thus freeing the researcher from the need to closely monitor activity. And five, 
MTurk’s 400,000-plus pool of potential participants, of whom 50,000–100,000 are available at 
any one time (Ross, Irani, Silberman, Zaldivar, & Tomlinson, 2010), makes for extremely quick 
data collection.  
Study 1 approval was obtained from the conducting university’s Institutional Review 
Board (IRB protocols 15050114057–8, 6/17/16). The instrument blocks were combined into a 
single online questionnaire that appeared on the MTurk website as the “Everyday Memory 
Study.” The listing was accompanied by a link that, when clicked, led to a brief introduction 
about the study, instructions on how to submit the compensation code to be displayed at the end 
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of the completed survey, and a link to the Qualtrics survey (see Appendix B). Upon clicking the 
Qualtrics survey link, participants were presented with an Information Sheet22 (see Appendix C). 
After reading and agreeing to the terms of the Information Sheet, participants were instructed to 
click the CONTINUE button if he or she wanted to enroll in the study and begin the survey. 
Participants were informed that clicking the CONTINUE button also served as their electronic 
signature. Participants who chose not to participate could click the EXIT button. No data were 
collected for participants who chose to exit the survey at that time. 
Participants who chose to proceed were next presented with the Study 1 items, beginning 
with the demographics block (see Instruments section for details). Items were all forced choice to 
ensure no missing data. However, participants who did not wish to provide demographic 
information were offered the option, “prefer not to answer.” For subsequent item blocks, 
participants who did not wish to provide responses could exit the study at any time by clicking 
the EXIT button embedded at the bottom of every online survey page. 
An “attention check” item was included in each the AMFS and HEXACO survey blocks 
(see Tables 3 and 5 for details). Participation in the survey was terminated for any participant 
who failed to answer an attention check item as instructed. As was disclosed in the Information 
Sheet, participants who failed an attention check were not eligible for compensation.  
Upon survey completion, each participant received a unique, five-digit Qualtrics-issued 
compensation code (see Appendix D). Participants were instructed to enter the code in the field 
provided in their MTurk survey screen. Submission of the code prompted a notification to the 
researcher that compensation had been requested. A list of participants (identified only by an 
MTurk generated “Worker ID” number) with their compensation codes was posted to the 
                                                
22 At the conducting university, online surveys provide Information Sheets rather than Informed Consent, as the 
latter is meant to be signed in person by the participant.  
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researcher’s MTurk account. The researcher then initiated compensation by checking an 
“Approve” box next to each listed participant. If the researcher chose to “Not Approve” a 
participant, the researcher was required to provide a full explanation as to why compensation 
was being denied, which was then forwarded to the participant. If approved, MTurk would apply 
the compensation to the participant’s Amazon.com account within 24 hours. All submitted 
surveys were approved. A total of 144 participants enrolled in the study. The first 34 received a 
credit to their Amazon.com account of $1.00 (US dollars) while the final 110 received a $2.00 
credit. A 10% fee was assessed on total compensation issued by MTurk to bring the total cost of 
Study 1 to $279.40.  
Data Analysis 
Data screening, descriptive statistics, and inferential analyses were conducted using SPSS 
version 22 (IBM Corp, 2014). An exploratory factor analysis (EFA)23 using principal axis 
factoring (PAF) was run to validate the AMFS scale. Because the data were Likert-type, ordinal 
alpha reliability analyses were performed. The PAF and reliability analyses were run using R-
Factor for Ordinal Data (Basto & Pereira, 2012a)24, an interface program for SPSS and the 
open-source statistical software program R (R Core Team, 2015). The R-Factor procedures used 
for Study 1 were per Basto & Pereira (2012b) and Courtney (2013). Results of the EPAF were 
subjected to confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) with robust unweighted least squares (RULS) 
estimation25 using LISREL v9.2 (Jöreskog, & Sörbom, 2015).  
                                                
23 A PAF was chosen for the validation of the AMFS over another popular scale validation method, principal 
components analysis (PCA). The objective of the PCA is to account for as much variance as possible with as few 
factors, or components, as possible (Warner, 2012). Contrarily, the PAF evaluates the shared variance in a set of X 
measurements (items) underlain by a set of latent variables, or factors, which reflect the hypothesized constructs 
underlying the items (Warner, 2012). 
24 Details on the use of R-Factor for ordinal factor analysis have been covered in full in Ranson & Fitzgerald (in 
preparation).  
25 Per Forero, Maydeu-Olivares, and Gallardo-Pujol (2009), the typical default method of maximum likelihood 
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Given Study 1’s small sample size, which precluded multitrait-multimethod (MTMM) 
construct validity analysis, correlation analyses were run between the AMFR’s factors and the 
ERQ’s Cognitive Reappraisal dimension (for convergent construct validity) and Expressive 
Suppression dimension (for discriminant construct validity). Additionally, multiple regression 
was used to test the functional relation between the AMFS and ERQ. Simple regression analyses 
were run to test whether personality predicts the three simulation-based autobiographical 
memory functions. Type I error risk was limited to 5% (α = .05); thus, results yielding p ≤ .05 
were considered statistically significant.  
Power Analysis. Because funding for Study 1 data was limited, popular guidelines were 
consulted to ensure that the planned collection of 100–150 cases would adequately power the 
EFA, CFA, and inferential statistics. Two common guidelines—the determination of minimum 
N, and the determination of the minimum N to p ratio (where p is the number of items), were 
employed. First, the “100 rule,” which recommends that samples be no less than 100 (Gorsuch, 
1983; Kline, 1979), was used, as was the widely used ratio rule of five cases per item (Bryant & 
Yarnold, 1995; Everitt, 1975). Study 1’s N = 110 met both guidelines (as 5 cases × 10 items = 50 
cases)26.  
Of the 110 completed surveys, eight were missing data on the HEXACO. Therefore, all 
analyses using the HEXACO data were N = 102. An achieved power analysis using G*Power 
(Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996) indicated that, for a sample of that size using α = .05, Power 
= .80, and R2 ≥ .07, regression analyses were sufficiently powered.  
                                                                                                                                                       
(ML) assumes normality and continuous data, so is inappropriate when evaluating ordinal and/or nonnormal data. 
The optimal estimation method for ordinal and/or nonnormal data that underlie a polychoric correlation matrix is 
robust ULS (RULS) (Morata-Ramírez & Holgado-Tello, 2013). 
26 Note that the main objective of Study 1 was to validate the items generated to measure the hypothesized 
Perspective TakingAMFS, Prospection, and Counterfactual Thinking functions of autobiographical memory for later 
incorporation into an augmented CRS-A. However, because the CRS-A, which has already been validated, features 
41 items alone, the minimum sample size needed to sufficiently power the validation of an augmented CRS-A (N = 
at least 255 per the N:p rule) was prohibitively expensive for Study 1.  
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2.4 Results 
Self-Descriptions and Mental Time Travel Conditions 
The self-descriptions and mental time travel conditions were reviewed for indications that 
participants understood the instructions, could mentalize and articulate examples of each of the 
requested mental time travel scenarios, and could relate to the idea a self that was consistent with 
the actual and reconstructed memory descriptions. No respondent appeared to have difficulty 
with this task; in fact, most elaborated as much as possible given the space allowed. No analyses 
were run on this data. Examples of five participants’ responses to each of the three mental time 
travel conditions are listed in Table 6.  
Data Screening 
AMFS data were screened prior to scale validation procedures using SPSS v22 (IBM 
Corp, 2014). Results of the univariate (UV) normality analyses showed that 9 out of 1027 items 
(90%) demonstrated negative UV skew, with 3 of 10 (30%) significantly negatively UV skewed 
at the .05 level (Z ≥ |1.96|) or greater. A total of 9 out of 1028 items (90%) demonstrated negative 
UV kurtosis (platykurtosis), two (20%) of which were significantly so. As expected, results of 
the multivariate normality29 tests showed significant MV skew (Z = 45.43, p < .001) and MV 
kurtosis (Z = 96.55, p < .001). This nonnormality, along with the ordinal nature of the scale 
items, recommended the use of polychoric30 correlation matrices for the EPAFs. Factor means 
(standard deviations) were, for Perspective TakingAMFS, 3.97 (1.08); for Prospection, 4.05 (1.06), 
                                                
27 The exception, as seen in Table 3, is the Counterfactual Thinking item number 8: “I spend time imagining 
specific past events with different details or outcomes than what actually occurred,” ZSkew = 0.96, n.s.  
28 The exception here is the Prospection item number 6: “I think about my own past experiences when I believe that 
doing so can help guide my future,” ZKurtosis = 0.43, n.s. 
29 Multivariate (MV) normality is an assumption of MV analyses, of which principal axis factoring is an example. 
MV normality is specified by means and covariances (Lubke & Muthèn, 2004), the computation of which requires 
continuous data. However, the inability of ordinal data to pass tests of MV normality justifies the use of MV 
techniques designed specifically for ordinal data. 
30 Polychoric correlation is a technique designed specifically for ordinal-level variables. 
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and for Counterfactual Thinking, 3.70 (1.33). AMFS item descriptives, including item and factor 
means and standard deviations, can be found in Table 7. 
Item Generation 
 Potential items for the AMFS were written to reflect the general and specific properties of 
the construct under investigation: simulation-based autobiographical memory functions of 
perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking. Because the construct is relatively 
straightforward, and somewhat constrained in terms of the various characteristics that comprise 
each function, it was thought that three to four good items per function would suffice. For 
perspective taking, two items from the previously validated CRS-A (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in 
preparation) were included, as well as two new items. Resources for the generation of the two 
new Perspective TakingAMFS items were the Davis (1980, 1983) Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
(IRI), a self-report instrument that measures empathy on four dimensions, including perspective 
taking, and the empathic accuracy paradigm by Ickes (2003). For the Prospection items, 
literature on the phenomena of future thinking, as well as research on the Directive function of 
autobiographical memory—which has been hypothesized to include the use of autobiographical 
memory for future planning and prediction (e.g., Williams et al., 2008)—was consulted, as was 
the TALE (Bluck et al., 2005; Bluck & Alea, 2011), which includes Directive items concerning 
the use of autobiographical memory for such purposes as future planning and guiding decisions 
about which path to take. As there was no scale-like Counterfactual Thinking self-report 
available, the literature regarding the definitions, characteristics, and phenomena of 
counterfactual thinking (e.g., Leithy, Brown, & Robbins, 2006; MacLeod & Byrne, 1996; Roese 
& Olson, 1993; Sanna, 1996) informed the Counterfactual Thinking items.  
Exploratory Principal Axis Factoring (EPAF) Analyses 
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 In support of Goal 2.1, EFAs using the principal axis factoring (PAF) procedure were 
conducted. All 10 potential items generated for the AMFS were found to fit the model, 
suggesting that all 10 items were “good,” and that no additional items were needed.  
 Although the assumption in behavioral science research is that multidimensional 
constructs are best represented by oblique structures, the data may bear evidence for 
orthogonality (Hancock & Mueller, 2010). Therefore, although the conceptual structure of the 
multidimensional AMFS suggests that factors be allowed to correlate (as all three functions are 
simulation-based), it is recommended that the true nature of the structure be tested first before 
choosing an oblique or orthogonal rotation method (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Thus two 
EPAFs were run: The first to test the oblique nature of the AMFS, and the second to investigate 
orthogonality. 
EPAF1: Testing for an Oblique Structure 
Per the procedure recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007, p. 646) 31, EPAF1 was 
run to test the strength of the correlations between the three hypothesized factors using the 
oblique rotation method geomin Q-Q (Yates, 1987). Geomin was designed for use with, and has 
been shown to be especially suitable for, structures that are complex32 (Browne, 2001). Because 
structural complexity is to be expected with behavioral science EFA data (Hancock & Mueller, 
2010), cross-loadings were expected here as well. 
Results of the factor correlations (see Table 8) showed that only one of three correlations 
(between Perspective TakingAMFS and Counterfactual Thinking, r = .56, r2 = 31.02%), were ≥ .32 
                                                
31 Tabachnick and Fidell (2007, p. 646) contend that, from a statistical standpoint, the use of orthogonal versus 
oblique rotation should depend on the degree to which factors are correlated. Correlations ≥ .32 indicate that at least 
10% of the variance between factors is shared to recommends the use of oblique rotation. Factor correlations < .32 
suggest that the solution is orthogonal. Per Tabachnick and Fidell’s recommendation, the PAF should be run using 
oblique rotation and forcing the hypothesized number of conceptual factors in order to obtain the factor correlations.  
32 In this context, “complex” refers to structures that feature a high degree of “cross-loadings”; i.e., loadings whose 
sums across factors are > 1 (Browne, 2001). 
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(i.e., overlapping variance > 10%) to suggest slightly more orthogonality than overlap. However, 
other results of EPAF1 supported the hypothesized model.  
A series of extraction diagnostics33 were run to verify the hypothesized three functions. 
Results of the Fit to Comparison test and Kaiser rule indicated that the 10 items as a set belonged 
to three factors. Results of the acceleration factor (AC), optimal coordinates (OC), parallel 
analysis (PA), scree plot, and Velicer’s minimum average partial (MAP)34 were inconclusive, as 
each recommended two to three factors (see Figure 10). However, several other results supported 
the three-factor solution. The total variance explained by three factors was an acceptable 60.75%. 
However, the variance accounted for with only two factors was 53.97%—thus the three-factor 
model resulted in a nearly 7% improvement in variance explained. Because overextraction tends 
to result in less error than does underextraction (Wood, Tataryn, & Gorsuch, 1996), EPAF1 
proceeded on the assumption of three factors.  
Model fitness was demonstrated via several goodness-of-fit indices. The root mean 
square residual (RMSR) was, at .037, well below the more stringent cutoff of .05 to indicate a 
low amount of squared error in the model35. The root mean partial correlation controlling factors 
(RMSP)36 was, at .11, good, as smaller values indicate better fit (Basto & Pereira, 2012b). The 
goodness of fit index (GFI)37 and the adjusted GFI (AGFI)38, both of which tend to be large 
                                                
33 Details of the formulas that inform each of R-Factor’s extraction diagnostics can be found in Basteo and Pereira 
(2012b).  
34 For more information, see Velicer & Fava (1998). 
35 The RMSR reflects the squared difference (squared error) between the original covariance matrix and the 
covariance matrix generated from the factor loadings. By convention, an RMSR of < .08 is considered acceptable, 
while a RMSR < .05 is considered excellent. 
36 The RMSP is computed on the partial correlations between variables; i.e., after the effects of all factors have been 
removed. The RMSP reflects how much of the variance each pair of variables share that is not explained by the 
extracted factors (Basto & Pereira, 2012b).  
37 The goodness of fit (GFI) index reflects the proportion of observed covariances explained by covariances implied 
by the model. It deals with error in reproducing the variance-covariance matrix (Westland, 2015). 
38 The AFGI is a GFI adjusted by degrees of freedom (Westland, 2015). 
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within their bounds of 0 to 1, should meet or exceed a value of .95. Results of EPAF1 showed 
that both were > .99 to indicate excellent fit. As the GFI and AGFI are also highly sensitive to 
large samples (Kenny, 2015), Study 1’s modest N of 110 suggests that these high values reflect 
excellent model fit rather than inflation due to sample size. Other indications of model fitness: 
Communalities39 were all ≥ .40, with 63.64% > .50, which is acceptable for the social sciences 
(Osborne & Costello, 2005). The Keyser Meyer Olkin (KMO)40, at .75 was slightly below the 
ideal cutoff of .80 to indicate sampling adequacy (Cerny & Kaiser, 1977). However, the per-item 
measures of sampling adequacy (MSA)41 were all > 0.60, well over the minimum cutoff of .40 to 
indicate that factor analysis can proceed without dropping items (Basto & Pereira, 2012b). The 
EPAF1 per-item communalities and MSA values are featured with other item descriptives in 
Table 7. 
Table 9 summarizes the geomin Q-Q pattern matrix loadings. Because Study 1’s sample 
size was ≈ 100, loadings of .30 or higher were considered salient (Osborne & Costello, 2004) 
and statistically significant (Kline, 2002, p. 52). Complexity was defined as loadings ≥ .40 on 
two or more factors (Osborne & Costello, 2004). Results showed that all 10 items loaded 
saliently and significantly on their hypothesized factors, with no salient cross-loads (≥ .40). 
Figure 11 illustrates the obtained factor structure, which was then evaluated for reliability. 
Because Study 1 data were both Likert-type and nonnormal, ordinal reliability alphas42 
                                                
39 Communalities reflect the amount of variance in the item that is explained by its extracted factor(s).  
40 The KMO measure (Cerny & Kaiser, 1977) reflects the degree to which items share factor variance, and is 
therefore computed based on partial correlations. The more overlap that exists, the smaller the partial correlations, 
thus the closer the KMO is to 1. By convention, adequacy is obtained when KMO ≥ .80; i.e., that the items are fit to 
remain in the model. The KMO can also be an indication that the sample is underpowered. 
41 The MSA values are the per-item KMO measures (Cerny & Kaiser, 1977). Values ≥ .40 indicate item adequacy.  
42 The Cronbach’s coefficient alpha (Cronbach, 1951) measure of internal consistency (reliability) is inappropriate 
for data that is continuous and/or skewed, both of which are features of Likert data (Jamieson, 2004; Sheng & 
Sheng, 2012). Ordinal reliability alpha (Zumbo, Gadermann, & Zeisser, 2007) have been shown to provide better 
estimates of theoretical reliability than coefficient alpha when data are Likert-type, as the latter yields negatively 
biased reliability estimates under these conditions. Thus, although the lower bound of ordinal alpha is, like 
77 
	
were run. Ordinal alpha for all three factors were > .70 (Perspective TakingAMFS = .85; 
Prospection = .76; and Counterfactual Thinking = .84) to indicate that the items per factor 
demonstrated sufficient internal consistency. The EPAF1 ordinal reliability α values can be 
found on the diagonals of Table 8.  
EPAF2: Testing for an Orthogonal Structure 
 That two of the three AMFS factor correlations when using oblique rotation had < 10% 
overlap suggests that the AMFS structure may be orthogonal (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Thus 
EPAF2 was conducted to investigate this possibility. Additionally, because orthogonal rotation 
produces more cross-loads than do oblique methods (Hancock & Mueller, 2010), a second 
objective to EPAF2 was to test the stability of the AMFS structure when factors were not 
allowed to correlate.  
Table 10 displays the results of EPAF2, which employed the popular orthogonal rotation 
varimax43. As was found with the EPAF1 oblique model, no cross-loads were > .40, resulting in 
all items loading saliently and significantly on their hypothesized factors. Loadings values were 
similar to those in EPAF144. rotation. Likewise, the EPAF2 ordinal reliabilities were identical to 
those of EPAF1: Perspective TakingAMFS = .85; Prospection = .76; and Counterfactual Thinking 
= .84. The EPAF2 varimax rotated structure is illustrated in Figure 12.  
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 
In support of Goal 2.2, an SEM CFA was run to verify the EFA structure. The CFA was 
                                                                                                                                                       
coefficient alpha, .70, ordinal alpha values will likely be higher than Cronbach’s for the same data (Basto & Pereira, 
2012b). The formula for ordinal reliabilities can be found in Appendix E. 
43 Varimax rotation (Kaiser, 1958) was designed to simplify structure interpretation by finding a solution featuring 
many small loadings and few large loadings, as items should ultimately have large loadings with a single factor 
(Basto & Pereira, 2012b).  
44 The largest difference between any EPAF1 and EPAF2 loading was a negligible .07 on the Counterfactual 
Thinking item 8, “I spend time imagining specific past events with different details or outcomes than what actually 
occurred.” 
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conducted using robust ULS estimation (RULS) in LISREL v9.2 (Jöreskog, & Sörbom, 2015). 
CFA factors were allowed to correlate in keeping with the oblique rotation validated in EPAF1. 
Scale was set at 1.0 in the psi matrix per convention (Raykov & Marcoulides, 2006). Data were 
treated as ordinal. To accommodate the nonnormality present in the data, the C3 (Satorra-
Bentler) model chi-square was used. Because LISREL computes fit indices on the Maximum 
Likelihood Ratio (C1) chi-square (Hu & Bentler, 1999), the absolute and relative fit indices of 
interest to Study 1—the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), Tucker-Lewis non-
normed fit index (NNFI), and the comparative fit index (CFI)—were computed by hand using 
the formulas detailed in Appendix E.  
Data screening confirmed aspects of the distribution found in EPAF1. The data displayed 
nonsignificant negative univariate skew (ZSkew = –0.57, p = .572) and significant platykurtosis 
(ZKurtosis = –5.15, p < .001). The test of MV normality showed that both skew (ZSkew = 6.25, p < 
.001) and kurtosis (ZKurtosis = 143.47, p < .001) were significant, as was the skewness and kurtosis 
chi-square (χ2 = 70.25, p < .001) to further recommend use the C3 model (Forero et al., 2009). 
The condition number (CN) 45  of 5.41 was well below cutoff of 15 to indicate no 
multicollinearity. Of the 110 total response sets, 109 (99.1%) represented unique patterns. 
Mardia’s Index of Relative Multivariate Kurtosis was, at 1.20, below the Z-cutoff of 1.96 (for α 
= .05, two-tailed distribution) (Mardia, 1970).  
Per the C3 (Satorra-Bentler) test statistic, χ2(32) = 47.40, p = .039. That the C3 was 
significant at the .05 level is less likely due to poor model fit than the sample being slightly 
                                                
45 The condition number (CN) was originally used as evidence of multicollinearity (i.e., when two or more variables 
are highly correlated) if ≥ 30. However, a more conservative index recommends that the CN be below 15. The CN is 
equal to the square root of the maximum eigenvalue divided by the minimum eigenvalue. (Belsley, 1991) 
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overpowered, as Hoelter’s Critical N46 indicated that samples greater than 70.82 could be 
inappropriate for the chi-square test (Hu & Bentler, 1995). The RMSEA = .066 indicated 
acceptable fit; however, both the NNFI (.96) and the CFI (.97) indicated excellent fit. The 
Standarized Root Mean Residual (SRMR) was at the upper cutoff of .05, which also indicated 
excellent fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
Table 11 summarizes the squared multiple correlations, factor means, and standard 
deviations for the three-function, 10-item CFA. Squared multiple correlations were stable, with 
the lowest R2 = .46 and the highest R2 = .75. Factor correlations were significant and acceptable, 
ranging from .35 to .67 (see Table 12). All factor loadings, disturbances (psi matrix), and factor 
variances (theta-epsilon matrix) were significant and positive (see Table 13). The path diagram is 
displayed in Figure 13. 
Results also showed the residuals to be reasonably normally distributed. The median 
value for both the fitted and standardized residuals were 0, which is optimal, with residuals 
clustered fairly symmetrically about the median (Jöreskog, 1993). The normal probability (Q-Q) 
plot showed that residuals kept close to the diagonal line, with the exception being some slight 
departure on either end. Such patterns are typical when data are significantly kurtotic (Raykov & 
Marcoulides, 2006), as was the case with the Study 1 data.  
Structural equation modeling (SEM) reliability calculations for each of the six factors all 
exceeded the .70 cutoff to demonstrate high internal validity (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994; 
Werts, Rock, Linn, & Jöreskog, 1978): Perspective-Taking = .91; Prospection = .86; and 
Counterfactual Thinking = .94. The reliabilities per factor can also be found in Table 12. The 
formula for computing SEM reliabilities can be found in Appendix E. 
                                                
46 The Critical N (Hoelter, 1983) value reflects the sample size needed to yield a model appropriate for an adequate 
chi-square test. Samples > than the Critical N may yield significant chi-square results (Hu & Bentler, 1995). 
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Construct Validity Using the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) 
 In support of Goal 2.3, bivariate correlations yielding Pearson’s coefficients were run on 
the factors of the AMFS and factors of the ERQ (Gross & John, 2003) to test for convergent and 
discriminant validity. As expected, results showed that the ERQ dimension of Expressive 
Suppression was negligibly and not significantly associated with any of the three AMFS factors 
to support the AMFS’s discriminant validity (Perspective TakingAMFS, r = .13; Prospection, r = 
.08; Counterfactual Thinking, r = –.01). Also as expected, Cognitive Reappraisal was 
significantly (p < .001) correlated to Perspective TakingAMFS (r = .38), Prospection (r = .35), and 
Counterfactual Thinking (r = .49), to show moderate support for the AMFS’s convergent 
validity. That is, although the coefficients were lower than the recommended .50 cutoff to 
indicate convergence (Carlson & Herdman, 2012), moderate coefficients were expected given 
that Cognitive Reappraisal, which measures a simulation-based behavior, is not a direct 
conceptual correlate for the use of autobiographical memory for simulation-based behaviors. 
Thus, the overlap shared between AMFS functions and Cognitive Reappraisal should reflect only 
their common characteristic of simulation. As such, smaller coefficients were expected, and 
therefore convergent validity was considered attained; however, these effects will be re-verified 
in Study 2. The bivariate correlations between the AMFS and EQR factors can be found in Table 
14. 
Provisional Analyses 
 In addition to the analyses conducted to test the validity and reliability of the AMFS, two 
sets of additional analyses were conducted to get a better understanding of the AMFS functions, 
and to inform potential hypotheses to be tested in Study 2. These analyses were considered 
provisional because the same data used to validate the AMFS was also used for these analyses. 
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Thus, caution was taken in the interpretation of the results and utility of the conclusions drawn, 
as data used to validate a scale that is then used to assess properties of the construct at the 
individual level is likely to produce biased results (Boslaugh, 2007). Findings from provisional 
analyses will be verified in Study 2.  
 The Functional Relation Between the AMFS Functions and Cognitive Reappraisal. 
A provisional analysis was run to test Chapter 1’s Hypothesis 1.7, which stated that the 
autobiographical memory function of Perspective TakingAMFS, which is an other-directed 
behavior (Shanton & Goldman, 2010), is underlain by interpersonal simulation, whereas 
Prospection and Counterfactual Thinking, which are self-directed behaviors (Shanton & 
Goldman, 2010), are underlain by intrapersonal simulation. Thus a provisional multiple 
regression analysis was conducted to garner the functional relations between the simulation-
based ERQ dimension of Cognitive Reappraisal (Gross & John, 2003), and the three AMFS 
functions. The idea was that, if Perspective TakingAMFS and one of the two mental time travel 
functions significantly explained variance in Cognitive Reappraisal, such would be evidence for 
the two forms of mental simulation proposed. If only one of the three AMFS functions 
significantly accounted for variance in Cognitive Reappraisal, such would be evidence the 
AMFS functions are underlain by a single form of simulation. If all three AMFS functions 
significantly accounted for variance in Cognitive Reappraisal, then attempts to understand why 
would be undertaken in Study 2. 
 Results showed that the multiple regression model was significant, R = .55, F(3, 106) = 
15.62, p < .001, with the three AMFS functions significantly accounting for 30.6% of the 
variance in Cognitive The coefficients analyses showed that, when holding the other predictors 
constant, Perspective TakingAMFS significantly accounted for 3.4% of the unique variance in 
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Cognitive Reappraisal  (b = 1.14, t(106) = 2.28, p = .025), and that Counterfactual Thinking 
significantly accounted for 12.9% of the unique variance in Cognitive Reappraisal (b = 1.66, 
t(106) = 4.44, p < .001). Prospection was not a significant predictor of Cognitive Reappraisal (b 
= .46, t(106) = .88, p = .380, sr2 = .05%), and was therefore expelled from the model. Table 15 
summarizes the results of multiple regression analysis. These functional relations will be re-
verified in Study 2. 
 Exploring Associations Between AMFS Factors and HEXACO Factors. Simple 
linear regression analyses were run to explore whether the frequency with which individuals 
engage in simulation-based autobiographical memory behaviors was predicted by personality as 
measured with the 60-item, six-dimension HEXACO (Ashton & Lee, 2005, 2009). Results 
showed that Perspective TakingAMFS was significantly predicted by Emotional Stability (the 
inverse of Emotionality/Neuroticism), (R = .28, b = .30, t(100) = 2.93, p = .004), Extraversion (R 
= .22, b = .22, t(100) = 2.21, p = .030), Conscientiousness (R = .26, b = .37, t(100) = 2.70, p = 
.008), and Openness (R = .36, b = .33, t(100) = 3.91, p < .001). That is, the more emotionally 
stable, conscientious, and open one is to new experiences, the more frequent the use of 
autobiographical memory for Perspective TakingAMFS. With respect to Prospection, results 
indicated that Emotionality/Neuroticism (R = .22, b = .18, t(100) = 2.21, p = .029), Openness (R 
= .44, b = .40, t(100) = 4.84, p < .001), and Conscientiousness (R = .36, b = .37, t(100) = 3.45, p 
= .001) were significant predictors. The significant predictors of Counterfactual Thinking were 
Emotionality/Neuroticism (R = .37, b = .54, t(100) = 4.00, p < .001), and Introversion (the 
inverse of Extraversion) (R = .21, b = –.30, t(100) = –2.17, p = .032). Counterfactual thinking 
was also predicted by the inverse of Honesty-Humility R = .34, b = –.53, t(100) = –3.66, p < 
.001, which indicates that people who use autobiographical memory with greater frequency for 
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the purpose of counterfactual thinking tend be deceptive, manipulative, and feel a strong sense of 
entitlement. Table 16 summarizes the bivariate correlations between the AMFS and HEXACO 
factors. 
2.5 Discussion 
 The primary objective of Study 1 was to validate the Autobiographical Memory 
Functions of Simulation (AMFS) scale, a 10-item self-report instrument intended to measure 
individuals’ use of autobiographical memory content when engaging in interpersonal and 
intrapersonal simulation-based behaviors. Goals 2.1 and 2.2, which were to validate the three-
factor structure of the AMFS, were supported by the results of two EPAFs and an SEM CFA. As 
such, the items of the AMFS were found to reliably measure the proposed autobiographical 
memory functions of Perspective TakingAMFS, Prospection, and Counterfactual Thinking.  
Evidence for Goal 2.3, that the AMFS functions would demonstrate construct validity 
when compared to a related simulation-based measure, was obtained via positive, significant 
correlations between all three AMFS factors and the Cognitive Reappraisal dimension of the 
ERQ (Gross & John, 2003). The ERQ’s second dimension, Expressive Suppression, which 
measures outward, observable coping strategies, was found to be nonsignificantly correlated to 
the three AMFS factors, thus showing discriminant validity. Cognitive Reappraisal has also 
recently been linked with the reflective autobiographical memory function, which encompasses 
“intellectual attentiveness, epistemic curiosity about the self, and self-focused attention 
motivated by interest in ones’ self and behavior” (Harris, Rasmussen, & Berntsen, 2014, p. 8; 
Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). These traits align with the idea of autonoetic consciousness—i.e., 
one’s sense of self in the past, present, and future (e.g., Baddeley, Eysenck, & Anderson, 2009; 
Tulving, 1984, 1985, 2005; Wheeler et al., 1997). Autonoetic consciousness is thought to be a 
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capacity essential to both mental time travel (Tulving, 1985, 2005) and the ability to use personal 
experience (i.e., autobiographical memory content) for mental simulation (Spreng et al., 2009). 
These considerations therefore suggest that Cognitive Reappraisal is a cogent correlate with 
which to assess the role of simulation in the autobiographical memory functions of Perspective 
TakingAMFS, Prospection, and Counterfactual Thinking.  
A second objective of Goal 2.3 was to provisionally test the functional relation between 
the three AMFS functions and Cognitive Reappraisal in support of Chapter 1’s Hypothesis 1.7. 
Results showed that two of the three functions—Perspective TakingAMFS and Counterfactual 
Thinking—significantly accounted for variance in Cognitive Reappraisal. This suggests that, as 
proposed by Shanton and Goldman (2010), there are two forms of simulation that underlie 
perspective taking and mental time travel: interpersonal and interpersonal, respectively. 
However, given that Study 1 results were attained using data on which the AMFS was also 
validated, these findings will be re-verified in Study 2.  
 Goal 2.4 was to provisionally explore associations between the three AMFS functions 
and personality traits as measured using the HEXACO 60 (Ashton & Lee, 2005). Study 1 results 
showed that individuals who estimate the frequency with which they use autobiographical 
memory for Perspective TakingAMFS also rate themselves low in Emotionality/Neuroticism 
(calm, emotionally autonomous and stable), Conscientiousness (responsible, dependable, 
methodical), Extraversion (vivacious, loquacious, and assertive), and Openness (independent, 
curious, adventurous). Examples that support the link between high trait neuroticism and 
behavioral perspective taking come from research on sensitivity to social cues, which shows 
links between neuroticism and the diligent attendance during social interactions for clues about 
the other’s mental states (e.g., Denissen & Penke, 2008). Additionally, the literature on 
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attachment style—which concerns how one forms, and behaves in, close relationships (Ickes, 
2003), indicate that attachment style can be predicted by trait personality (Shaver & Brennan, 
1992). Attachment theory (Bowlby, 1958) states that individuals fall within one of three 
attachment categories: secure (reliable, communicative, proactive), anxious (insecure, 
hypervigilant, clingy), or avoidant (distant, independent, emotionally detached (Ickes, 2003). 
Studies show that anxious attachment and neuroticism predict the use of perspective taking in 
response to social threats (e.g., Crawford, Shaver, & Goldsmith, 2007. Research suggests that, 
because anxiously attached individuals fear others’ negative impressions, they hypervigilantly 
watch for evidence of the other’s disapproval during social interactions (Vrtička, Andersson, 
Grandjean, Sander, Vuilleumier, Zak, 2008). Thus individuals attempting to cope with fear of 
social rejection, disapproval, and non-inclusion may rely more heavily on the use of 
autobiographical memory to aid their assessments of social others. 
 Research in empathy may inform Study 1 findings that Conscientiousness predicted 
Perspective TakingAMFS. Per the Davis (1980, 1983) empathy model, on which the IRI self-report 
scale measuring the four dimensions of perspective taking, fantasy, empathic concern, and 
personal distress is based, perspective taking is characterized as a form of “cognitive,” rather 
than “emotional” empathy. Research shows that people who are both sensitive to other’s states of 
mind and high in conscientiousness tend to strive to “get things right,” and are thus highly 
motivated to accurately understand another’s point of view (Howe, 2012). Study 1 results 
therefore suggest that people high in conscientiousness draw more upon personal past experience 
in their attempt to achieve empathic accuracy.  
 The link between Extraversion and the use of autobiographical memory for perspective 
taking may reflect the increased opportunities to infer other minds, due to the extended social 
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network characteristically possessed by extraverts (Kessler, Creem-Regehr, Hamilton, 2015). 
Further, both Extraversion and Openness have been found to predict social self-efficacy 
(Cavanaugh, 2013), which has also been linked with social perspective taking (e.g., Gehlbach, 
Brown, Ioannou, Boyer, Hudson, Ni-Solomon, et al., 2008). Thus people who are open and 
willing to explore the thoughts and feelings of social others may depend more heavily on 
information from their personal pasts to facilitate affinity and understanding. 
Emotionality/Neuroticism, Openness, and Conscientiousness were also found to 
significantly predict the use of autobiographical memory for prospection. Related research shows 
that Neuroticism predicts an increase in negatively biased future imaginings (e.g., MacLeod & 
Byrne, 1996; MacLeod, Tata, Tyrer, Schmidt, Davidson, & Thompson, 2005), suggesting that, 
with respect to autobiographical memory functions, the higher the individual is on trait 
neuroticism, the more frequently he or she uses autobiographical memory for downward biased 
prospection. However, related research also indicates that the inverse of 
Emotionality/Neuroticism, Emotional Stability, has no apparent influence on the number of 
positive future imagining (MacLeod & Byrne, 1996; MacLeod et al., 2005). Curiously, an 
informal review of the responses given for the prospection mental time travel condition did not 
reveal this negativity bias. But because the same data used to validate the AMFS was then used 
to for the provisional personality analyses, some results may be distorted. Study 2 will therefore 
attempt to verify these findings. 
Related studies have also reported a link between behavioral prospection and Openness to 
Experience (e.g., Allen et al., 2014; Furey & Fortunato, 2014). This association has been 
attributed to the creativity and adventurousness that are characteristic of those high in Openness, 
thus encouraging musings and predictions about future possibilities (Allen, Greenlees, & Jones, 
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2014). Results of Study 1 may suggest that creative tendencies may facilitate the “pre-
experience” of imagined future scenarios constructed from autobiographical memory. Also, 
although related research shows that Extraversion predicts behavioral prospection (Allen et al., 
2014; Furey & Fortunato, 2014), Study 1 results did not support this relation47. This may be 
because, although Extraversion predicts the behavior of prospection, it may not predict the use of 
autobiographical memory for the behavior of prospection. Likewise, the provisional nature of the 
personality data, or the small sample size, may have produced misleading results. As such, the 
relation between Extraversion and the function of Prospection will be retested in Study 2. 
Study 1 also found that Emotionality/Neuroticism, Introversion, and the inverse of 
Honesty-Humility (vengefulness, insincerity, Machiavellianism) significantly predicted 
Counterfactual Thinking. Related research reports that individuals high in neuroticism tend to 
produce downwardly biased counterfactuals more often than do individuals low in neuroticism 
(Allen et al., 2014). As was the case with the Study 1 finding that Emotionality/Neuroticism 
predicted the use of autobiographical memory content for Prospection, this finding suggests that 
the counterfactuals reported for the mental time travel condition should have been negatively 
biased. While a review of the Counterfactual Thinking mental time travel task did reveal a 
tendency to recall negatively toned actual events, most of the corresponding, “reframed” 
counterfactuals were comparatively upwardly biased. 
That the use of autobiographical memory content for counterfactual thinking was 
inversely predicted by Extraversion may be due to findings indicating that introversion is related 
to emotional intensity—the tendency to experience extreme, complex, shifting emotion, and high 
sensitivity to others’ emotions (e.g., Aron, 1996). However, given that counterfactual thinking is 
                                                
47 R2 = .4%; p = .550. 
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known to be is often used a strategy for coping with emotionally charged memories (e.g., Allen 
et al., 2014; Lindeman & Abraham, 2008; Ruiselová, Kresánek, & Prokopcáková, 2009; 
Ruiselová & Prokopcáková, 2010), engaging in counterfactuals may be a employed more 
frequently be people low in trait extraversion. As such, results suggest that individuals high in 
Introversion are activating and retrieving autobiographical memory content with greater 
frequency than extraverted individuals for both the “re-experience” of the actual, emotionally 
charged events, as well as their imaginative “re-framing.” And finally, although related research 
(e.g., Allen et al., 2014) shows that Openness 48  and Agreeableness 49  are predictive of 
Counterfactual Thinking, Study 1 did not find these effects.  
 Finally, Goal 2.5 was to informally review responses to the mental time travel conditions 
and accompanying self-descriptors to discern whether respondents understood how 
autobiographical memory content informs counterfactual thinking and future thinking. Although 
not formally analyzed, results suggested that respondents grasped the idea that autobiographical 
memory content informs mental time travel, as responses were consistent with the given 
instructions, and the properties of personal past episodes that were described were sensible and 
aligned with the corresponding self-descriptors. For example, as shown in Table 6, when the 
actual past event was that the respondent’s “cat knocked over the plant and dirt was everywhere. 
I got mad and yelled at her,” the corresponding self-descriptors were, “irate,” “helpless,” “hurt,” 
impatient,” “ashamed.” Such descriptors are intuitively consistent with the described event. The 
counterfactual was then, “instead of getting mad I just cleaned up and realized the cat wasn’t 
doing it to make me mad.” This description indicates that the respondent understood the 
instruction to describe both an actual past event, as well as a counterfactual “reframing” of that 
                                                
48 R2 = .8%; p = .383. 
49 R2 = .8%; p = .360. 
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actual past event. The corresponding self-descriptors also changed accordingly, to “calm, 
“strong,” “rational,” “empathetic,” and “articulate.” That respondents understood the use of 
autobiographical memory for the three mental time travel conditions also implies that 
respondents are reasonably able to estimate the frequencies with which they use autobiographical 
memory content for such purposes.  
2.6 Conclusion 
The AMFS was developed as an instrument for the overarching objective of Chapter 1—
that autobiographical memory content specifically, rather than long-term memory content 
specifically, informs perspective taking and mental time travel, which has been operationalized 
in the current paper as prospection and counterfactual thinking. Study 2 will use the AMFS to 
support Chapter 1’s Hypothesis 1.2 (autobiographical memory content specifically, rather than 
long-term memory content generally, can inform perspective taking), Hypothesis 1.5 
(autobiographical memory content specifically, rather than long-term memory content generally, 
can inform mental time travel), Hypothesis 1.6 (the use of autobiographical memory content for 
perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking is evidence that all three are 
functions of autobiographical memory), and Hypothesis 1.7 (the autobiographical memory 
function of perspective taking reflects interpersonal simulation, and the autobiographical 
memory functions of prospection and counterfactual thinking reflect intrapersonal simulation). 
Together, such findings would empirically elucidate the role of autobiographical memory in 
interpersonal and intrapersonal simulation. 
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CHAPTER 3 STUDY 2: EMPIRICALLY VALIDATING THE LONG-TERM MEMORY 
COMPONENT OF THE EXPANDED SIMULATION MODEL 
 
3.1 Introduction  
Per simulation theory by Goldman (2006) and later Shanton and Goldman (2010), 
perspective taking and mental time travel are informed by “background information” activated 
and retrieved from long-term memory storage. The current paper has argued that a specific form 
of long-term memory content that could be used for these purposes is autobiographical memory 
content. To theoretically support, Chapter 1 proposed the Expanded Simulation Model, which 
aimed to explain how autobiographical memory could be used for perspective taking and mental 
time travel. Chapter 2 (Study 1) and Chapter 3 (Study 2) concern the empirical testing some of 
Chapter 1’s claims. 
The primary objective of Study 2 was to test four of Chapter 1’s hypotheses: 1) 
Hypothesis 1.2, that autobiographical memory content specifically, rather than long-term 
memory content generally, can be used for perspective taking; 2) Hypothesis 1.5, that 
autobiographical memory content specifically, rather than long-term memory content generally, 
can be used for mental time travel; 3) Hypothesis 1.6, that because autobiographical memory 
content is used for perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking, they are 
therefore functions of autobiographical memory; and 4) Hypothesis 1.7, that the autobiographical 
memory function of perspective taking reflects interpersonal simulation, and the 
autobiographical memory functions of prospection and counterfactual thinking reflect 
intrapersonal simulation.  
Justification and Background: Empirically Validating the Existence of, and Functional 
Relations Between, Autobiographical Memory Functions 
 
In order to validate the existence of the autobiographical memory functions of 
91 
	
perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking, Study 1 (Chapter 2) detailed the 
validation of the Autobiographical Memory Functions of Simulation (AMFS) scale, a self-report 
instrument designed to measure the use of autobiographical memory content for these purposes. 
The format of the AMFS was modeled on the Autobiographical Memory Functions of Joint 
Reminiscence (AMFJR) scale50, another self-report scale that measures rated frequency of 
functional use of autobiographical memory for an expanded set of reminiscence behaviors for 
adults (see Figure 9). The AMFJR was adapted from the Child-Caregiver Reminiscence Scale 
(CRS) (Kulkofsky & Koh, 2009), which concerns the use of autobiographical memory for a 
collection of reminiscence behaviors thought to be essential to the socialization and development 
of the autobiographical memory system (Nelson & Fivush, 2004). Like the CRS, the AMFJR is 
situated in the social context of joint-reminiscence, a setting within which autobiographical 
memory develops (Nelson & Fivush, 2004). The purpose of adapting the CRS for adults was to 
establish the extent to which functions that emerge in early childhood as a result of socialization 
are used in later life. Results of the AMFJR validation suggested that, although a core set of 
functions are used throughout life, some early-life functions either later coalesce or diverge into 
new functions, presumably in response to acquired cognitive abilities, language, understanding 
of time and self, and social interaction (Nelson & Fivush, 2004). This finding implies that 
perceived distinctions between autobiographical memory functions could be more relative than 
absolute.  
Thus, of interest to Study 2 was whether or not the functions of the AMFS and AMFJR 
would remain independent when examined collectively. However, it was assumed that the 
                                                
50 The Child-Caregiver Reminiscence Scale for Adults (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation), or “CRS-A,” has been 
renamed the Autobiographical Memory Functions of Joint Reminiscence (AMFJR) scale, to make clear the 
similarities and differences between it and the Autobiographical Memory Functions of Simulation (AMFS) scale.  
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common construct of “perspective taking” measured by both the Perspective TakingAMFS and 
Perspective TakingAMFJR subscales would be evident in respondents’ equivalent estimations of 
their use of autobiographical memory content for this purpose. This assumption was made 
despite structural differences between the Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective TakingAMFJR 
subscales (the AMFS features two items in addition to the two that comprise the AMFJR), and 
contextual differences between the AMFS and AMFJR scales (the AMFS is “simulation-based” 
whereas the AMFJR is “socially situated”). It was expected that the constructual similarities of 
the Perspective TakingAMFS and the Perspective TakingAMFJR functions would supersede the 
structural differences to compel equivalent estimations of autobiographical memory content use 
for the subscales concerning “perspective taking” behavior. 
Also of interest to Study 2 was whether the functions of the AMFS would be empirically 
linked to the broad functions of the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011), as was the case for all six 
functions of the AMFJR (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation) and the six corresponding 
functions of the CRS (Kulkofsky & Koh, 2009). Although Ranson and Fitzgerald found that the 
Perspective TakingAMFJR function mapped onto the TALE’s broad Social function, it was 
assumed that the Perspective TakingAMFS function would do likewise. But given the novelty of 
the Prospection and Counterfactual Thinking functions, no direct evidence was available to 
recommend associations with the TALE. However, because theory indicates that an objective of 
the Directive function is the directing of present and future thoughts and actions (Williams et al., 
2008), it was reasonable to expect that the Prospection function would be broadly Directive. 
Because counterfactual thinking can be used as an emotion regulation strategy (e.g., Allen et al., 
2014; Lindeman & Abraham, 2008; Ruiselová et al., 2009; Ruiselová & Prokopcáková, 2010), 
and because Ranson and Fitzgerald found that the AMFJR function of Emotion Regulation 
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mapped as Directive, it was also possible that Counterfactual Thinking would be broadly 
Directive. Alternatively, Shanton and Goldman (2010) characterized simulated mental time 
travel as a self-directed behavior, implying that Prospection and Counterfactual Thinking could 
be broadly Self. Thus Study 2 explored whether the functions of Prospection and Counterfactual 
thinking are primarily Directive, Self, a combination of both, or, altogether independent of the 
broad functions of the TALE.  
Justification and Background: Individual Differences in Autobiographical Memory Use 
In addition to validating the existence of, and associations between, the autobiographical 
memory functions measured by the AMFS, AMFJR, and TALE, it was also important to the 
current paper to discern who uses which autobiographical memory functions and why. Thus 
Study 2 examined individual differences in the rated frequency of functions use of 
autobiographical memory as measured by the AMFS, AMFJR, and TALE. Specifically Study 2 
tested for effects of personality, age, gender, and culture.  
Although little direct evidence was available to inform expected results, the following 
summarizes related research on how person characteristics influence autobiographical memory 
and rated frequency of its functional use, as well as behavioral perspective taking, prospection, 
and counterfactual thinking. 
Personality Effects. Research shows that personality traits measured by Five Factor 
(Emotionality/Neuroticism, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness to 
Experience) inventories can predict the experience and use of autobiographical memory 
(Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010). Because personality traits inform conceptual self-knowledge, 
they are considered constituents of semantic autobiographical memory (Abram et al., 2014; 
Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Yet, self-identity is also said to arise from the 
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life story or narrative, which consists of autobiographical memory content accumulated over 
one’s lifetime, as well as previously imagined and stored future scenarios and the person one 
predicts he or she might be in such situations (e.g., McAdams, 2001). As such, links have been 
found between the content of one’s life-narrative and personality traits (McAdams, Anyidoho, 
Brown, Huang, Kaplan, & Machado, 2004; Woike, Gersekovich, Piorkowski, & Polo, 1999). 
Although the literature on autobiographical memory functions has grown in recent years, 
only a small portion of functions studies have examined personality effects, and of those, results 
have been inconsistent (Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010). Although Bluck and Alea (2009, 2011) 
found that Extraversion predicted the broad Social function (i.e., the more extraverted an 
individual, the more that that individual is likely to use autobiographical memory for the purpose 
of fostering and maintaining social relationships), Neuroticism—the only other trait evaluated in 
that study—was unrelated to any of the TALE functions. This was unexpected given previous 
findings that Neuroticism predicts both Self (Cappeliez & O’Rourke, 2002; Rasmussen & 
Berntsen, 2010) and Directive (Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010) functions. In an extensive study of 
personality and autobiographical memory, Rasmussen and Berntsen (2010) not only replicated 
the relation between Extraversion and the broad Social function reported by Bluck and Alea, but 
also found that Openness to Experience predicted the Social, Self, and Directive functions. 
However, Rasmussen and Berntsen found no significant associations between the three TALE 
functions and the personality traits of Agreeableness or Conscientiousness. And although Ranson 
and Fitzgerald did not assess personality effects in their validation of the AMFJR, it was 
reasonable to expect that those personality traits shown by previous research to predict the broad 
Social, Self, and Directive functions would be “inherited” by the broad functions’ corresponding 
AMFJR functions.  
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Thus, in an attempt to replicate previous findings and fill gaps in the literature, Study 2 
tested for trait-level personality effects on the AMFS, AMFJR, and TALE. Additionally, facet-
level effects were sought for the functions of the AMFS. Study 2 also aimed to yield evidence of 
the HEXACO-100’s fitness and utility within the context of autobiographical memory functions 
research, especially given that Study 1 of the current paper is the only known autobiographical 
memory functions study to date that has incorporated it. Finally, because the AMFJR has not 
previously been assessed for personality effects, Study 2 also sought to document the 
relationship between personality factors and the rated frequency of its six “socially situated” 
functions of  Conversation, Perspective TakingAMFJR, Relationship Maintenance, 
Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control, Emotion Regulation, and Self. 
Age Effects. Research shows that autobiographical memories change over the life span in 
response to their integration with old and new memories and re-experience for various purposes 
over time (Bluck & Habermas, 2001). As such, the differential use of autobiographical memory 
as a function of age has informed such instruments as the Child-Caregiver Reminiscence Scale 
(CRS) (Kulkofsky & Koh, 2009)—which concerns those functions essential to the socialization 
and development of the autobiographical memory system—and the Reminiscence Functions 
Scale (RFS) (Webster, 1995, 1997), which is especially focused on functions used later in life. 
Thus, although research examines rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical 
memory within isolated life stages, other studies have investigated the impact of age in general. 
For example, Bluck and Alea (2009) found that older adults tend to use autobiographical 
memory for the TALE’s broad family of Self functions less frequently than do younger adults. 
This result was attributed to the hypothesis that older adults have, over time, acquired a clear 
self-concept that can be sustained with little need to consult stored autobiographical information. 
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In contrast, younger individuals discuss or contemplate autobiographical memories more often 
than do older adults in order to facilitate the development of their still-forming self-concepts. 
Bluck and Alea also found that age predicted the broad Directive function, claiming that young 
adults may rely more heavily on autobiographical memory to direct future actions (i.e., engage in 
prospection) because their sense of time ahead is greater than that of older adults. That Bluck and 
Alea found no age effects for the broad Social function is surprising; both the CRS and RFS—
which were designed in response to known age effects in rated frequency of functional use of 
autobiographical memory—feature items specifically intended to assess autobiographical 
memory use for social purposes. Note that none of the studies of age effects have employed the 
gold standard of longitudinal design, and none have possessed sufficient power to assess small 
effects.  
Related research also suggests possible age effects for the AMFS and AMFJR. With 
respect to the AMFS, age is known to influences the behaviors of perspective taking, 
prospection, and counterfactual thinking. For example, skillfulness in perspective taking 
progresses in stages that aligns with the course of normal cognitive development—a trajectory 
that begins with the emergence of theory of mind capacity at three to four years of age (Selman, 
2003). By the age of 15, normally developed adolescents have acquired proficiency in third-
person perspective taking, with “societal perspective-taking”—the ability to grasp, forecast, and 
coordinate various perspectives—developing into adulthood from about the age of 14 (Selman, 
2003). However, evidence that perspective taking abilities decline as a function of age has been 
inconsistent. Some research indicates age-related deficiencies in perspective taking may be due 
to age-related cognitive deficiencies (e.g., Helson, Jones, & Kwan, 2002; Maylor, Moulson, 
Munson, & Taylor, 2002; Ruffman, Henry, Livingston, & Phillips, 2008). However, other 
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studies show no decline in perspective taking abilities, surmising that the uptick in the number of 
satisfying social relationships that individuals tend to acquire later life help to keep social-
cognition skills sharp (Kilpatrick, Bissonnette, & Rusbelt, 2002). Likewise, meaningful social 
interaction may motivate individuals to not only engage in, but become proficient in, perspective 
taking (Zhang, Feng, Stanley, & Isaacowitz, 2013).  
A study by Abram et al. (2008) reports that, during the early years of cognitive 
development—when the autobiographical memory system is just beginning to emerge—children 
have difficulty with both past and future episodic remembering—challenges that are typically 
overcome by early adulthood. Other studies have found that older adults tend to generate more 
semantic autobiographical memory details than episodic autobiographical memory details when 
asked to imagine future events (Addis et al., 2009; Cole, Morrison, & Conway, 2013, Schacter, 
Gaesser, & Addis, 2013). This finding somewhat contradicts the assumption that the primary 
form of autobiographical memory content used during the “re-experiencing” of past events and 
the “pre-experiencing” of future scenarios is episodic (e.g., Tulving, 2002b; Shanton & 
Goldman, 2010).  
Like perspective taking and prospection, individuals develop the ability to engage in 
counterfactual thinking concurrent with the acquisition of theory of mind (Beck et al., 2011; 
Bosaki, 2008; Epstude & Roese, 2008; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). However, children for whom 
this capacity is just beginning to emerge have more difficulty with counterfactual tasks than they 
do with imagining possible future realities (Riggs, Peterson, Robinson, & Mitchell, 1998). This 
may be because children of this age are inexperienced in processing and expressing those 
complex emotions associated with counterfactual thinking: relief (Guttentag & Ferrell, 2004), 
disappointment (e.g., Coricelli & Rustichini, 2010), envy (Coricelli & Rustichini, 2010), and 
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especially, regret (e.g., Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002; Roese, Pennington, Coleman, Janicki, Li, 
and Kenrick, 2008; Roese, & Summerville, 2005; Tykocinski & Pittman, 1995). Research on 
adulthood finds that, once the ability to generate counterfactuals has been instantiated, the 
emotional valence of counterfactuals changes as a function of age. Specifically, older adults tend 
to engage in more positive counterfactuals than do young people (Mather & Carstensen, 2005).  
Gender Effects. Although gender effects with respect to various properties of 
autobiographical memory have been widely reported (e.g., Grysman & Fivush, 2016; Grysman 
& Hudson, 2012; St. Jacques, Conway, & Cabeza, 2011), other studies have been unable to 
detect such effects (Rubin, Schulkind, & Rahhal, 1999). Such is the case with the broad 
functions of the TALE, for which no gender effects have been found to date (Bluck & Alea, 
2009). Thus, it could be assumed that gender would play no role in rated frequency of functional 
use of autobiographical memory as measured by the AMFJR, the functions of which were found 
by Ranson and Fitzgerald (in preparation) to map onto the TALE. However, although the 
AMFJR was shown to be structurally invariant across gender (i.e., the scale performed 
equivalently for both men and women), mean gender differences were not tested.  
Despite the lack of gender differences with respect to the TALE, gender effects in rated 
frequency of functional use of autobiographical memory content are nonetheless plausible given 
related research. For example, studies show that men and women differ in the recollection of 
early personal emotional events (Davis, 1999), the socialization of autobiographical memory 
(Nelson & Fivush, 2002, 2004), the degree of detail recalled (Pillemer, Wink, Di Donato, & 
Sanborn, 2003; Ross & Holmberg 1992; Seidlitz & Diener 1998), and the frequency of reflecting 
on the past (Webster, 1995).  
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Culture Effects. There is much evidence indicating that the development of the 
autobiographical memory system, as well as the nature of autobiographical memory content, are 
differentially socialized according to culture (Nelson & Fivush, 2002, 2004). Likewise, previous 
research shows that culture can impact rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical 
memory (Ranson, 2014), as well as the behaviors of perspective taking (e.g., Rasmussen & 
Sieck, 2012), imagining future scenarios (e.g., Moore, 2006), and counterfactual thinking (e.g., 
Gilbert, 2012). Thus it was important for Study 2 to glean whether the cultural variation found in 
such contexts are reflected in the use of autobiographical memory for the functions measured by 
the AMFS, AMFJR, and TALE. 
Few autobiographical memory functions studies have had the opportunity to investigate 
cultural variations, as obtaining ethnically diverse samples large enough for statistical evaluation 
is challenging. However, Ranson (2014) tested the functions of the AMFJR for possible cultural 
effects between the Caucasian and African-American/Black ethnic groups. Results showed that 
that people who identify as Caucasian use of autobiographical memory with greater frequency 
for the purpose of Conversation (thinking or talking about the past to promote social interaction; 
i.e., engage in “small talk” about the past) than do people who identify as African-
American/Black. Related research shows that “small-talk” can be perceived as an informal, light-
hearted means of increasing social intimacy, or contrarily, as superficial and manipulative 
(Goldsmith & Baxter, 1996). Thus, the Ranson findings may suggest that “small-talk past-talk” 
is a more widely accepted practice in Caucasian ethnic groups, whereas it is thought by African-
American/Black cultures to be undesirable and something to be avoided (Goldsmith & Baxter, 
1996). 
Ranson (2014) also found that African-American/Blacks used autobiographical memory 
100 
	
content more often than Caucasians for Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control (thinking 
or talking about the past in an attempt to resolve everyday difficulties). Related research shows 
that talking about the challenges one is facing and engaging in problem-solving with others may 
facilitate decision-making, provide needed instruction, and prompt others to offer advice 
(Goldsmith & Baxter, 2006), which would promote the Ranson finding. Such interactions may 
occur more frequently when individuals’ real-life circumstances—whether real or perceived—
require resolution or repair. For example, research shows that, compared to Caucasians, the life 
experiences of African-American/Blacks reflect more chronic negativity and hardship, that 
aligns with other factors known to be associated with this ethnic group, such as poverty/low 
socioeconomic status, feelings of oppression, actual and perceived discrimination, and loss of 
control (Coleman, 2012). If considered with the other Ranson finding, African-American/Blacks 
may engage in less Conversation “past-talk” than Caucasians because they tend to reminisce 
with others instead about more serious matters.  
Related research may also inform possible culture effects for the functions measured by 
the AMFS. For example, there is evidence that the behaviors of perspective taking and 
prospection are differentially influenced by culture. With respect to perspective taking, a recent 
study found that perspective-taking accuracy is severely impaired when the perceiver has little to 
no experience with the target other’s culture (Rasmussen & Sieck, 2012). Although such 
conclusions emphasize the importance of cultural experience for developing a proficiency in 
understanding others, it also implies that individuals will simulate whatever “background 
information” they have available—however mismatched for the task—rather than not make an 
attempt to infer the minds of unfamiliar others. While this may suggest that perspective taking, 
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as an everyday phenomenon (Ickes, 2003; Winner, 2000), may be engaged in equivalently 
regardless of culture, no studies were found that specifically tested this possibility. 
 With respect to prospection, research shows that different cultures perceive and plan for 
the future for different purposes and with different expectations of what is possible. For example, 
a study by Moore (2006) posited that, because American culture is future-oriented, it sees the 
future as something that can be anticipated and controlled. As such, Americans tend to imagine 
future scenarios in which desired short- and long-term outcomes are planned for and achieved. 
Contrarily, because Hindu culture is past-oriented, its members believe that the future is 
unalterably determined by past action. As such, their imagined future scenarios concern short-
term outcomes constrained by past occurrences. 
 Research exploring cultural effects in counterfactual thinking have found that the content 
of counterfactuals differs between individualistic and collectivist cultures (e.g.,  Gilbert, 2012; 
White & Lehman, 2005). Likewise, cultural priorities can inform the nature and frequency of the 
counterfactuals generated. For example, Chen, Chiu, Roese, Tam, & Lau (2006) found that, in 
response to negative life events concerning schoolwork, romance, family, and friendship, 
collectivist participants were more likely to generate subtractive counterfactuals—i.e., 
“reframing” the negative event such that the actual outcome did not occur—than additive 
counterfactuals—i.e., “reframing” the negative event such that the actual event is augmented to 
make something new occur. Results also showed that collectivist cultures engaged in more 
counterfactuals for schoolwork and family events than did participants from individualist 
cultures. However, it is currently unknown if, in general, there are cultural differences in the 
frequency with which collectivist versus individualistic cultures engage in counterfactual 
thinking.  
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3.2 Objective, Hypotheses, and Goals 
Primary Objective  
The primary objective of Study 2 was to provide empirical evidence for the Expanded 
Simulation Model proposed in Chapter 1. Specifically, Study 2 sought evidence that 
autobiographical memory content can be used for simulation-based perspective taking (Chapter 
1, Hypothesis 1.2) and mental time travel (Chapter 1, Hypothesis 1.5), the latter of which was 
operationalized in the current paper as prospection. and counterfactual thinking. Establishing that 
autobiographical memory is used for these purposes will empirically support Chapter 1’s 
Hypothesis 1.6, that perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking are therefore 
functions of autobiographical memory. Study 2 also sought evidence in support of Chapter 1’s 
Hypothesis 1.7, that the form of simulation that underlies perspective taking is interpersonal, 
whereas the form of simulation that underlies mental time travel is intrapersonal. 
In pursuit of these objectives, Study 2 was designed to evaluate six new hypotheses and 
three goals. Hypotheses were stated when either direct evidence or strongly related previous 
findings were available to recommend particular outcomes. Goals were stated in lieu of 
hypotheses when gaps in the literature precluded prediction, or when available evidence was too 
conceptually distal to make prediction plausible. The provisional analyses of Study 1 were also 
rerun in Study 2, with the expectation that Study 1 results would be replicated. 
Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis 3.1. It was assumed that, despite structural differences between the 
Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective TakingAMFJR subscales (i.e., the AMFS subscale featured 
two additional items in addition to the two items comprising the AMFJR subscale), the use of 
autobiographical memory content for perspective taking, regardless of the instrument on which it 
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was measured, would be relatively equivalent. The result would be a single “autobiographical 
memory functions” second-order construct indicated by eight distinct constructs comprising the 
following subscales: the AMFS’s Prospection and Counterfactual Thinking subscales; the 
AMFJR’s Conversation, Relationship Maintenance, Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral 
Control, Emotion Regulation, and Self subscales; and a single Perspective TakingS&JR51 subscale. 
The expected eight-function, second-order structure was in lieu of a single-order, oblique 
structure, the latter of which had no reasonable conceptual basis (e.g., there was no reason why 
such simulation-based functions as Counterfactual Thinking would be directly inter-correlated 
with such socially situated functions as Conversation). As such, the hypothesized second-order 
model was not only more parsimonious, but more interpretable (Chen, Sousa, & West, 2005; 
Judge, Erez, Bono, & Thoresen, 2002). The predicted eight-function structure is depicted in 
Figure 14. 
Hypothesis 3.2 The six autobiographical memory functions measured by the AMFJR 
would map onto the three autobiographical memory functions measured by the TALE (Bluck & 
Alea, 2011), in replication of results by Ranson & Fitzgerald (in preparation). However, to 
extend the research by Ranson and Fitzgerald, Hypothesis 3.2 tested whether the TALE 
functions could be characterized as higher-order functions of the AMFJR. It was also 
hypothesized that the Perspective TakingAMFS function, as an other-directed phenomenon 
underlain by interpersonal simulation (Shanton & Goldman,  2010), would be predicted by the 
TALE’s broad Social function. Contrarily, it was predicted that Prospection and Counterfactual 
Thinking, as self-directed phenomena underlain by intrapersonal simulation (Shanton & 
Goldman,  2010), would map onto the broad Self function. Also, given related research that 
                                                
51 Unless otherwise noted, from this point forward, the current paper will use the convention of tacking the subscript 
notation “S&JR” to all references to the subscale comprising both the Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective 
TakingAMFJR subscales. 
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characterizes the Directive function as involving the use of autobiographical memory for future 
planning (e.g., Bluck et al., 2005; Williams et al., 2008), Study 2 tested whether the Prospection 
function was broadly Directive. Likewise, because counterfactual thinking can be used as an 
emotion control strategy (e.g., Allen et al., 2014; Lindeman & Abraham, 2008; Ruiselová et al., 
2009; Ruiselová & Prokopcáková, 2010; Williams et al., 2008), which renders it conceptually 
similar to the broadly Directive Emotion Regulation function of the AMFJR, Study 2 tested 
whether the Counterfactual Thinking function was therefore also broadly Directive.  
Assuming confirmation of the Hypothesis 3.2, of interest to Study 2 was whether the 
AMFS and AMFJR functions would “inherit” significant individual difference effects from their 
corresponding broad functions of the TALE. It was thought that, if the personality, age, gender, 
and/or culture effects found for the functions of the TALE then manifested in the lower-order 
functions of the AMFS and AMFJR, such would be additional support for the second-order 
structure predicted in Hypothesis 3.2.  
Hypothesis 3.3. Study 2 will replicate Study 1 findings regarding associations between 
the AMFS functions and the ERQ’s (Gross & John, 2003) Cognitive Reappraisal dimension, 
which reflects a simulation-based process (Lindeman & Abraham, 2008).  
Hypothesis 3.4. Perspective TakingAMFS would emerge as the primary significant 
predictor reflecting the interpersonal form of simulation proposed by the Shanton and Goldman 
(2010) to underlie behavioral perspective taking. Likewise, it was expected that Counterfactual 
Thinking would emerge as the second significant predictor of Cognitive Reappraisal and would 
reflect the intrapersonal form of simulation posited by Shanton & Goldman to underlie mental 
time travel.  
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There are two arguments as to why Counterfactual Thinking, rather than Prospection, was 
expected to significantly predict Cognitive Reappraisal on behalf of intrapersonal simulation. 
One, Study 1 results indicated that Counterfactual Thinking accounted for almost four times the 
variance in Cognitive Reappraisal than did Perspective TakingAMFS, and more than 25 times the 
variance accounted for by Prospection—a pattern of effects that was expected to be replicated in 
Study 2. Two, related research (e.g., Allen et al., 2014) implies that behavioral counterfactual 
thinking is more emotion-based than either behavioral prospection or perspective taking. 
Because Cognitive Reappraisal assesses emotion-control strategies (e.g., Allen et al., 2014; 
Lindeman & Abraham, 2008; Ruiselová et al., 2009; Ruiselová & Prokopcáková, 2010), it is 
thus conceptually plausible that the function most predictive of Cognitive Reappraisal would be 
Counterfactual Thinking. However, given that the results of Study 1 were provisional and thus 
potentially biased, it was possible that Study 2 effects would be comparatively smaller in 
magnitude. Additionally, it was possible that, given that Study 2’s sample was substantially 
larger than Study 1’s, Study 2 would yield significant results where Study 1 did not.  
Hypothesis 3.5. An association would be found between the AMFJR’s function of 
Emotion Regulation and the ERQ’s Expressive Suppression (Gross & John, 2003). The 
Expressive Suppression dimension concerns the management of outward behaviors that can be 
socially observed (Gross & John, 2003). Likewise, the AMFJR’s Emotion Regulation function 
involves the use of “past-talk” to understand or obtain emotion control (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in 
preparation). That Study 1 showed no relation between Expressive Suppression and the three 
AMFS functions was attributed to the fact that Expressive Suppression is more likely to be 
elicited by social situations (i.e., where one’s emotional behavior is observed, and to which 
others may react), whereas the AMFS functions, which are simulation based, have been posited 
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herein as being comparatively more subjective. Examples of Emotion Regulation items that 
reflect their objectiveness include, “I think or talk about the past to emphasize or clarify 
appropriate emotional responses”; and “I think or talk about the past to help me or another 
control emotions” (see Table 18 for all AMFJR Emotion Regulation items). As the AMFJR’s 
Emotion Regulation function thus concerns strategies played out in the social sphere, it was 
anticipated that this and Expressive Suppression would be correlated.  
Hypothesis 3.6. Results from previous studies regarding associations between Five 
Factor inventory dimensions and the functions of the TALE were expected to be replicated. 
Specifically, it was hypothesized that Openness to Experience would predict the broad Directive 
function (Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010; Webster, 1993), the broad Self function (Cappeliez & 
O’Rourke, 2002; Rasmussen & Berntsen. 2010), and the broad Social function (Rasmussen & 
Berntsen, 2010). Additionally, it was expected that Emotionality/Neuroticism would predict both 
the broad Self function (Cappeliez & O’Rourke, 2002; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010), and the 
broad Directive function (Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010) Finally, it was hypothesized that 
Extraversion would predict the broad Social function (Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010). Also of 
interest was whether personality effects would be found for the Agreeableness and 
Conscientiousness dimensions, as no known autobiographical memory functions study to date 
has reported associations between these dimensions and TALE functions (Rasmussen & 
Berntsen, 2010).  
With respect to the AMFS, the associations found in Study 1 between the personality 
dimensions of the HEXACO-60 (Ashton & Lee, 2009) were expected to be replicated in Study 2 
when using the 100-item HEXACO-PI-R (Ashton & Lee, 2005, 2009). Specifically, it was 
hypothesized that Perspective TakingAMFS would be predicted by Emotional Stability (the inverse 
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of Emotionality/Neuroticism), Extraversion, Conscientiousness, and Openness to Experience; 
that Prospection would be predicted by Emotionality/Neuroticism, Conscientiousness, and 
Openness to Experience; and that Counterfactual Thinking would be predicted by 
Emotionality/Neuroticism, Introversion (the inverse of Extraversion), and the inverse of 
Honesty-Humility. Also of interest was whether personality would differentially predict the 
simulation-based Perspective TakingAMFS function compared to the socially situated Perspective 
TakingAMFJR function. The results should help elucidate the Rasmussen and Berntsen (2010) 
contention that the stability of the relation between the TALE Social function (and thus its lower-
order functions) and Extraversion is dependent on the Social function’s operationalization. 
Because there was no previous research on which to base specific hypotheses, Study 2 
explored the relations between AMFS functions and the 24 HEXACO facets, as well as the 
HEXACO’s interstitial dimension, Altruism (the inverse of which is Antagonism). Given the 
extensive small, but significant findings that could not be corroborated by related research, 
results of the facet analyses and a discussion of findings can be found in Appendix F.  
Goals 
Goal 3.1. To replicate the age effects previously reported for the TALE, and to test 
whether age predicted the use of autobiographical memory for the functions of the AMFS and 
AMFJR52. Although related research has reported cognitive development-related age effects for 
behavioral perspective taking (Selman, 2003) and behavioral prospection (Abrams et al., 2008), 
and because the functions of the AMFJR were adapted from a scale concerned with the functions 
that emerge in early childhood but are presumed to be used in some form throughout the life 
                                                
52 Age effects were not tested during validation of the AMFJR. The survey system (SONA) used to collect data for 
that study featured a standard prescreen that asked respondents to indicate only if he/she was over 18 years of age or 
not. 
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span, it was unknown if such effects would impact the rated frequency of functional use of 
autobiographical memory content for the functions measured by the AMFS and AMFJR.  
Goal 3.2. To test for possible gender effects in the functions of the TALE, AMFS, and 
AMFJR. Although no study to date has found gender differences in rated frequency of functional 
use of autobiographical memory as measured by the TALE, differences in the processing, 
experiencing, and properties of autobiographical memory are widely reported to occur between 
men and women could plausible influence gender effects on autobiographical memory functions. 
Goal 3.3. To examine differences in the frequency with which autobiographical memory 
is used for the functions of the TALE, AMFS, and AMFJR across ethnic groups. Although no 
culture effects have been reported for the TALE, Study 2 aimed to replicate findings by Ranson 
(2014) that showed differential use of autobiographical memory for the AMFJR functions of 
Conversation and Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control by Caucasians and African-
American/Blacks. Additionally, because related research indicates that there are cultural 
differences in the use of behavioral perspective taking (e.g., Rasmussen & Sieck, 2012), 
prospection (e.g., Moore, 2006), and counterfactual thinking (e.g., Chen et al., 2006; Gilbert, 
2012; White & Lehman, 2005), Study 2 tested whether or not such influences impact the use of 
autobiographical memory for the functions measured by the AMFS.  
3.3 Methods 
Participants 
A total of 903 participants, who were recruited online through MTurk 
(www.MTurk.com), completed a survey administered by Qualtrics (2015, Provo, UT). 
Enrollment in Study 1, which was also conducted through MTurk, prohibited enrollment in 
Study 2 to ensure that all cases were unique across the two studies.  
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Participant ages ranged from 18 to 66+ (M = 34.92 years, SD = 11.21), with the majority 
(n = 382, 42.4%) being slightly older than college-aged (ages 25–34). As was the case for Study 
1, the gender split was nearly equal (F = 449, 49.7%, M = 450, 49.8%), with three participants 
(0.3%) identifying as transgender, and one (0.1%) preferring not to answer. As for ethnicity/race, 
because the Native American and Hawaiian/Pacific Islander ethnicity/race groups had 
representation of < 1% of the total sample for both Study 1 and the AMFJR validation study by 
Ranson and Fitzgerald (in preparation), those groups were omitted from Study 2. Instead, to 
align with more recent recommendation by the U.S. Census Bureau (e.g., Hoeffel, Rastogi, Kim, 
& Shahid, 2012), “Asian” was split into “East Asian” and “South Asian.” The frequencies and 
proportions of the ethnic/race groups were as follows (from high to low): Five hundred eighty-
four participants identified as Caucasian (64.7%); 157 as South Asian (17.4%); 51 as African-
American/Black (5.6%); 43 as East Asian (4.8%); 35 as Hispanic (3.9%); 14 as Other (1.6%); 10 
as Multiracial (1.1%); and two as Arab/Middle Eastern (0.2%). Seven participants (0.8%) chose 
“prefer not to answer.” Study 2 demographics are summarized in Table 20.  
Compensation for the 903 participants who passed all attention checks and satisfactorily 
completed the survey was an Amazon credit worth $1.6053, and which was posted to their 
Amazon.com account within 24 hours of survey submission.  
Instruments  
 The seven blocks (181 total items) that comprised the online survey are detailed below. 
Except for the demographics and self-descriptors blocks, all items were rated on a 1 to 6 Likert-
type scale. All items within each block were randomly ordered, and all blocks except the 
                                                
53 The Study 2 proposal indicated that participant compensation would be $2.00 per survey. However, due to an 
increase in January 2-16 in the MTurk fee from 10% to 40% of total participant compensation, the $2.00/participant 
fee was reduced to $1.60/participant. This rate, however, was still over MTurk’s guideline of $1.00/30 minutes, as 
survey test metrics indicated that the average completion time was no more than 30 minutes. 
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information sheet/introduction block, demographic items, and self-descriptors were also 
randomly ordered. Blocks that included attention check items have been indicated below and in 
their corresponding tables.  
Block 1: Demographics. Study 2 included three demographic items: age (drop-down list 
of ages 18 through 66+ and prefer not to answer); gender (male, female, transgender, prefer not 
to answer); and ethnicity (Caucasian, South Asian, Arab/Middle Eastern, Hispanic, East Asian, 
African-American/Black, Multiracial, Other, prefer not to answer). 
 Block 2: Self-Descriptors of Current Self. As per Study 1, respondents were primed to 
activate the Self-Memory System (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) by 
providing five self-descriptors. Respondents were presented with the following instruction: 
“Take a moment to consider what traits and characteristics describe who you are at this point in 
your life. For example, are you ambitious? A good friend? Shy? Think of 5 one- or two word 
descriptions that best reflect these characteristics and enter them in the spaces below.” The item 
will feature five open fields preceded by the statement, ‘I _______________.’ Each field 
permitted a total of 60 characters. This item was adapted for Study 2 from the Twenty Statement 
Test (TST), Kuhn & McPartland (1954).  
Block 3: Autobiographical Memory Functions of Simulation (AMFS) scale. The 10-
item AMFS that was validated in Study 1 was included in Study 2. The 10 AMFS items and their 
corresponding functions, as well as the attention check item, can be found in Table 3. 
Block 4: Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ). The 10-item ERQ (Gross & John, 
2003) used in Study 1 was included in Study 2. The 10 items of the ERQ are listed in Table 4. 
Block 5: HEXACO Personality Inventory-Revised. The HEXACO-PI-R (Lee & 
Ashton, 2008) features 100 items to assess the same six dimensions as the HEXACO-60, but 
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with the addition of the interstitial facet scale of Altruism (inverse: Antagonism). Additionally, 
all six dimensions are further subdivided into four facets each for a total of 24 facets. Results of 
the HEXACO-PI-R validation study yielded Cronbach’s alpha reliabilities ranging from .78 to 
.84.  
Respondents were presented with the instruction, “The following section addresses 
various personality traits. On a 1 to 6 scale, please rate the extent to which you agree (or 
disagree) with each statement as it describes your personality.” As with the Study 1 HEXACO 
survey block, Study 2’s HEXACO survey block included an attention check item. The 
HEXACO-PI-R’s 100 items, dimensions, facets, and attention check item can be found in Table 
17. 
Block 6: Autobiographical Memory Functions of Joint Reminiscence (AMFJR). The 
36-item AMFJR (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation), formerly called the CRS-A, comprises 
the two Perspective Taking items that are now also included in the AMFS. The AMFJR was 
found during validation to measure six autobiographical memory functions that mapped onto the 
three broad TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011) functions of Social, Self, and Directive. The six 
functions of the AMFJR are: Conversation (Social: engaging in past-talk to promote and sustain 
conversation); Relationship Maintenance (Social: engaging in past-talk to establish and 
strengthen social bonds); Perspective TakingAMFJR (Social: engaging in past-talk to 
understand/infer others’ minds); Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control (Directive: 
engaging in past-talk to make informed decisions and attitudes); Emotion Regulation (Directive: 
engaging in past-talk to cultivate and encourage appropriate emotional responses); and Self (Self: 
engaging in past-talk to develop and maintain one’s self-identity) The factors of the CRS-A were 
shown during validation to have reliabilities ranging from .89 to .95 (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in 
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preparation). 
Respondents were presented with the instruction, “We are interested in how and why 
people engage in past-talk. Past-talk is conversation about events that you have experienced with 
the person(s) you are speaking to or that you have experienced but your conversational partner(s) 
have not. Please keep past-talk conversations in mind when rating how often you engage in each 
of the situations below using a 1 to 6 scale (1 = almost never; 6 = almost always). Please click 
the NEXT button to continue.” Items are in response to the stem statement, “I engage in past-talk 
with another or others in order to...” The AMFJR items and corresponding factors are 
summarized in Table 18. 
Block 7. Thinking About Life Experiences (TALE) scale. The TALE (Bluck et al., 
2005; Bluck & Alea, 2011) was the first instrument with which the three broad autobiographical 
memory functions of Social, Self, and Directive were empirically validated. Study 2 used the 15-
item TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011), which has been validated for use with adult populations. The 
internal consistency reported for the TALE ranges from .74 for the Social subscale; .83 for the 
Self subscale; and .78 for the Directive subscale (Bluck & Alea, 2011). 
Respondents were presented with the instruction, “Sometimes people think back over 
their life or talk to other people about their life: It may be about things that happened quite a long 
time ago or more recently. We are not interested in your memory for a particular event, but more 
generally in how you bring together and connect the different events and periods of your life. 
Please rate how often you do the following on a 1 to 6 scale (1 = Almost Never; 6 = Almost 
Always). Please click the NEXT button to continue.” Items then followed the stem statement, “I 
think back over or talk about my life or certain periods of my life...” The TALE items and 
corresponding functions can be found in Table 19.  
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Procedures   
Study 2 approval was obtained from the conducting university’s Institutional Review 
Board (IRB protocol 1604014867, 5/19/16). The Study 2 online questionnaire followed the 
protocol already detailed for Study 1 with the exception of the following four modifications: 1) 
Except for the current self-descriptors, the mental time travel components and accompanying 
self-descriptors conditions were omitted; 2) the 36-item AMFJR was included; 3) the 15-item 
TALE was included; and 4) the HEXACO-100 was used instead of the HEXACO-60. The online 
questionnaire featured 179 items plus two attention check items for a total of 181 items. Items 
and blocks—except for the informed consent, demographics, and self-descriptors blocks—were 
randomly ordered. 
MTurk metrics indicated that all 903 surveys were completed in about a five-hour time 
period, with the average time spent on each survey reported as 21.52 minutes. Respondents who 
passed all attention checks and satisfactorily completed the survey were compensated with a 
$1.60 credit posted to their personal Amazon.com account. This rate was consistent with average 
rate of $1.00 that MTurk participants earn per 30 minutes (www.MTurk.com). The total value of 
the Amazon credits issued as compensation to respondents was $1,440 (900 × $1.60). The total 
fee assessed by MTurk on participant compensation was $576 (40% × $1440), which brought the 
total payout to $2,016. The $16 overage was paid out-of-pocket by the Study 2 Principal 
Investigator.  
Because MTurk keeps the survey open until the requested number of surveys (here, 900) 
have been completed rather than started, three additional participants’ submissions were 
submitted but missed the MTurk cutoff. As a result, only 900 participants were compensated, as 
only the first 900 Worker IDs flagged as completing the survey appear in the researcher’s 
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compensation queue. Because the MTurk de-identification process makes impossible the 
discernment of which three participants’ surveys were uncompensated, there was no way to 
know which surveys were paid versus unpaid; nor was there any way to issue compensation to 
the three extra participants. However, MTurk does disclose this possibility, instructing 
respondents to monitor how close a survey is to being closed or risk being uncompensated for 
their work. 
Data Analyses 
 The Study 2 data analysis protocol was similar to that of Study 1. Data screening, 
descriptive statistics, and regression analyses were conducted using SPSS v23 (IBM Corp, 
2015), LISREL v9.2 (Jöreskog, & Sörbom, 2015), and AMOS v22 (Arbuckle, 2014). Type I 
error risk was limited to 5% (α = .05); thus results that featured p ≤ .05 were considered 
statistically significant.  
 For all non-SEM inferential tests, composite “scale score” variables comprising the items 
for each function, dimension, and facet were generated. Only the HEXACO-100 (Ashton & Lee, 
2005) featured reverse-scored items, which were recoded prior to composite score generation.  
 The associations between AMFS functions and the ERQ (Gross & John, 2003) predicted 
by Hypothesis 3.3, as well as the association between the AMFJR function of Emotion 
Regulation and the ERQ predicted by Hypothesis 3.5, were tested using bivariate correlation 
analyses. Hypothesis 3.4, which predicted the functional relation of the AMFS factors with 
respect to interpersonal and intrapersonal simulation, was tested using simultaneous multiple 
linear regression. Simple linear regression was used to test whether personality predicts the use 
of autobiographical memory for the functions measured by the TALE, AMFS, and AMFJR 
(Hypotheses 3.6). Simple linear regression was also used to test for age and gender effects per 
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Goals 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. Kruskal-Wallis W chi-square comparison tests with Bonferroni 
corrected Mann-Whitney U post-hocs (using αADJ = .0167 to reflect three pairwise comparisons 
per each Kruskal-Wallis model) were used for Goal 3.3, which sought differences in the use of 
autobiographical memory for the functions of the AMFS, AMFJR, and TALE across Study 2’s 
three largest ethnic groups (Caucasian, n = 582; African-American/Black, n = 51; South Asian, n 
= 157). The Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U tests were used due to both the nonnormality 
of the data, and the differences in subgroup sample size, which can impair results when tested 
parametrically (Helsel, 1992). The effect size for the Mann-Whitney U, r = |Z|/√N, is interpreted 
similar to a Cohen’s d, where effects of .10 = small, .30 = moderate, and .50 = large (Fields, 
2005; Rosenthal, 1994). The effect size r was computed using the following total sample sizes: 
for Caucasian versus South Asian comparisons, N = 741; for Caucasian versus African-
American/Black comparisons, N = 635; and for African-American/Black versus South Asian 
comparisons, N = 208. 
 Power Analyses. The target sample size of 900 was sufficient for the most complex SEM 
configuration tested. An SEM power analysis based on power = .80, α = .05, minimum effect 
size of .1054, number of observable variables = 61 (10 AMFS + 36 AMFJR + 15 TALE), and 
number of latent variables = 12 (3 AMFS, 6 AMFJR, 3 TALE) yielded a minimum sample of 
766 (see Figure 16). However, given that a number of Study 2’s hypotheses and goals included 
strictly exploratory components, N = 900 was obtained to ensure that inferential tests using 
simple and multiple regression were sufficiently powered, especially given that some of the 
                                                
54 The current paper used the A-priori Sample Size Calculator for Structural Equation Models, an online power 
analysis program by Soper (2016). The calculator requires an effect size as specified by Westland (2010), who states 
that the approach for determining N for SEM is analogous to that for standard univariate calculations (e.g., 0.1 = 
smallest minimum effect; 0.3 = moderate; 0.5 = large) (Cochran 1977; Kish 1955; Lohr 1999; Snedecor & Cochran 
1989, Westland & See, 2007), but which employs a formulation for variance customized for SEM.  
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effects that Study 2 aimed to replicate were expected to be very small (r2 < 2%)55. Figure 17 
shows the power analysis results for a general multiple regression analysis using power = .80, α 
= .05, minimum effect size (squared multiple correlation) of approximately .10, and two 
predictors.  
 Several post-hoc power analyses were also conducted to get a sense of how overpowered 
the bivariate correlation, simple regression, and multiple regression models of Study 2 were. 
Results showed that, even for effect sizes smaller than 10% (e.g., R2 = 6.5%), achieved power 
was > .99, with a  minimum N needed to detect a significant effect = 118, which was way below 
the actual N = 903. Because significance is largely driven by the sample size, it is helpful to 
consider p-values in the context of effect size and achieved power in order to determine how 
relevant and/or meaningful a significant result is. Thus, because nearly all tests for Study 2 were 
overpowered, and because many effects were small, Study 2 effect sizes have also been reported 
for all analyses. 
3.4 Results 
Data Screening  
 Data from all Study 2 survey blocks were screened prior to all planned analyses. As 
expected there were no missing data. Data were evaluated for UV normality using Z ≥ |1.96| as 
an indicator of significant nonnormality at the .05 level; Z ≥ |2.58| at the .01 level; and Z ≥ |3.29| 
at the .001 level. Results indicated a high amount of skew and moderate kurtosis at the item 
level, as well as in the scale scores used to test Hypotheses 3.3–3.7 and Goals 3.1–3.3. 
Specifically, of the 20 scale scores (three from the AMFS, two from the ERQ, six from the 
HEXACO, six from the AMFJR, and three from the TALE) that were evaluated, all but five 
                                                
55 Effect sizes < 2% were reported by Ranson & Fitzgerald (in preparation) when analyzing cultural effects.  
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(75%) were significantly negatively UV skewed. Results also showed that 11 of the 20 (55%) 
scale scores were significantly UV leptokurtic, and that three of the 20 (11%) were significantly 
UV platykurtic. Scale score means, standard deviations, and UV skew and kurtosis Z-scores for 
the dimensions of the AMFS, ERQ, HEXACO, AMFJR, and TALE are detailed in Table 21.  
 Other preliminary analyses included bivariate correlations of and regressions on the items 
that comprise each of the functions of the AMFS, AMFJR, and TALE. Assessed were potential 
problems, such as high inter-item correlations. As can be seen in Table 22, results showed that 
inter-item correlations for items of each scale were within a desired range of .39–.77, with nine 
out of 61 (~85%) between .40 and .69. However, two of the three inter-item correlations for 
Counterfactual Thinking were higher than .80 (.87,  and .89) to suggest either item redundancy 
or that the construct measured was “too specific” (Briggs & Cheek, 1986, p. 114). This was 
surprising given that the Study 1 inter-item correlations for Counterfactual Thinking were much 
lower (.54, .57, and .68). Likewise, the mean inter-item correlation for the AMFS scale using the 
Study 2 data was .39—which was a bit higher than the inter-item correlation mean of .30 for 
Study 1—but which is still within the optimal range of .20–.40  (Briggs & Cheek, 1986, p. 115) 
to suggest both sufficient coverage of various construct characteristics (i.e., perspective taking, 
prospection, and counterfactual thinking), and the faithful encapsulation of the overarching 
construct (e.g., use of autobiographical memory content). Thus, although the cause of the higher-
than-expected Counterfactual Thinking inter-item correlations was unknown, their values were 
below the .90 threshold that can portend unstable matrices or inadmissible solutions for CFA 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007, p. 90). Therefore, the performance of these items in the testing of 
Study 2 hypotheses was monitored for possible issues, and caution was taken when interpreting 
results. 
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 Individual CFAs were then conducted on the AMFS, AMFJR, and TALE to verify their 
expected structures prior to running the series of confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) used to test 
Study 2’s Hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2, as well as using the AMFS, AMFJR, and TALE scale scores 
for the inferential tests of Hypotheses 3.3–3.7 and Goals 3.1–3.3. Individual CFAs were 
conducted in LISREL v9.2 using robust ULS estimation on polychoric correlation matrices with 
the asymptotic covariance matrices to yield Satorra-Bentler nonnormal-adjusted chi-square 
values. The fit indices of RMSEA, NNFI, and CFI, which, by default, LISREL computes using 
the ML Ratio chi-square rather than the Satorra-Bentler, were manually recomputed according to 
the formulas detailed in Appendix E, and using the Satorra-Bentler chi-square and degrees of 
freedom values as recommended (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Results supported all three scales’ 
expected structures, thus hypothesis and goal testing proceeded. Summaries of the three scales’ 
individual CFA results can be found in Table 23. The factor correlations for each individual scale 
can be found in Table 24. 
Hypothesis 3.1 Analyses 
 Overcoming Data Analysis Issues. Although results of the data screening procedures 
verified the structures and properties of the variables to be used to test Hypothesis 3.1 (as well as 
Hypothesis 3.2), there were problems in getting the models to converge when using LISREL 
v9.2 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2015). This was likely mostly due to the fact that LISREL computes 
each pairwise correlation of the polychoric correlation matrix—which is used to generate the 
asymptotic covariance matrix on which the Satorra-Bentler adjusted chi-square is derived) one at 
a time. Because model convergence is assessed as the polychoric matrix is being built, there is a 
risk of yielding “not positive definite” errors, which halts the analysis before the entire matrix 
has been completed (Lee, Poon, & Bentler, 1992). However, even for those statistical programs 
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that generate matrices simultaneously56, the processing burden can cause the program to crash 
with as few as 10 variables (Hox, 1995), but is more likely to occur for models with more than 
30 variables, especially with sample sizes > 500 (Muthèn & Kaplan, 1992). Because the Study  2 
sample size was almost twice this limit (N = 903), and because each model featured a large 
number of variables from multiple scales (25–61, depending on the model), the models could not 
be run in LISREL. Finally, the highly correlated Counterfactual Thinking items could have 
compelled inadmissible solutions. However, if the Counterfactual Thinking items were the root 
cause of the LISREL issues, alternate software programs and/or statistical approaches would 
yield the same nonconvergence problems. 
 As both a workaround to the model complexity issues, and to determine the utility of the 
Counterfactual Thinking for the planned CFAs, models for Hypothesis 3.1 (and Hypothesis 3.2) 
were configured in AMOS v22 (Arbuckle, 2014) using robust maximum likelihood (ML) 
estimation with bias corrected bootstrapping for ML and the Bollen-Stine correction (Bollen & 
Stine, 1992). Using AMOS 57  to conduct Bollen-Stine bootstraps of 2,000 iterations is 
recommended for models that would otherwise employ the asymptotic covariance matrix 
approach, but that fail to converge due to a large number (> 25) of model variables (Muthèn & 
Kaplan, 1992; Nevitt & Hancock, 2001). In fact, under such conditions, the modified Bollen-
Stine bootstrap has been shown in Monte Carlo studies to produce results that are commensurate 
with, if not slightly more accurate than, those based on the Satorra-Bentler adjustment (e.g., 
Byrne, 2000; Cheung & Lau, 2008; Hox, 1995; Ichikawa & Konishi, 1995; Yuan & Bentler, 
2000; Yung & Bentler, 1996; Zhu, 1997). One caveat to the Bollen-Stine bootstrap, however, is 
that its use can result in a slight loss of power (Nevitt & Hancock, 2001). However, a power 
                                                
56 ESQ (Multivariate Software, Inc., 2014) conducts simultaneous polychoric correlation matrix generation, but this 
program was not available for use for Study 2.   
57 The Bollen-Stine correction (Bollen & Stine, 1992) is not available in LISREL v9.2. 
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analysis run prior to the recruitment of Study 2 participants indicated that a sample of 766 (137 
cases fewer than the actual sample size) was sufficient for yielding significant small effects in 
the planned CFAs (see Figure 16). Therefore, there was little risk that conducting the Bollen-
Stine would unduly underpower the models used to test Hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2. As such, the 
Hypothesis 3.1 and 3.2 models were excellent candidates for Bollen-Stine bootstrapping 
available in AMOS.  
In order to ensure that results from the Bollen-Stine bootstrap in AMOS were similar to 
those produced using the polychoric correlation and asymptotic covariance matrices in LISREL, 
three independent CFAs, with the same configurations used during data screening, were run in 
AMOS on the AMFS, AMFJR, and TALE. Results of the AMOS CFAs were then compared to 
those obtained from the individual structure validation CFAs run in LISREL—which were the 
only models from Study 2 that would converge. Results showed that key estimates and fit indices 
were commensurate for all three individual scales (see Table 25). However, increased chi-square 
values, which can occur under ML estimation when data are nonnormal and/or the model 
features a large number of variables (e.g., Cook, Kallen, & Amtmann, 2009; Jöreskog, 2005), 
was evident when comparing the Satorra-Bentler to the ML Ratio chi-square test statistics. 
Although the LISREL- and AMOS-generated  χ2s for the AMFS were similar (74.74 vs. 67.13, 
respectively), the increase in the AMOS versus the LISREL χ2 tests statistics became more 
pronounced as the number of model variables increased (see Table 24). Thus, it was likely that, 
as the models increased in complexity, the fit indices generated for Hypothesis 3.1 (and 
Hypothesis 3.2)—which were designed to follow null model logic—would reflect a somewhat 
poorer fit than would have been attained had the polychoric-based approach been possible. As 
such, the objective was to find a sufficiently fitting model that both theory and statistical results 
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suggested was the most likely to be replicable (e.g., Cudeck & Henly, 1991; Meehl, 1991; 
Tanaka, 1993). With that caveat, Study 2 proceeded with the testing of Hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2 
using AMOS and the Bollen-Stine bootstrap. 
CFA: Eight-Function Structure. A second-order CFA was conducted to test whether a 
second-order “autobiographical memory functions” construct was indicated by eight first-order 
latent variables comprising the AMFS subscales of Prospection and Counterfactual Thinking; the 
AMFJR subscales of Conversation, Relationship Maintenance, Teaching/Problem 
Solving/Behavioral Control, Emotion Regulation, and Self; and the combined Perspective 
TakingS&JR subscale, comprising items from both Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective 
TakingAMFJR (see Figure 14). A second-order model was used to reflect the idea that, 
contextually, although the AMFS functions were “simulation-based,” whereas the AMFJR 
functions were “socially situated,” all ultimately reflect rated frequencies of functional use of 
autobiographical memory. Thus it made more conceptual sense to take a second-order approach 
than to correlate the simulation-based functions with each other, and correlate the socially 
situated functions together, then employ the Perspective TakingS&JR function as a common 
source of shared variance between the AMFS and AMFJR scales. Such modeling would also 
indicate the integrity of the combined Perspective TakingS&JR subscale in the presence of the 
other two AMFS subscales and the other five AMFJR subscales. 
Results showed that, as expected, the large sample compelled a significant Bollen-Stine 
bootstrap-adjusted chi square test statistic, χ2(981) = 4071.98, p < .001. The RMSEA (.059) was 
above the optimal cutoff of .05, but below the acceptable cutoff of .08, to indicate adequate 
model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). However, both the NNFI (.86) and CFI (.82) were ≤ .90 to 
indicate less than adequate model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999).  
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Estimates results showed that the squared multiple correlations (SMCs) were mostly 
stable (R2 = .31–.98), with the exception of the first-order Counterfactual Thinking latent, which, 
at R2 = .10, was below the recommended lower-bound cutoff of .20 to signify that the indicator 
(or first-order factor) is explaining a reasonable amount of variance in its factor (or second-order 
factor) (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). As this was the only SMC outside the recommended 
bounds, it may have been reflecting the high inter-item correlations of the Counterfactual 
Thinking items (see Data Screening section), rather than model instability. This latter 
explanation seemed reasonable given that all standardized regression coefficients, disturbances, 
and error variances were positive and significant (p < .001). Likewise, all standardized regression 
coefficients were > .30 (λ = .31–.99), with ~98% over .50 and ~93% over .60. Structural equation 
modeling (SEM) reliabilities for all eight first-order latent variables exceeded the .70 cutoff to 
demonstrate high internal validity (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994; Werts et al., 1978): Perspective-
TakingS&JR = .87; Prospection = .82; Counterfactual Thinking = .99; Conversation  = .85; 
Relationship Maintenance = .83; Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control = .78; Emotion 
Regulation = .89; and Self = .82. The formula for computing SEM reliabilities can be found in 
Appendix E. Table 26 summarizes the first- and second-order standardized regression 
coefficients, squared multiple correlations, and SEM reliabilities of the eight-factor model. 
“Simulation-Based” Versus “Socially Situated” Perspective Taking. Given that the 
eight-function structure yielded an overall “adequate,” rather than “good,” fit, additional analyses 
were conducted to test the Hypothesis 3.1 assumption that Perspective TakingAMFS and 
Perspective TakingAMFJR were functionally and conceptually equivalent enough to warrant their 
being combined as a single Perspective TakingS&JR function. To start, two multiple regression 
models were run to test the functional relation between the two Perspective Taking functions and 
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the dimensions of the ERQ (Gross & John). In the first model, the Cognitive Reappraisal scale 
score variable served as the dependent variable, with the Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective 
TakingAMFJR scale scores variables as predictors. Results showed that the model was significant, 
R = .31, F(2, 900) = 49.39,  p < .001, with 9.9% of the variance in Cognitive Reappraisal 
accounted for by Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective TakingAMFJR together. The coefficients 
analysis indicated that Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective TakingAMFJR were each 
significant predictors, with Perspective TakingAMFS uniquely accounting for 2.9% of the variance 
in Cognitive Reappraisal (b = .19, t(900) = 5.40, p < .001), and Perspective TakingAMFJR 
uniquely accounting for 1.7% of the variance in Cognitive Reappraisal (b = .13, t(900) = 4.16, p 
< .001). However, a one-tailed Z-test for the differences between correlations (Preacher, 2002) 
indicated that the amount of variance in Cognitive Reappraisal that was uniquely accounted for 
by Perspective TakingAMFS was not significantly greater than the amount of variance uniquely 
accounted for by Perspective TakingAMFJR (Z = .69, p = .246) to suggest that, regardless of scale 
context (AMFS versus AMFJR), the use of autobiographical memory for perspective taking is a 
simulation-based phenomenon. 
To test whether, in contrast, Perspective TakingAMFJR was more socially oriented than 
Perspective TakingAMFS, a second multiple regression model was run using the Expressive 
Suppression scale score variable as the dependent variable, again with Perspective TakingAMFS 
and Perspective TakingAMFJR as predictors. Results showed that this model was also significant, 
R = .34, F(2, 900) = 58.15,  p < .001, with 11.4% of the variance in Expressive Suppression 
accounted for by Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective TakingAMFJR together. Results of the 
coefficients analysis indicated that, as before, Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective 
TakingAMFJR were each significant predictors, with Perspective TakingAMFJR uniquely accounting 
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for 5.6% of the variance in Expressive Suppression (b = .36, t(900) = 7.59, p < .001), and 
Perspective TakingAMFS function uniquely accounting for 0.6% of the variance in Expressive 
Suppression (b = .13, t(900) = 2.40, p = .016). A Z-test indicated that the unique variance of 
Perspective TakingAMFJR was significantly greater than the unique variance of Perspective 
TakingAMFS (Z = 6.16, p < .001), to suggest that, although both Perspective TakingAMFJR and 
Perspective TakingAMFS reflect rating frequency of functional use of autobiographical memory 
content for the social behavior of perspective taking, Perspective TakingAMFJR is more socially 
situated than Perspective TakingAMFS. 
To test the degree of direct association between Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective 
TakingAMFJR, a Pearson’s coefficient correlation and a Spearman’s rho correlation were run on 
the scale scores of the two functions. The Spearman’s—which evaluates the rank-order 
monotonic relation between two ordinal-level variables, and is thus less biased by nonnormality 
(e.g., Hauke & Kossowski, 2011)—was included to determine if the UV nonnormality present in 
the data was overly upwardly biasing the regression coefficients. The Pearson’s correlation 
analysis showed that Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective TakingAMFJR function were 
significantly, but only moderately positively related, r = .54, p < .001, with 29.2% overlapping 
variance. Results of the Spearman’s correlation analysis showed the same relation, ρ = .51, p < 
.001, with 26.0% overlapping variance. A one-tailed Z-test run on the difference between the 
coefficients (Preacher, 2002) showed that the r and the ρ (rho) were statistically equivalent, Z = 
.88, p = .189, which suggested that the nonnormality of the data was not overly upwardly biasing 
the Pearson’s coefficient. Furthermore, results of the bivariate correlations between Perspective 
TakingAMFS and the remaining functions of the AMFS and AMFJR (see Table 27) showed that 
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the only correlation coefficient that was higher58 was between Perspective TakingAMFS and 
Prospection, r = .64, p < .001 (41.0% overlap). This suggests that Perspective TakingAMFS and 
Perspective TakingAMFJR are no more statistically, and therefore conceptually, equivalent than are 
any of the AMFS or AMFJR functions with each other.  
Because Perspective TakingAMFS featured two new items in addition to the two items 
comprising Perspective TakingAMFJR, Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlation analyses were also 
run on the scale score variable for the two-item Perspective TakingAMFJR and a Perspective 
TakingAMFS(2) scale score comprising only the two Perspective TakingAMFS items that directly 
corresponded to those comprising Perspective TakingAMFJR. Results showed that the Perspective 
TakingAMFJR and Perspective TakingAMFS(2) were only moderately positively, but significantly 
correlated, r = .51, p < .00, and ρ = .48, p < .001. Results of a one-tailed Z-test (Preacher, 2002) 
to determine whether the difference between the Pearson’s r coefficient of .51 was significantly 
stronger than the Spearman’s ρ coefficient of .48 showed that the two coefficients were also 
statistically equivalent,  Z = .84, p = .201. Because the Pearson’s r of .51 between Perspective 
TakingAMFJR and Perspective TakingAMFS(2) was slightly weaker than the Pearson’s r of .54 
between Perspective TakingAMFJR and Perspective TakingAMFS, a one-tailed Z-test was run to test 
the difference between these coefficients. Although results showed that the two coefficients were 
statistically equivalent, Z = .88, p = .189, the only moderate, rather than strong, association 
between Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective TakingAMFJR suggested that they are 
independent, and should not be combined into a single “Perspective TakingS&JR” function. Table 
28 summarizes the results of the functional multiple regression and correlation models run to test 
                                                
58 Note that some of the bivariate correlations between items within the same scale were stronger, as can be seen in 
Table 27. 
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the “simulation-based” Perspective TakingAMFS versus the “socially situated” Perspective 
TakingAMFJR.  
Finally, to determine the extent to which respondents differed in their rated frequency of 
functional use of autobiographical memory content for perspective taking as a function of the 
measurement instrument (i.e., the simulation-based AMFS vs. the socially situated AMFJR), a 
Wilcoxon paired-samples T-test59 was conducted. Results showed that respondents rate their use 
of autobiographical memory as statistically significantly more frequent for simulation-based 
perspective taking (M = 4.31, SD = 1.02) compared to socially situated perspective taking (M = 
4.19, SD = 1.18), Z = –3.26, p < .001. However, when comparing the mean ranks of Perspective 
TakingAMFS(2) to Perspective TakingAMFJR, effects were significant, but reversed. Results showed 
that respondents rate the frequency with which they use autobiographical memory content for 
Perspective TakingAMFS(2) (M = 4.05, SD = 1.26) as lower than for socially situated Perspective 
TakingAMFJR when using the AMFJR subscale, Z = –4.85, p < .001.  
Given these results, Hypothesis 3.1 was next tested as a nine-factor model with each the 
simulation-based Perspective TakingAMFS and socially situated Perspective TakingAMFJR 
functions.  
CFA: Nine-Function Structure. An additional second-order CFA was conducted, this 
time treating Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective TakingAMFJR as independent of one another 
(i.e., not combined as Perspective TakingS&JR) (see Figure 18). Results showed that, again, as 
expected, the Bollen-Stine bootstrap-adjusted chi square test statistic was significant, χ2(980) = 
3441.92, p < .001. The RMSEA (.052) was still above, but closer to the optimal cutoff of .05 
than was the RMSEA of the eight-factor structure to indicate that the nine-function structure 
                                                
59 Although the Wilcoxon T evaluates differences between mean ranks, such values are less intuitive than subscale 
means; therefore, the subscale means (with standard deviations) have been provided here.  
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demonstrated adequate to good model fit. The NNFI (.91), which met the cutoff for adequate fit, 
was an improvement over the .86 of the eight-function model. However, the CFI (.89) was still a 
low, but also an improvement over the eight-function CFI of  .82. Also examined was the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC). The AIC is useful when two or more models are being estimated 
and compared. Because lower AICs indicate better fit, the model with the lowest AIC is 
considered the better fitting model (Kenny, 2015).  Results of the nine-function CFA showed that 
the AIC of 3735.917 was quite a bit lower than the eight-function model’s AIC of 4363.983, to 
suggest that that the nine-function model was the better fitting of the two. 
Estimates showed that the squared multiple correlations were similar to that of the eight-
function model (R2 = .31–.98). Again, however, the Counterfactual Thinking latent was, at R2 = 
.10, still below the optimal lower-bound cutoff of .20. Standardized regression coefficients were 
also similar to those of the eight-function model (λ = .31–.99; ~98% > .50; ~93% > .60), with all 
regression coefficients, disturbances, and error variances positive and significant at the p < .001 
level. SEM reliabilities for all nine first-order latent variables were above the .70 cutoff; 
likewise, the Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective TakingAMFJR latents demonstrated higher 
reliability than did Perspective TakingS&JR (.87). Specifically, the computed reliabilities were, 
Perspective TakingAMFS = .94; Prospection = .82; Counterfactual Thinking = .99; Conversation = 
.85; Perspective TakingAMFJR = .94; Relationship Maintenance = .83; Teaching/Problem 
Solving/Behavioral Control = .78; Emotion Regulation = .89; and Self = .82. The formula used 
to compute the SEM reliabilities can be found in Appendix E. The first- and second-order 
standardized factor loadings, squared multiple correlations, and reliabilities of the nine-factor 
model can be found in Table 29. In all, results of the nine-function CFA appeared to support the 
independence of Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective TakingAMFJR.  
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Hypothesis 3.2 Analyses 
 To replicate associations between the functions of the AMFJR (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in 
preparation) and the broad functions of the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011), and to explore 
associations between the TALE and AMFS functions, Hypothesis 3.2 was tested with three 
second-order CFAs: 1) The mapping of the AMFJR onto the TALE; 2) the mapping of the 
AMFS onto the TALE; and 3) the mapping of the AMFS and AMFJR onto the TALE.  
 Mapping the AMFJR onto the TALE: Replicating previous findings and exploring 
additional associations. The purpose of first second-order CFA (with the broad Social, Self, and 
Directive functions as second-order latents indicated by AMFJR functions; see Figure 19) was to 
replicate previous findings by Ranson and Fitzgerald (in preparation). Specifically, it was 
expected that the AMFJR functions of Conversation, Perspective TakingAMFJR, and Relationship 
Maintenance would map onto the broad Social function; that Teaching/Problem 
Solving/Behavioral Control and Emotion Regulation would map onto the broad Directive 
function; and that SelfAMFJR60 would map onto the broad SelfTALE.  
Results supported Hypothesis 3.2, such that the AMFJR (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in 
preparation) functions mapped onto the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011) functions as expected. The 
large sample size compelled a significant ML Ratio chi-square, χ2(1215) = 3331.76, p < .001. 
The RMSEA (.043) was below the optimal cutoff of .05, to indicate excellent model fit. The 
NNFI = .92 indicated an adequate model fit, where as the CFI = .88 was below the acceptable 
cutoff of .90. However, taken in aggregate, the fit indices suggested that the CFA model was 
acceptable. 
                                                
60 From this point forward, the current paper will notate the AMFJR Self function as “SelfAMFJR,” and the broad 
TALE function as “SelfTALE” unless otherwise noted. 
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Estimates also confirmed that the model was acceptable. The squared multiple 
correlations for both the first-order AMFJR indicators (R2 = .31–.70) and second-order latents 
(R2 = .50–.85) were stable, as were SMC’s for the TALE items (R2 = .39–.69) Standardized 
regression coefficients for the first-order AMFJR indicators were all above .50 (λ = .57–.83), 
whereas the second-order AMFJR standardized coefficients were also strong (λ = .70–.92). 
Loadings for the TALE indicators were also strong (λ = .63–.83) All regression coefficients, 
disturbances, and error variances were positive and significant at the p < .001 level. SEM 
reliabilities (see Appendix E for the formula) for the first-order AMFJR functions were above the 
.70 cutoff: Conversation = .85; Perspective TakingAMFJR = .94; Relationship Maintenance = .83; 
Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control = .78; Emotion Regulation = .89; and SelfAMFJR = 
.82. The factor correlations for the TALE were all > .30 to support the TALE’s assumed oblique 
structure: Social × Directive = .85; Social × SelfTALE = .64; and Directive × SelfTALE = .77. A 
summary of the factor correlations, first- and second-order standardized factor loadings, squared 
multiple correlations, and reliabilities of the AMFJR-TALE second-order CFA can be found in 
Table 30. 
 Mapping the AMFS onto the TALE. A second-order CFA was also run to explore the 
associations between the AMFS functions and the broad functions of the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 
2011). It was expected that Perspective TakingAMFS would map onto the TALE’s Social function, 
but it was unknown whether the mental time travel functions of Prospection and Counterfactual 
Thinking would map as broadly Directive, broadly SelfTALE, or both.  
Although a number of model configurations were run, the best-fitting model (χ2(269) = 
1225.93, p < .001) indicated that, as expected, Perspective TakingAMFS was broadly Social, 
whereas the Prospection function was broadly Directive, and the Counterfactual Thinking 
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function was broadly SelfTALE (see Figure 20). The RMSEA (.063) was a bit above the optimal 
cutoff of point .05, but below the upper cutoff of .08 to indicate that the fit was adequate. The 
NNFI (.92) and CFI (.93) also indicated adequate fit, falling above the .90 lower-bound cutoff, 
but a bit short of the optimal .95 cutoff.  
 Estimates indicated that the model was stable, with all regression coefficients, 
disturbances, and error variances positive and significant (p < .001). Standardized regression 
coefficients for the first-order AMFS indicators were all above .60 (λ = .66–.98), with the 
Counterfactual Thinking indicators, ranging the highest (λ = .88–.98), which was foreshadowed 
by these three items’ high inter-item correlations discussed previously in the Data Screening 
section. Loadings for the TALE indicators were similar to those found in the AMFJR mapping 
CFA (λ = .66–.84). The second-order standardized coefficients for the AMFS functions were 
more widely varied than those of the AMFJR-TALE CFA, but within a desirable range (λ = .36–
.62). The squared multiple correlations were very stable (R2 = .38–.71), with the expected 
exception of the SMC for the Counterfactual Thinking indicators (R2 = .78–.98), which were 
reflective of the high inter-item correlations discovered at data screening. Likewise, the SMCs of 
the second-order Perspective TakingAMFS (R2 = .38) and Prospection (R2 = .34) latents were 
good, while Counterfactual Thinking latent, at R2 = .13, accounted for less than the 
recommended lower bound cutoff of .20. The SEM reliabilities remained above .70: Perspective 
TakingAMFS = .94; Prospection = .82, and Counterfactual Thinking = .99. The TALE’s factor 
correlations were as expected for an assumed oblique structure: Social × Directive = .65; Social 
× SelfTALE = .52; and Directive × SelfTALE = .71. A summary of the factor correlations, first- and 
second-order standardized factor loadings, squared multiple correlations, and reliabilities of the 
AMFS-TALE CFA can be found in Table 31. 
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 Mapping the AMFJR and AMFS onto the TALE.  To fully test Hypothesis 3.2, and to 
add support to the nine-function model that emerged from the testing of Hypothesis 3.1, a third 
second-order CFA was conducted to verify whether the associations between the functions of the 
AMFJR (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation) and TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011), and the AMFS 
and TALE, would hold when all three scales were examined together.  
 As before, a series of model configurations were run, but the best fitting model (see 
Figure 21) confirmed previous results. The ML Ratio chi-square was again significant, χ2(1757) 
= 5008.367, p < .001), most likely due to the large Study 2 sample size. The RMSEA (.045) was 
excellent, falling below the optimal .05 cutoff. However, as was the case for all Study 2 CFAs, 
the NNFI (.90) was merely adequate, while the CFI (.85) fell short of the lower acceptable cutoff 
of .90.  
 Estimates showed that, as with all previous models, all regression coefficients, 
disturbances, and error variances positive and significant (p < .001). Other results suggested a 
fairly stable model, with most erratic performance again stemming from the Counterfactual 
Thinking function. The squared multiple correlations for the AMFJR indicators ranged from .32 
to .76; the AMFS indicators ranged from .43 to .98; and the TALE indicators ranged from .39 to 
.69. For the AMFJR latents, the range of SMCs was .50–.85, and for the AMFS, .13–.41. 
Standardized regression coefficients for the first-order AMFJR indicators were all above .50 (λ = 
.57–.81); the AMFS loadings were above .60 (λ = .66–.99); as were the TALE loadings (λ = .62–
.83). The second-order standardized coefficients were λ = .71–.92 for the AMFJR, and λ = .37–
.64. There were no changes to the SEM reliabilities. For the AMFJ: Conversation = .85; 
Perspective TakingAMFJR = .94; Relationship Maintenance = .83; Teaching/Problem 
Solving/Behavioral Control = .78; Emotion Regulation = .89; and SelfAMFJR = .82. For the 
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AMFS: Perspective TakingAMFS = .94; Prospection = .82, and Counterfactual Thinking = .99. 
The TALE’s factor correlations were similar to those yielded from the AMFJR-TALE CFA: 
Social × Directive = .87; Social × SelfTALE = .65; and Directive × SelfTALE = .77. A summary of 
the factor correlations, first- and second-order standardized factor loadings, SMCs, and 
reliabilities of the AMFS-AMFJR-TALE CFA can be found in Table 32. 
Hypothesis 3.3 Analyses 
 Hypothesis 3.3 stated that, because the ERQ’s dimension of Cognitive Reappraisal 
assesses individuals’ use of simulation-based emotion-control strategies (Lindeman & Abraham, 
2008), the AMFS functions would be moderately and significantly related to indicate that 
simulation was a common property of Perspective TakingAMFS, Prospection, and Counterfactual 
Thinking. Thus bivariate correlation analyses were conducted to show this relation and to 
replicate the provisional results of Study 1. Results showed that all three AMFS functions were 
significantly associated with Cognitive Reappraisal: Perspective TakingAMFS (r = .29, p < .001, 
with 8.20% variance explained), Prospection (r = .24, p < .001, with 5.52% variance explained), 
and Counterfactual Thinking (r = .15, p < .001, with 2.40% variance explained). However, 
although all three AMFS functions were, as expected, significantly associated with Cognitive 
Reappraisal to support Hypothesis 3.3, the magnitude of each of the correlations was lower than 
expected per the provisional results of Study 1.  
 To more thoroughly assess whether simulation was the common property of the AMFS 
functions, a second set of bivariate correlations were run on the three AMFS functions and the 
ERQ dimension of Expressive Suppression. Because Expressive Suppression measures 
individuals’ tendency to use outward, behavior-based emotion-control strategies, it is not 
considered a simulation-based emotion control strategy (Lindeman & Abraham, 2008). 
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Therefore, it was hypothesized that the magnitude of the correlations between Expressive 
Suppression and the three AMFS functions would be weak and nonsignificant. Results showed 
that the magnitude of correlation coefficients were, as expected, smaller than those between the 
AMFS functions and Cognitive Reappraisal, but results also showed that all three correlations 
were significant: For Perspective TakingAMFS, r = .24, Prospection, p < .001, with 5.70% of 
variance explained; for Prospection, r = .20; p < .001, with 4.00% of variance explained; and for 
Counterfactual Thinking, r = .12, p < .001, with 1.40% of variance explained.  
 The significant results that were not predicted for the Expressive Suppression correlations 
are likely due to the highly powered model. To establish whether the coefficients from the 
Cognitive Reappraisal associations were significantly stronger than the coefficients from the 
Expressive Suppression correlations, one-tailed Z-tests for differences between correlations were 
conducted (Preacher, 2002). Results showed that none of the Cognitive Reappraisal correlations 
were significantly greater than those for Expressive Suppression: Perspective TakingAMFS (r = 
.29 versus r = .24), Z = 1.14, p = .127; Prospection (r = .24 versus r = .20), Z = .89, p = .187; and 
Counterfactual Thinking (r = .15 versus r = 12), Z = 1.08, p = .140. As such, in terms of 
magnitude—i.e., the correlations between the AMFS functions were stronger when correlated 
with Cognitive Reappraisal than with Expressive suppression, results supported Hypothesis 3.3. 
However, the pattern and differential magnitude of effects were not faithfully replicated. The 
bivariate correlations between the AMFS and EQR scale scores can be found in Table 33. 
Hypothesis 3.4 Analyses 
 The purpose of Hypothesis 3.4 was to obtain empirical support for Hypothesis 1.7, which 
stated that the form of simulation underlying the autobiographical memory function of 
Perspective TakingAMFS is interpersonal simulation, whereas the form of simulation underlying 
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the autobiographical memory functions of mental time travel—Prospection and Counterfactual 
Thinking—is intrapersonal simulation. Hypothesis 3.4 evaluated the consistency of the current 
data and the evidence presented in Study 1. Simultaneous multiple linear regression was used to 
determine the amount of variance in Cognitive Reappraisal dimension of the ERQ (Gross & 
John, 2003) that was explained by the three AMFS functions. It was predicted that, if Perspective 
TakingAMFS is an example of a purpose for which autobiographical memory is used for other-
directed, simulation-based behaviors, then Perspective TakingAMFS would be a significant 
predictor of simulation-based Cognitive Reappraisal. Additionally, if Prospection and 
Counterfactual Thinking are examples of purposes for which autobiographical memory is used 
for self-directed simulation behaviors, then only one of these two mental time travel behaviors 
would emerge as a significant predictor of Cognitive Reappraisal. Given that results of Study 1 
showed Counterfactual Thinking to be the AMFS function representing intrapersonal simulation, 
the same was expected for Study 2. 
 Results showed that the multiple regression model was significant, R = .30, F(3, 899) = 
29.86, p < .001, with the three AMFS functions significantly accounting for 9.1% of the variance 
in Cognitive Reappraisal. When holding the other predictors constant, as hypothesized, both 
Counterfactual Thinking  (b = .06, t(899) = 2.11, p = .035, .45% unique variance) and 
Perspective TakingAMFS (b = .21, t(899) = 5.31, p < .001, 2.86% unique variance) were 
significant predictors of Cognitive Reappraisal, but Prospection was not (b = .07, t(899) = 1.67, p 
= .094, .28% unique variance). Thus Hypothesis 3.4 was supported by Study 2 results. A 
summary of the Hypothesis 3.4 functional multiple regression results can be found in Table 34. 
Hypothesis 3.5 Analyses 
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 Because the Expressive Suppression dimension of the ERQ (Gross & John, 2003) 
concerns emotion regulation strategies that can be socially observed, and are likely precipitated 
by social pressures and interactions (Gross & John, 2003), Hypothesis 3.5 predicted that 
Expressive Suppression would be significantly and moderately associated with the AMFJR’s 
socially situated Emotion Regulation function. The Emotion Regulation function is grounded in 
the social context of joint reminiscence, a characteristic of which is the use of “past-talk” with 
another or others in order to obtain, or an attempt to understand how to obtain, emotion control.  
Results showed that Hypothesis 3.5 was supported. The bivariate correlation between the 
AMFJR function of Emotion Regulation and the ERQ’s dimension of Expressive Suppression 
was significant, r = .45, p < .001, with 20.3% of the variance in Expressive Suppression 
accounted for by Emotion Regulation. In comparison, the bivariate correlation between the 
AMFJR function of Emotion Regulation and Cognitive Reappraisal was significant, but weaker 
in magnitude, r = .26, p < .001, with 6.5% of the variance in Cognitive Reappraisal explained by 
Emotion Regulation. A Z-test for the difference between correlations (Preacher, 2002) showed 
that the coefficient for Emotion Regulation and Expressive Suppression (r = .45) was 
significantly greater than the coefficient for Emotion Regulation and Cognitive Reappraisal (r = 
.26), Z = 4.64, p < .001. However, because Emotion Regulation, Cognitive Reappraisal, and 
Expressive Suppression all concern emotion control, it is reasonable that all three would share 
variance; yet, as expected, more variance was shared between the two explicitly social factors: 
Emotion Regulation and Expressive Suppression. The bivariate correlations between the AMFJR 
Emotion Regulation scales score and ERQ scale scores summarized in Table 35. 
Hypothesis 3.6 Analyses61  
                                                
61 All descriptions of HEXACO dimensions and facets provided with respect to the Hypothesis 3.6 Analyses 
sections are by Lee & Ashton (2009). 
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 Hypothesis 3.6 was extended for the purpose of replicating the personality effects 
previously reported with respect to the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011) as well as the effects found 
for the AMFS in Study 1. Because no previous study had tested for personality effects on the 
functions of AMFJR (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation), Study 2 explored the idea that those 
personality traits predictive of the broad TALE functions would be inherited by their 
corresponding subordinate functions according to the confirmed Hypothesis 3.2 mapping. 
Additionally, the idea of inheritance was also explored with respect to the lower-order AMFS 
functions and their higher-order TALE correlates. All Study 2 personality dimensions were 
measured using the HEXACO-PI-R (Ashton & Lee, 2005; 2009).  
 The following personality-effects subsections includes only those results that were 
significant at p < .05 or less. Because effects were small, only effect sizes in the form of squared 
semi-partial coefficients (i.e., the amount of variance that the predictor uniquely explains in the 
outcome) have been reported. The customary statistics reported for regression analyses (e.g., 
zero-order correlation coefficient, t-statistic, unstandardized regression coefficients, and p-value 
(* = .05, ** = .01, and *** = .001) are detailed in the accompanying tables. 
 Personality and the TALE. To support the replication of findings reported elsewhere, 
Study 2 results showed that, as expected, the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011) function of Openness 
to Experience was significantly predictive of the broad Directive function (R2 = 3.7%) and 
SelfTALE (R2 = 1.1%). Also as expected, Extraversion significantly predicted the broad Social 
function (R2 = 5.4%).  
 Study 2 results also showed a number of other personality effects for the functions of the 
TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011) not previously reported in the literature. For the Social function, 
Emotionality/Neuroticism (R2 = 6.2%), Conscientiousness (R2 = 1.8%), Openness to Experience 
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(R2 = 4.6%), and the interstitial facet of Altruism (R2 = 4.9%) were all significant predictors. 
With respect to the Directive function, results showed that all HEXACO dimensions except for 
Honesty-Humility were significant predictors: Emotionality/Neuroticism (R2 = 6.8%), 
Extraversion (R2 = 3.2%), Agreeableness (R2 = 1.7%), Conscientiousness (R2 = 3.7%), and 
Altruism (R2 = 6.9%). Finally, for SelfTALE, the inverse of Honesty-Humility (R2 = 1.2%), 
Emotionality/Neuroticism (R2 = 6.7%), Extraversion (R2 = 0.8%), and Altruism (R2 = 1.0%) 
were significant predictors. A summary of the regression analysis results for the TALE functions 
can be found in Table 36.  
 Personality and the AMFS. In support of Study 1 findings, results showed that 
Perspective TakingAMFS was significantly predicted by Extraversion (R2 = 2.7%), 
Conscientiousness (R2 = 1.4%), and Openness to Experience (R2 = 3.7%). Not supported was the 
Study 1 finding that the function of Perspective TakingAMFS is predicted by Emotional Stability 
(the inverse of Emotionality/Neuroticism). Rather, results of Study 2 showed that 
Emotionality/Neuroticism predicted the function of Perspective TakingAMFS (R2 = 3.9%). 
Although not found in Study 1—most likely due to the small effects—Study 2 found that 
Perspective TakingAMFS was significantly predicted by both the dimension of Agreeableness (R2 
= 0.5%) and Altruism (R2 = 2.5%). Table 37 summarizes the significant results of the AMFS 
personality effects tests (dimensions and facets).  
 With respect Prospection, as expected per Study 1 results, the dimensions of 
Emotionality/Neuroticism (R2 = 2.5%), Conscientiousness (R2 = 0.7%), and Openness to 
Experience (R2 = 4.8%) were significant predictors. In addition, although not foreshadowed by 
Study 1 results, the inverse of the Honesty-Humility dimension (R2 = 0.5%), Extraversion (R2 = 
0.6%), and Altruism (R2 = 0.8%) significantly predicted the function of Prospection.   
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 All three of the HEXACO (Ashton & Lee, 2005; 2009) dimensions expected to 
significantly predict the function of Counterfactual Thinking based on Study 1 provisional results 
were confirmed: The inverse of Honesty-Humility (R2 = 3.7%),  Emotionality/Neuroticism (R2 
=1.6%), and the inverse of Extraversion, also thought of as Introversion (R2 = 0.5%). Two of the 
remaining three HEXACO dimensions were also significant predictors of the function of 
Counterfactual Thinking: the inverse of Agreeableness—i.e., a tendency toward criticism and 
argumentativeness (R2 = 0.5%), and the inverse of Conscientiousness—i.e., tending to be 
impulsive, non-reflective, and careless (R2 = 1.3%). 
 Personality and the AMFJR. Regression analyses were also run to test for possible 
personality effects on the functions of the AMFJR (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation). It was 
hypothesized that those AMFJR functions that had been shown in previous research by Ranson 
and Fitzgerald to map onto the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011) would inherit the personality effects 
of their corresponding higher-order TALE functions. Results supported that expectation for all 
AMFJR functions except for Conversation, which was not predicted by Agreeableness although 
the TALE Social function was.  
 With respect to those TALE personality effects that were replicated from previous 
findings, Openness to Experience predicted the AMFJR Directive Functions of 
Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control (R2 = 3.3%) and Emotion Regulation (R2 = 
3.6%). As was found for SelfTALE, SelfAMFJR (R2 = 2.8%) was also significantly predicted by 
Openness to Experience. Also supported was the expectation that Extraversion would predict the 
broadly Social AMFJR functions of Conversation (R2 = 5.9%), Perspective TakingAMFJR (R2 = 
5.9%), and Relationship Maintenance (R2 = 10.0%).  
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 Of the other personality effects inherited by the AMFJR (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in 
preparation) functions from their corresponding TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011) functions, results 
showed the following. In addition to Extraversion, the Social function of Conversation was 
significantly predicted by Emotionality/Neuroticism (R2 = 3.7%), Conscientiousness (R2 = 
3.1%), Openness to Experience (R2 = 3.4%), and Altruism (R2 = 4.6%). For the broadly Social 
Perspective TakingAMFJR, additional significant predictors were Emotionality/Neuroticism (R2 = 
4.0%), Agreeableness (R2 = 1.7%), Conscientiousness (R2 = 2.5%), Openness to Experience (R2 
= 4.7%), and Altruism (R2 = 3.9%). For the remaining AMFJR Social function of Relationship 
Maintenance, in addition to Extraversion, Emotionality/Neuroticism (R2 = 9.8%), Agreeableness 
(R2 = 1.3%), Conscientiousness (R2 = 1.9%), Openness to Experience (R2 = 2.9%), and Altruism 
(R2 = 6.0%) were all significant predictors.  
 With respect to the broadly Directive AMFJR functions, the HEXACO (Ashton & Lee, 
2005; 2009) dimensions that were, in addition to Openness to Experience, significant predictors 
of Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control were Emotionality/Neuroticism (R2 = 4.8%), 
Extraversion (R2 = 6.2%), Agreeableness (R2 = 0.5%), Conscientiousness (R2 = 2.9%), and 
Altruism (R2 3.6%). The HEXACO dimensions that, in addition to Openness to Experience, 
significantly predicted the AMFJR Emotion Regulation function were Emotionality/Neuroticism 
(R2 = 10.9%), Extraversion (R2 = 4.6%), Agreeableness (R2 = 0.8%), Conscientiousness (R2 = 
1.4%), and Altruism (R2 = 5.3%).  
 Finally, as was prefigured by the significant personality effects for the SelfTALE function, 
SelfAMFJR was predicted by the inverse of Honesty-Humility (R2 = 2.6%), 
Emotionality/Neuroticism (R2 = 4.9%), Extraversion (R2 = 5.2%), Openness to Experience (R2 = 
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2.8%), and Altruism (R2 = 0.7%). Table 38 summarizes the significant results of the regression 
analyses run to test personality effects of AMFJR functions.  
Goal 3.1 Analyses 
 Results of the Goal 3.1 analyses yielded two significant age effects. Age predicted the use 
of autobiographical memory for the broad SelfTALE, with 0.8% of the variance in SelfTALE 
significantly accounted for by age. The obtained regression equation (Y = 4.292 – .010X) 
indicated that individuals use autobiographical memory with less frequency on average for the 
SelfTALE function as they get older, with the average frequency of autobiographical memory use 
of broad SelfTALE of 4.11 (on a 1 to 6 Likert Scale) at 18 years of age decreasing to an average 
frequency of 3.63 by the age of 66+.  
 In keeping with the idea that age effects are inherited by the lower-order functions that 
map onto their higher-order TALE “parent” function, age predicted the use of autobiographical 
memory for the broadly Self Counterfactual Thinking function, with 1.7% of the variance in the 
function of Counterfactual Thinking significantly accounted for by age. Consistent with effect 
found for SelfTALE, per the obtained regression equation (Y = 4.586 –.015X), as individuals age, 
they use autobiographical memory content with less frequency on average for the purpose of 
counterfactual thinking, with an average frequency of 4.32 at 18 years of age, which declines to 
an average frequency of 3.60 by the age of 66+. Table 39 summarizes the results of the Goal 3.1 
regression analyses. 
Goal 3.2 Analyses 
 As expected, the gender split for Study 2 was equivalent (M = 49.8%; F = 49.7%; 
Transgender or Prefer Not to Answer, 0.4%), making gender comparisons across males and 
females tenable. However, given that very little direct evidence was available to inform 
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hypotheses, Goal 3.2 was instead to explore the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011), AMFS, and 
AMFJR (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation) functions for possible gender effects.  
 Although no previous findings regarding gender effects for the TALE have been 
reported, Study 2 results showed that females use autobiographical memory content for the broad 
Social purposes with significantly greater frequency on average (M = 4.40, SD = 1.04) than men 
(M = 4.19, SD = 1.04), with 1.0% of the variance in the broad Social significantly accounted for 
by gender. However, none of the lower-order AMFS and AMFJR functions that Hypothesis 3.2 
found to map onto the broad Social function were significantly predicted gender.  
 Although not inherited as gender effects from their corresponding Directive or SelfTALE 
functions, results showed that gender predicts Counterfactual Thinking (R2 = 1.0%), such that 
men use autobiographical memory for counterfactual thinking significantly more frequently on 
average (M = 4.20, SD = 1.32) than do females (F = 3.95, SD = 1.18). It was also found that 
gender predicted the frequency with which autobiographical memory is used for the AMFJR 
function of Emotion Regulation (R2 = 0.5%), whereby females use autobiographical memory 
with significantly greater frequency on average (M = 4.08, SD = 1.05) than do men (M = 3.93, 
SD = 1.04). Goal 3.2 regression analyses are summarized in Table 39 
Goal 3.3 Analyses 
 Goal 3.3 was to examine differences in the frequency with which individuals from Study 
2’s three largest ethnic groups (Caucasian, n = 584; South Asian, n = 157; and African-
American/Black, n = 51) use autobiographical memory for the functions measured by the TALE 
(Bluck & Alea, 2011), AMFS, and AMFJR (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation). Of primary 
interest to Study 2 was the replication of results found by Ranson (2014), such that Caucasians 
(M = 4.53, SD = 1.01) were found to use autobiographical memory with greater frequency than 
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African-American/Blacks (M = 4.40, SD = 1.07) for the AMFJR function of Conversation, and 
that Caucasians (M = 3.97, SD = .93) were found to use autobiographical memory with less 
frequency than African-American/Blacks (M = 4.12, SD = 1.02) for the AMFJR function of 
Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control. Also consistent with the Ranson findings were 
the size of the Study 2 effects, where, for Conversation, r = .039 (compared to R2 < 2%62 for 
Ranson, 2014); and for Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control, r = .041 (compared to R2 
< 2% for Ranson, 2014). However these effects did not reach significance given the 
unexpectedly small African-American/Blacks sample. A post-hoc power analysis confirmed that 
these two comparisons were underpowered, showed that, based on the smallest of the two effect 
sizes, r = .03963,  achieved power was only .20 (where ≥ .80 considered the lowest amount of 
power needed to obtain significance). Thus, had the African-American/Black subsample been 
commensurate with the Ranson study subsample (n = 451), the Study 2 effects would have been 
fully replicated. 
 Goal 3.3 analyses also yielded evidence for a number of novel culture effects across 
various functions of the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011), AMFS and AMFJR (Ranson & Fitzgerald, 
in preparation). For the TALE, culture predicted SelfTALE (r = .24), but not Social or Directive. 
Specifically, results showed that South Asians (M = 4.48, SD = .92) use autobiographical 
memory more for SelfTALE than do Caucasians (M = 3.78, SD = 1.25). 
 The SelfTALE subordinate function of Counterfactual Thinking was also significantly 
predicted by culture (r = .15) to suggest that the culture effects were inherited by Counterfactual 
Thinking from SelfTALE. Results of the Mann-Whitney U post-hoc comparison tests showed that 
individuals who identify as South Asian use autobiographical memory with greater frequency (M 
                                                
62 Ranson (2014) evaluated culture effects using multiple regression, whereas the current paper used Kruskal-Wallis 
comparison tests to better accommodate the unequal sample sizes. 
63 From a Mann-Whitney U comparison test, where r = |Z|/√N (Field, 2005). 
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= 4.43, SD = 1.08)64 for Counterfactual Thinking than do individuals who identify as Caucasian 
(M = 3.97, SD = 1.29). However, although not foreshadowed by the culture effects found for the 
higher-order SelfTALE, results also showed that South Asians (M = 4.43, SD = 1.08) use 
autobiographical memory or the purpose of Counterfactual Thinking with significantly greater 
frequency (r = .20) than individuals who identify as African-American/Black (M = 3.82, SD = 
1.43). 
 Also implying that the culture effect found for SelfTALE was inherited by its AMFJR 
subordinate function, SelfAMFJR was significantly predicted by culture (r = .25), such that South 
Asians use autobiographical memory content with greater frequency (M = 4.39, SD = .86) than 
do Caucasians (M =3.77, SD = 1.08). However, results also showed that South Asians use 
autobiographical memory with greater frequency than African-American/Blacks (M = 3.80, SD = 
1.11; r = .25). Thus, while results support the inheritance from SelfTALE of differential use of 
autobiographical memory content between Caucasians and South Asians, the differential use of 
autobiographical memory content between South Asians and African-American/Blacks was not 
prefigured by culture effects for SelfTALE.  
 Although no significant culture effects were found for the broad Social function, small 
but significant individual differences in the rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical 
memory content across the evaluated culture groups were found for all functions the AMFJR 
functions except Conversation (p = .223). Specifically, for Perspective TakingAMFJR (r = .172), 
post-hoc Mann-Whitney U tests showed that South Asians (M = 4.52, SD = 1.05) use 
autobiographical memory with greater frequency than Caucasians (M = 4.06, SD = 1.18). With 
respect to Relationship Maintenance, South Asians use autobiographical memory more 
                                                
64 Table 40 lists the group mean ranks on which each reported Mann-Whitney U Z-score was computed. However, 
mean scale scores are featured here, given that they are more representative of the range of possible scores, and thus 
more intuitively interpretable than group mean ranks. 
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frequently (M = 4.52, SD = .79) than do both Caucasians (M = 4.00, SD = 1.02), r = .21, or 
African-American/Blacks (M = 4.01, SD = 1.14), r = .20.  
 Finally, no culture effects were found for the broad Directive function, but culture effects 
were found for the broadly directive AMFJR function of Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral 
Control (r = .21), whereby Caucasians (M =3.97, SD = .93) report using autobiographical 
memory content with less frequency for this purpose than do South Asians (M =4.41, SD = .77). 
The same pattern was found for the broadly Directive Emotion Regulation function of the 
AMFJR (r = .18), such that Caucasians (M = 3.88, SD = 1.07) reporting less frequent use of 
autobiographical memory content for this function than South Asians (M =4.35, SD = .83). For a 
summary of the significant results of the culture effects analyses, see Table 40. 
3.5 Discussion 
In Support of Hypotheses and Goals  
 The following sections address the results of Study 2’s six hypothesis tests and the 
exploration of its three goals. The broader merits, limitations, implications, and future directions 
of Study 2 (Chapter 3) as it pertains to the current paper (i.e., Chapters 1–3) will be discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
 Hypothesis 3.1. The first of Study 2’s six hypotheses was meant to establish that the 
Perspective TakingAMFS, Prospection, and Counterfactual Thinking functions of autobiographical 
memory were viable in their own right, thus demonstrating structural and functional integrity 
when combined with a set of previously validated autobiographical memory functions measured 
by a separate scale. Results showed that the AMFS functions were distinct and independent from 
the functions of the AMFJR (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation).  
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However, Hypothesis 3.1 predicted an eight-function model consisting of Prospection, 
Counterfactual Thinking, Conversation, Relationship Maintenance, Teaching/Problem 
Solving/Behavioral Control, Emotion Regulation, Self, and the “Perspective TakingS&JR” 
function, which consisted of the combined items of the Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective 
TakingAMFJR subscales. Study 2 assumed that the “perspective taking” construct, regardless of 
autobiographical memory functions scale to which it belonged, or within which context 
(simulation-based or socially situated) its items were embedded, could be viewed as a single 
purpose for which autobiographical memory content could be used. However, results did not 
support this assumption. Rather, additional analyses run to investigate differential patterns of 
effects across the Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective TakingAMFJR functions showed that the 
use of autobiographical memory for perspective taking is both simulation-based and socially 
situated. When examined with respect to simulation—i.e., using both Perspective TakingAMFS 
and Perspective TakingAMFJR as predictors of the ERQ (Gross & John, 2003) dimension of 
simulation-based Cognitive Reappraisal—both Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective 
TakingAMFJR explained significant variance in Cognitive Reappraisal. Likewise, although not 
statistically significant, Perspective TakingAMFS function uniquely explained more variance in 
Cognitive Reappraisal than did Perspective TakingAMFJR. This finding suggests that, although the 
mechanism of simulation is common to the behavior of perspective taking, regardless of whether 
measured using the AMFS or AMFJR, Perspective TakingAMFS, as a simulation-based measure 
of perspective taking, yields the stronger association with simulation-based Cognitive 
Reappraisal. When Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective TakingAMFJR were tested as 
predictors of the socially oriented Expressive Suppression dimension of the ERQ, both 
Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective TakingAMFJR accounted for significant variance in 
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Expressive Suppression. However, that the socially situated Perspective TakingAMFJR uniquely 
explained a significant amount of this variance above and beyond that explained by Perspective 
TakingAMFS to imply that, although perspective taking as measured by either scale is a social 
behavior (e.g., Ickes, 2003; Malle & Hodges, 2005), the social aspect is enhanced when 
measured using the Perspective TakingAMFJR subscale.  
 Also evaluated were individual differences in the estimated use of autobiographical 
memory content for simulation-based Perspective TakingAMFS versus socially situated 
Perspective TakingAMFJR. When the mean estimated use of autobiographical memory content for 
the four-item Perspective TakingAMFS subscale was compared to the mean use for the two-item 
Perspective TakingAMFJR subscale, results showed that people use autobiographical memory 
content more frequently for simulation-based Perspective TakingAMFS. However, when 
comparing the two-item Perspective TakingAMFJR subscale to the Perspective TakingAMFS(2) 
subscale, which featured only the same two items comprising Perspective TakingAMFJR, the 
opposite effect was found. With the random ordering of survey blocks eliminating the possibility 
of order effects, other than the different contexts within which the AMFS and AMFJR are 
situated, there were no other measures in Study 2 that would help explicate why respondents 
differentially estimated their use of autobiographical memory content for Perspective 
TakingAMFJR and Perspective TakingAMFS(2).  
 Because these myriad discrepancies endorsed the treatment of Perspective TakingAMFS 
and Perspective TakingAMFJR as independent, rather interdependent (e.g., Perspective 
TakingS&JR), functions, the Hypothesis 3.1 model was revised to include nine, rather than eight, 
functions. And although the modified CFA showed that, overall, the nine-function model 
demonstrated better fit than the eight-function model, there were minor issues with the 
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Counterfactual Thinking subscale that may have undermined an even better fit. However, results 
implied that any compromised estimates were likely limited to the Counterfactual Thinking 
subscale, as estimates for the remaining subscales were stable. That the fit indices implied an 
adequate, rather than excellent, fit was likely due to the Counterfactual Thinking items’ high 
inter-item correlations—an occurrence known to produce inflated chi-square statistics that in 
turn attenuate the value of fit indices (Clark & Watson, 1995)—rather than misspecification of 
the nine-function model. 
 Hypothesis 3.2. The first objective of Hypothesis 3.2 was to use second-order CFA 
modeling to replicate the associations between the functions of the (Bluck & Alea, 2011) and the 
AMFJR as reported by Ranson and Fitzgerald (in preparation). As expected, results showed that 
the AMFJR Conversation, Perspective TakingAMFJR, and Relationship Maintenance functions 
mapped onto the broad Social function of the TALE; the Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral 
Control and Emotion Regulation functions of the AMFJR mapped onto the TALE’s broad 
Directive function, and SelfAMFJR mapped onto SelfTALE. Although, to be thorough, several other 
configurations, including cross-loadings between functions, were explored, none were backed by 
compelling theoretical evidence, nor did any yield a better fit than that based on findings by 
Ranson and Fitzgerald.  
 The second objective of Hypothesis 3.2 was to explore associations between the AMFS 
functions and the broad functions of the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011), also using second-order 
modeling. As expected, CFA results showed that Perspective TakingAMFS mapped onto the broad 
Social function. However, theory and related research were somewhat ambiguous in terms of 
how the two mental time travel functions would definitively map—accordingly, either or both 
could have been broadly Directive, SelfTALE, or some combination thereof. Results showed that 
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Prospection was strongly broadly Directive, Counterfactual Thinking was moderately broadly 
Self, with neither cross loading onto other TALE functions. That the Prospection function was 
found to be broadly Directive was best supported by theory: It has long been hypothesized 
elsewhere that one of the Directive uses of autobiographical memory content is the predicting of 
and planning for the future (e.g., Bluck et al., 2005; Bluck & Alea, 2011; Williams et al., 2008). 
This purpose is reflected in two explicitly “future thinking-oriented” Directive items (numbers 7 
and 9), which ask respondents to estimate their use of autobiographical memory content for 
“guiding one’s future” and “deciding which path to take.” Thus, the conceptual alignment of 
these two TALE items and the three items of the Prospection subscale likely fostered the 
mapping indicated by CFA results. That Study 2 found no association between the Prospection 
function and SelfTALE was fairly unsurprising: Although research shows that self-continuity—
which is an overarching purpose of SelfTALE by definition (Bluck & Alea, 2011)—is a 
phenomenon that concerns the extending of self forward (and backward) in time (e.g., Benoit, 
Gilbert, & Burgess, 2011; Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Hershfield, 2011), no SelfTALE items 
explicitly reflect the use of autobiographical memory for such a purpose.  
 Although behavioral counterfactual thinking is arguably conceptually Directive—i.e., it is 
known to be a strategy for regulating behavior (e.g., Epstude & Roese, 2008) and emotions (e.g., 
Allen et al., 2014; Lindeman & Abraham, 2008; Ruiselová et al., 2009; Ruiselová & 
Prokopcáková, 2010)—results yielded no association between the AMFS’s Counterfactual 
Thinking function and the Directive function of the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011). Rather, results 
showed the Counterfactual Thinking function to be broadly, albeit moderately, Self. One 
possible explanation as to why a seemingly conceptually Directive phenomenon like 
Counterfactual Thinking would be SelfTALE rather than Directive may be due to the content of the 
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Directive function subscale items. Although the TALE’s Directive items address the expected 
practical use of autobiographical memory content for Directive purposes (e.g., “learning from 
past mistakes” and “remembering lessons learned”), these items are not in any way aligned with 
the idea of “reframing” one’s past—for any reason, much less counterfactual thinking 
specifically. But nor do the items of SelfTALE reflect the “reframing” of autobiographical memory 
content; rather, SelfTALE concerns the self-reflective use of autobiographical memory content to 
establish self-concept and maintain self-continuity (e.g., “still the type of person I was”; 
determining “how I have changed”). However, the literature indicates that counterfactual 
thinking is motivated by a number of self- (and perhaps therefore Self-) directed goals and 
phenomena, such as ego-involvement (Anderson & Slusher, 1986), self-evaluation (Tyser, 
McCrea, & Knüpfer, 2012), self-motives (Sanna, Chang, & Meier, 2001), self-esteem (Roese & 
Olson, 1993), self-efficacy and self-confidence (Roese, 1999), and self-referencing (e.g., 
Burnkrant & Unnava, 1989; Roese & Olson, 1993). Thus, although counterfactual thinking 
clearly has a Directive-like utility—i.e., it can highlight one’s actions and prompt alternative 
responses—it is the self—its efficacy, motivation, confidence, and consistency—that Study 2 
results, and to some extent, related theory, suggest is ultimately being served by counterfactual 
thinking.  
 The third and final objective of Hypothesis 3.2 was to test whether mappings found for 
the TALE and AMFJR, and the TALE and AMFS, would hold when combined. It was thought 
that stability in this model would be additional support for the autonomy of the AMFS and 
AMFJR functions found in the testing of Hypothesis 3.1. Results of this second-order CFA 
showed that the best-fitting model confirmed the mappings of the previous two CFAs, such that 
the broadly Social functions were Perspective TakingAMFS, Perspective TakingAMFJR, AMFJR 
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Conversation, and AMFJR Relationship Maintenance. The three functions that were broadly 
Directive were AMFS Prospection, AMFJR Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control, and 
AMFJR Emotion Regulation. And finally, AMFS Counterfactual Thinking SelfAMFJR were 
broadly SelfTALE.  
 Hypothesis 3.3. In order to test the construct validity of the AMFS, Study 1 evaluated the 
associations between the three AMFS functions and the two ERQ (Gross & John, 2003) 
dimensions of Cognitive Reappraisal (to establish convergent validity) and Expressive 
Suppression (to establish discriminative validity). Significant, moderate correlations between 
Cognitive Reappraisal and the three AMFS functions suggested that simulation was the source of 
the association, whereas weak, nonsignificant correlations between the AMFS functions and the 
socially oriented Expressive Suppression further supported that line of reasoning. Thus Study 2’s 
Hypothesis 3.3 aimed to replicate the Study 1 findings with respect human behavior rather than 
the psychometric properties of the AMFS. Hypothesis 3.3 results supported the predicted 
associations; however, the expected associations between the AMFS functions and Cognitive 
Reappraisal were only slightly larger than the associations between the AMFS functions and 
Expressive Suppression. Further, all Hypothesis 3.3 correlations were significant, even when 
effect sizes were small—an outcome compelled by Study 2’s large sample size. Yet, results 
implied that people who use autobiographical memory content with greater frequency for 
perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking are more likely to employ 
subjective, thought-restructuring emotion control strategies than outward, behavior-regulating 
strategies—i.e., those that can be socially observed and/or are likely to be prompted by social 
pressures and interactions (Gross & John, 2003). 
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 Another difference between the Study 1 and Study 2 findings was that, for Study 1, 
Counterfactual Thinking accounted for the most variance in Cognitive Reappraisal. This was a 
plausible outcome given that both Cognitive Reappraisal and behavioral counterfactual thinking 
concern simulation-based strategies for controlling emotional responses. As such, it was assumed 
for Study 2 that some of the variance shared between Cognitive Reappraisal and the 
Counterfactual Thinking would be, above and beyond that attributable to simulation, attributable 
to their use as emotion control strategies. Study 2 therefore expected to replicate not only 
direction, but magnitude, of Study 1 effects. However, results showed that the function 
explaining the most variance in Cognitive Reappraisal was Perspective TakingAMFS—not 
Counterfactual Thinking—the latter of which shared the least amount of variance with Cognitive 
Reappraisal. As for why the Study 2 assumptions were not supported, one or more of the 
following reasons are possible. One, as was discovered during Study 2 data screening, the three 
Counterfactual Thinking items were more highly correlated in Study 2 than in Study 1. As 
redundancy can attenuate the magnitude of effects (e.g., Loevinger, 1954), if the high inter-item 
correlations are due to redundancy (although there was no evidence of redundancy in Study 1), 
such would explain the reduced association between Counterfactual Thinking and Cognitive 
Reappraisal. Two, Study 1 results may reflect order and/or priming effects. The Study 1 AMFS 
block, which preceded the ERQ block, was itself preceded by the mental time travel conditions. 
Thus, the mental time travel conditions—which included a counterfactual thinking condition but 
not a perspective taking condition (see the Chapter 2 Instruments section for details)—may have 
compelled respondents to estimate their use of autobiographical memory for the AMFS items 
differently in Study 1 than in Study 2. Order effects were not possible in Study 2 because the 
mental time travel conditions were omitted, and because, with the exception of the demographics 
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and self-descriptor blocks, all subsequent survey blocks were randomly ordered. And three, the 
Study 1 results that correspond to those of Hypothesis 3.3 were provisional, as the same data 
used to validate the AMFS was then used for further inferential testing using the validated 
AFMFS. Consequently, Study 1 results may have been biased whereas Study 2 results were not. 
If both bias and order effects were an issue in Study 1, then the Study 1 effects may have been 
excessively inflated and therefore unreplicable. 
 Hypothesis 3.4. Hypothesis 3.4 tested the functional relation between the AMFS 
functions and Cognitive Reappraisal to determine if simulation was a source of shared variance 
as found in Study 1. Results replicated the Study 1 findings, thus supporting the Hypothesis 3.4 
prediction that Perspective TakingAMFS and Counterfactual Thinking would significantly explain 
variance in Cognitive Reappraisal but Prospection would not. That Study 2 replicated these 
findings from Study 1 had additional utility in results provided empirical support for Chapter 1’s 
Hypothesis 1.7—that the autobiographical memory function of perspective reflects interpersonal 
simulation, whereas the autobiographical memory functions of mental time travel—here, 
prospection and counterfactual thinking—reflect intrapersonal simulation.  
 That said, although the testing of Hypothesis 3.4 confirmed the expected functional 
relation between the AMFS functions and Cognitive Reappraisal, Study 1 findings were not 
replicated as faithfully as expected. Specifically, Study 1 found that the Counterfactual Thinking 
function uniquely explained the most variance in Cognitive Reappraisal, but Study 2 found that 
the strongest predictor of Cognitive Reappraisal was instead Perspective TakingAMFS. That these 
incongruous patterns of effects were prefigured in the results of Hypothesis 3.3 imply that 
Hypothesis 3.4 results could have been prejudiced by the same psychometric issues as detailed 
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for Hypothesis 3.3—i.e., high inter-item correlations within the Counterfactual Thinking 
function, Study 1 order effects, and/or bias in Study 1’s provisional results.  
 Hypothesis 3.5. Hypothesis 3.5 predicted that, because the ERQ (Gross & John, 2003) 
dimension of Expressive Suppression concerns emotion control strategies that involve more 
social, externally observable behavior, the Expressive Suppression subscale would be more 
strongly associated with the Emotion Regulation subscale of the socially situated AMFJR than it  
would with simulation-based Cognitive Reappraisal. Findings supported the prediction, with 
results showing that the amount of variance shared by Emotion Regulation and Expressive 
Suppression was significantly greater than the amount of overlapping variance shared by 
Emotion Regulation and Cognitive Reappraisal. These results suggest that, as expected, 
individuals who use autobiographical memory content with greater frequency for Emotion 
Regulation reminiscence behaviors are also more likely to employ Expressive Suppression-type 
emotion control strategies, which presumably help them to regulate outward behavior.  
 Hypothesis 3.6. A main objective of Hypothesis 3.6 was to replicate previous results 
concerning the personality dimensions of the HEXACO (Ashton & Lee, 2005, 2009) and the 
autobiographical memory functions of the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011). However, all HEXACO 
dimensions were tested as predictors of the three TALE functions in order to either confirm 
previous reports that certain personality traits were not predictive of the Social, SelfTALE, and 
Directive functions, or to discover new associations that previous studies may have been too 
underpowered to detect. Hypothesis 3.6 also sought to replicate the personality effects found for 
the AMFS functions during Study 1, and to explore whether those personality effects found for 
the TALE would be inherited by the AMFS and AMFJR functions onto which the TALE 
functions correspondingly mapped.  
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 Personality and the TALE: The Social Function. Study 2 replicated results from 
previous studies (Cappeliez & O’Rourke, 2002; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010; Bluck & Alea, 
2009) of the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011) functions to confirm that Openness to Experience was 
predicted the Social, SelfTALE, and Directive functions; Emotionality/Neuroticism predicted the 
Directive and Self functions; and Extraversion predicted the Social function.  
 A number of novel personality effects with respect to the broad functions of the TALE 
(Bluck & Alea, 20110 were also obtained in Study 2. In addition to Extraversion and Openness 
to Experience, results showed that the broad Social function was predicted by 
Emotionality/Neuroticism, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and the interstitial facet of 
Altruism. Although Rasmussen and Berntsen (2010) reported that the relation between the Social 
function and Emotionality/Neuroticism was positive, it was nonsignificant. However, given the 
small effect (5.4% variance in the Social subscale accounted for by Emotionality/Neuroticism) 
yielded in Study 2, it may be that the Rasmussen and Berntsen sample of 136 was not 
statistically powerful enough to detect it. There is also something of a contradiction in this effect 
when compared to Extraversion; a number of studies report that trait Extraversion and 
Emotionality/Neuroticism tend to produce differential and often contrasting effects, especially 
when assessed with respect to social behaviors (e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1980; Hamburger & Ben-
Artzi, 2000; Larsen & Ketelaar, 1980; Magnus, Diener, Fujita, & Pavot, 1983). Yet Study 2 
results suggest that the use of autobiographical memory for Social purposes is equally high for 
extraverts (i.e., low in introversion) and people high in neuroticism. Studies by Hamburger and 
Ben-Artzi (2000) and Hamburger, Wainapel, and Fox (2004) show that, whereas people high in 
Extraversion are naturally social and therefore seek out social situations, people high in 
Introversion are less comfortable in social settings, and thus become anxious or experience other 
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negative emotions as a result. However, introverts demonstrate a level of sociability similar to 
extraverts in the online setting. As such, it may be individuals consider both face-to-face and 
online settings when estimating their rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical 
memory for Social purposes.  
 Rasmussen and Berntsen (2010) found no significant associations between the three 
TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011) functions and Agreeableness or Conscientiousness. However, Study 
2 found both personality dimensions to predict the broad Social function, albeit with very small 
effects (0.7% and 1.6%, respectively), which could explain the Rasmussen and Berntsen results. 
However, the direction of the Rasmussen and Berntsen effects were opposite that found in Study 
2, the latter of which suggested that rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical 
memory content for reminiscence behaviors of a Social nature are cooperative, willing to 
compromise, disciplined, and careful (Lee & Ashton, 2009)—all traits that would plausibly 
facilitate social interactions. This also aligns with the Study 2 finding that the Social function is 
predicted by Altruism—the tendency to be sympathetic and empathetic toward others (Lee & 
Ashton, 2009). 
 Finally, of note with respect to personality and the broad Social function of the TALE 
(Bluck & Alea, 2011) is that the significant personality effects found for the TALE corresponded 
to those found for Perspective TakingAMFS. The relevance to this to Study 2’s conclusions, is that 
the Perspective TakingAMFS was shown in the testing of Hypothesis 3.2 to map broadly onto the 
TALE Social function. Thus, that personality effects can seen as flowing from the higher-order 
functions (such as the broad Social function) to the lower-order functions to which they are 
empirically linked (such as Perspective TakingAMFS function) is vital to Study 2 conclusions.  
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 Personality and the TALE: The Directive Function. Study 2 also confirmed previous 
findings by Rasmussen and Berntsen (2010) with respect to Directive function of the TALE 
(Bluck & Alea, 2011), such that the broad Directive function Emotionality/Neuroticism and 
Openness to Experience. In addition, Study 2 found that the broad Directive function was 
predicted by Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Altruism. Although no 
previous association between Extraversion and the broad Directive function have been reported, 
it is a plausible link considering that there is a social component to the TALE, including its 
Directive subscale. For example, that the TALE items are prefaced with instructions to consider 
the extent to which they think about or “talk to other people about their life.” (Bluck et al., 2005; 
Bluck & Alea, 2011). As such, it is likely that the TALE elicits estimations of individuals’ rated 
frequency of functional use of autobiographical memory for Directive purposes that facilitate or 
even require explicit social interaction—e.g., talking about the past with others to “help solve a 
problem”; talking about the past with others to “remember something that someone else said or 
did that might help me now.” That Study 2 found Agreeableness to predict the Directive function 
contradicts the Rasmussen and Berntsen finding that, although nonsignificant, showed an inverse 
association. However, the Study 2 results is more in line with the idea that, in order to discuss 
problems or past scenarios with others requires some degree of cooperation and tendency not to 
judge that are characteristic of high levels of trait Agreeableness (Lee & Ashton, 2009). Yet, the 
Rasmussen and Berntsen finding is mirrored in the personality effect between the Prospection 
function—which Hypothesis 3.2 testing indicated is a Directive subscale—and the Flexibility 
facet of Agreeableness. Thus, the inconsistency of the Agreeableness function across 
autobiographical memory function studies as observed by Rasmussen and Berntsen appears to be 
confirmed by Study 2. However, it may be that such inconsistency reflects instead adaptability: 
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Being well intentioned, nonjudgmental, and warm could facilitate socially oriented Directive 
reminiscence behaviors and the reduces risk of criticism or rejection; but being too agreeable 
could encourage others to take advantage or call the shots on one’s behalf—the latter of which 
would reduce one’s need to use of personal past information for Directive purposes. That 
Altruism predicts the Directive function implies that empathy toward others facilitates the use of 
brainstorming past-talk with others.  
 Finally, in support of the Hypothesis 3.2 results, the personality effects found for the 
higher-order Directive function corresponded to those found in the AMFS Prospection. This 
corroborates the Hypothesis 3.2 conclusion that the broad Directive function is empirically 
linked to the Prospection function such that Prospection can be thought to have inherited the 
effects from the broad Directive function onto which it maps. 
 Personality and the TALE: The SelfTALE Function. Findings by Rasmussen and 
Berntsen (2010) that Emotionality/Neuroticism and Openness to New Experience predict 
SelfTALE were replicated in Study 2. Additionally, SelfTALE was found for the first time in Study 2 
to be predicted by Extraversion, Altruism, and the inverse Honesty-Humility. As with the 
Directive function, that Extraversion is predictive of SelfTALE may be influenced by the social 
dimensions of the TALE, such that talking about the past with others to understand and maintain 
the self may align with trait sociability. However, the effect found in Study 2 was very small 
(with Extraversion explaining only 0.8% of the variance in SelfTALE), thus being low in 
Extraversion is not likely to diminish one’s use of autobiographical memory content for SelfTALE 
purposes. The empirical link with Altruism may also be tapping into the social aspects of the 
SelfTALE function, such that empathy toward others, as well as toward one’s self, should help 
foster the personal dialog beneficial to the understanding of one’s self and others. SelfTALE was 
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the only TALE function to be predicted by the Honesty-Humility dimension—and here, 
inversely so—thus no previous research exists to support this result. However, that this effect 
appears to have been inherited by the SelfTALE subordinate function of AMFS Counterfactual 
Thinking, which was found in Hypothesis 3.2 analyses to moderately map onto SelfTALE gives it 
a bit more weight, and is discussed further in the subsection that addresses personality effects for 
the Counterfactual Thinking function.  
 Personality and Simulation-Based Perspective TakingAMFS. Study 2 results replicated 
the Study 1 findings that Perspective TakingAMFS was predicted by Extraversion, 
Conscientiousness, and Openness to Experience. The Study 1 finding that Perspective 
TakingAMFS was predicted by Emotional Stability was not replicated; however, Perspective 
TakingAMFS was found in Study 2 to be predicted by the inverse of Emotional Stability, 
Emotionality Neuroticism. Related research suggests that extraverts may have more 
opportunities to engage in perspective taking given their characteristically large social circles 
(Kessler et al., 2015).  
 That Study 2 results showed that Emotionality/Neuroticism predicted rated frequency of 
functional use of autobiographical memory content for Perspective TakingAMFS is more strongly 
supported by the literature than is the Study 1 finding Perspective TakingAMFS is predicted by 
Emotional Stability. For example, research shows that proficiency in perspective taking, which is 
referred to as empathic accuracy, is enhanced in women whose are insecurely, or “anxiously” 
attached (Ickes, 2003). Because anxiously attached women, who tend also to be high in 
Emotionality/Neuroticism (e.g., Crawford et al., 2007; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007), tend also to 
be insecure in close relationships, they become hypervigilant about reading their romantic 
partner’s thoughts and feelings, which enhances their perspective taking accuracy (Simpson, 
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Ickes, & Grich, 1999). This effect can be even further amplified by trait Conscientiousness 
(Crawford, 2007). Other research shows that relationships need not be romantic for perspective 
taking acuity to be heightened; attachment and neuroticism are also linked to an increased 
tendency to engage in perspective taking in response to any perceived social threat (e.g., 
Crawford et al., 2007). Because anxiously attached persons fear social others’ disapproval, they 
become hypervigilant about inferring the others’ mental states (Vrtička et al., 2008). Not only do 
these related findings align strongly with the HEXACO dimensions found in Study 2 to predict 
simulation-based Perspective TakingAMFS, but also the Study 2 evidence that Perspective 
TakingAMFS is predicted by the Emotionality/Neuroticism facets of Anxiety, Dependence, and 
Sentimentality. Such individuals may use simulation-based Perspective TakingAMFS as a means 
of coping with perceived social rejection, condemnation, or abandonment. Contrarily, people 
high Emotionality/Neuroticism (as well as the facets of Anxiety and Dependence) whose rated 
frequency in functional use of autobiographical memory content for Perspective TakingAMFS is 
low may be more inclined toward “motivated inaccuracy”—the intentional attempt to not 
correctly infer another’s mental states (Cuperman, Howland, Ickes, & Simpson, 2011). Research 
shows motivated inaccuracy serves as a coping mechanism for individuals who believe that not 
understanding another’s mind will mitigate potential hurt. Contingently, perspective taking may 
be used to assuage social status anxiety—whereby individuals use one another as “social looking 
glasses” through which to glean one’s social status compared to another or others (Schwartz, 
1967, p. 7). Thus, for people high in Emotionality/Neuroticism, as well as Anxiety, the motive to 
perspective take may involve a need to determine others’ perceptions of the perspective taker’s 
place in the immediate or broader social circle. This may explain the Study 2 finding that people 
whose rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical memory content for Perspective 
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Taking is high are also low in Greed-Avoidance—a concern over and tendency to pursue social 
status (Lee & Ashton, 2009). For full coverage of facets, see Appendix F. 
 In addition to replicating Study 1 personality effects, Study 2 also found evidence that, 
like the broad Social function onto which it mapped, Perspective TakingAMFS was predicted by 
Agreeableness and the interstitial facet of Altruism. Research in intercultural communication 
shows that Agreeableness predicts motivation to engage in and be accurate in perspective taking 
(Cavanaugh, 2013); most likely because Agreeableness is largely a social trait (Graziano & 
Tobin, 2009). Agreeableness is also associated with social affiliation—the motive to seek 
interpersonal relationships (Digman, 1990)—which also aligns with altruistic tendencies 
(Ashton, Paunonen, Helmes, & Jackson, 1998; MacDonald & Messinger, in press; Buss, 1991, 
1996). As such, people who use of autobiographical memory content with high frequency for 
simulation-based Perspective TakingAMFS may be calling on their own past experiences to 
understand others to meet prosocial goals.  
 Personality and Prospection. Study 2 also replicated results from Study 1 whereby the 
autobiographical memory function of Prospection was predicted by the personality dimensions 
of Emotionality/Neuroticism, Openness to Experience, and Conscientiousness—all of which 
were also predictive of the broad Directive function onto which Prospection mapped. As to how 
the inherited effects manifest at the subordinate Prospection level, related research may provide 
insight. For example, much of the related research regarding Emotionality/Neuroticism and 
Prospection concerns the emotional valence of imagined future scenarios. For example, 
Emotionality/Neuroticism has been found to predict a greater tendency to form negatively biased 
future imaginings (e.g., MacLeod & Byrne, 1996; MacLeod et al, 2005). However, it is unknown 
if the autobiographical memory content that is activated and retrieved for the purpose of “pre-
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experiencing” downwardly biased prospective imaginings is itself of a negative nature, or if 
positive and/or emotionally neutral memory content is being so modified during simulation.  
 That both Study 1 and Study 2 found a link between the Prospection function and 
Openness to Experience is supported by related research. Related research attributes the 
adventurousness and creativity that are characteristic of the Openness trait as prompting 
individuals to imagine future scenarios (e.g., Allen et al., 2014; Prenda & Lachman, 2001). Study 
2 also replicated the Study 1 finding that Conscientiousness predicted the Prospection function. 
Related research aligns with these findings, indicating that Conscientiousness predicts behavioral 
perspective taking to suggest that, because people high in Conscientiousness are goal-oriented, 
non-impulsive, and reflective (Lee & Ashton, 2009), they may engage in prospection as a way of 
shepherding and optimizing both ongoing or future success (Prenda & Lachman, 2001). That 
both traits—Openness to Experience and Conscientiousness—were also predictive of the broad 
Directive function, further supports the Hypothesis 3.2 second-order configurations. 
 Although Study 1 results did not yield personality effects between Prospection and the 
personality dimension of Extraversion, Study 2 did. Extraversion has been found in related 
research to predict future thinking (e.g., Allen et al., 2014; Furey & Fortunato, 2014), but some 
studies report no association (e.g., Prenda & Lachman, 2001). Given the small effect size found 
in Study 2 (< 1.0%), it may be that the apparent inconsistency of this association is due to 
underpowered analyses rather than lack of association. However, Extraversion did significantly 
predict the broad Directive function, which helps to substantiate this effect, however small, given 
evidence that it was inherited. 
Personality and Counterfactual Thinking. Study 2 confirmed the Study 1 findings that 
the autobiographical memory function of Counterfactual Thinking is predicted by 
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Emotionality/Neuroticism, the inverse of Extraversion (i.e., Introversion), and the inverse of 
Honesty-Humility. People high in Emotionality/Neuroticism are known to generate more 
downwardly biased counterfactuals than people who demonstrate trait emotional stability (Allen 
et al., 2014), often as a coping mechanism (e.g., Allen et al., 2014; Lindeman & Abraham, 2008; 
Ruiselová et al., 2009; Ruiselová & Prokopcáková, 2010) or means of avoiding regret (e.g., 
Tykocinski & Pittman, 1995). This corresponds to research showing that trait procrastination 
predicts downward-biased counterfactuals (Sirois, 2004, p. 279). People high in trait-
procrastination tend to also be neurotic (Schouwenburg & Lay, 1995), highly anxious (Sirois, 
2004), low in Conscientiousness (Schouwenburg & Lay, 1995), and possess a tendency to self-
enhance in order to improve their social image (Sirois, 2004, p. 271).  
Study 2 replicated the Study 1 finding that Introversion predicted the function of 
Counterfactual Thinking. However, there was no evidence in the counterfactual thinking 
literature to substantiate this finding, as the examination of Big Five personality effects with 
respect to counterfactual thinking is both sporadic (Ruiselová & Prokopcáková, 2011), and often 
unfruitful (e.g., Sirois, 2004). Thus, the fact that Study 2 found the Counterfactual Thinking 
function to be predicted by the facets of Sociability, as well as the inverse of both Social Self-
Esteem—i.e., the tendency to see oneself as worthless and unpopular (Lee & Ashton, 2009) and 
Liveliness—i.e., characterized by pessimism and dampened mood—may provide insight. 
Research by Roese and Olson (1993) investigating associations between counterfactual thinking 
and self-esteem found that, although individuals with high and low self-esteem engage in 
counterfactual thinking, the counterfactuals people with low self-esteem are self-critical 
following one’s own failure, whereas the counterfactuals of people with high self-esteem focused 
more on one’s success following the failure of others. This aligns with Study 2 links between the 
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Counterfactual Thinking function and both pessimism (the inverse of Liveliness) and 
Introversion, such that introverts tend to internalize (e.g., Brenner, 1996) and reflect upon their 
experiences (e.g., Feist, 1998; Verhaegen, Joormann, & Khan, 2005). Thus, not only may people 
high in trait Introversion use autobiographical memory content with greater frequency for 
Counterfactual Thinking compared to people low in trait Extraversion. 
Consistent with the personality effect found for SelfTALE, the inverse of Honesty-Humility 
dimension was found in both Study 1 and Study 2 to predict the function of Counterfactual 
Thinking. These associations may imply that people who use autobiographical memory content 
with the greatest frequency for Counterfactual Thinking have a tendency to be manipulative, 
self-important, inveigling, fraudulent, status-seeking, pompous, and have a strong sense of 
entitlement (Lee & Ashton, 2009). Indirect support for these findings may come from the 
revenge motive literature, which indicates that the magnitude of perceived injustices occur as a 
result of having considered how things should have gone instead (e.g., Beugré, 2005; Folger & 
Cropanzano, 1998; Hardman & Hardman, 2009). Given the relation between revenge motive and 
such personality traits as vindictiveness, superiority, manipulativeness (e.g., Gurtman, 1992)., it 
may be that the Study 2 findings reflect a tendency to use autobiographical memory content for 
the purpose of generating alternative scenarios in response to perceived slights. This may also tie 
in with the literature on fairness theory (Folger and Cropanzano, 1998), which posits that 
individuals contrastively consider what could have occurred instead of what actually occurred; 
what should have occurred; and what would have ideally occurred had the negative event played 
out as alternatively imagined (McColl-Kennedy & Sparks, 2003, p. 254). 
Allen et al. (2014) also reported an inverse relation between counterfactual thinking and 
Conscientiousness—such that low trait Conscientiousness predicted negative emotionality, 
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which corresponded to the generation of downward-biased counterfactuals.  Although Study 1 
findings did not support these related findings, Study 2 findings did, with the inverse of 
Conscientiousness significantly predicting Counterfactual Thinking. As such, people whose rated 
frequency of functional use of autobiographical memory content for counterfactual thinking tend 
to be impulsive, unstructured, haphazard, and have little concern over potential consequences of 
their actions (Lee & Ashton, 2009).  
 With respect to the inheritance argument, the effect of Extraversion Counterfactual 
Thinking contradicted the effect on SelfTALE, such that the association was negative for 
Counterfactual Thinking and positive for SelfTALE. However, there was alignment in that the 
Extraversion facet of Sociability was also positive for Counterfactual Thinking. Although it is 
unknown whether the Sociability facet of Extraversion would have produced the strongest effect 
on SelfTALE to bring these effects into greater alignment, it is likely that the positive effect of 
Extraversion of SelfTALE is also enhanced by the social dimensions of the socially situated 
TALE. Likewise, Study 2 found Openness to Experience to be predictive of SelfTALE; and 
although the direction of the effects were consistent with those for Counterfactual Thinking, the 
association was not significant. The inverse of Conscientiousness was also found to predict 
Counterfactual Thinking, but no corresponding relation was found between Conscientiousness 
and SelfTALE. One of the strongest personality effects for Counterfactual Thinking was with the 
inverse of Agreeableness; however, Study 2 did not find that trait to be associated with the broad 
function of SelfTALE. However, also of note is that the empirical link between the SelfTALE and 
the subordinate Counterfactual Thinking was the weakest of the associations between the TALE 
and AMFS functions, which may explain why not all SelfTALE effects were faithfully inherited. 
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 Personality and the AMFJR: The (Social) Conversation Function. Also explored in 
Study 2 were, for the first time, personality effects with respect to the functions of the AMFJR 
(Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation). As such, because no previous findings were available to 
replicate, the objective of Hypothesis 3.6 with respect to the AMFJR was to verify the 
assumption that the personality effects of the higher-order TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011) functions 
are inherited by the lower-order functions of the AMFJR. 
With the exception of Agreeableness, all personality effects found for the broad Social 
function of the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011) were also found for the Conversation function of the 
AMFJR (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation). The Conversation function was found in Study 2 
to map onto the higher-order Social function. That there was no personality effect of 
Agreeableness on Conversation may be an issue of power; although the effects of Agreeableness 
on Conversation were directionally aligned to those of the broad Social function, it was 
nonsignificant. This is unsurprising given that the magnitude of the effect on Social was itself 
weak (0.7%), which, conceptually, may have been too unsubstantial to impact the subordinate 
function of Conversation. This may also be in keeping with the Rasmussen and Berntsen (2010) 
assertion that the relation between Agreeableness and autobiographical memory functions across 
studies has been inconsistent, suggesting that varying degrees of agreeableness serve different 
purposes in different social settings (e.g., Digman, 1990; Graziano, Jensen-Campbell, & Hair, 
1996). 
Personality and the AMFJR: The (Social) Perspective TakingAMFJR Function. Results 
showed that all personality effects found for the broad Social function of the TALE (Bluck & 
Alea, 2011) were inherited by Perspective TakingAMFJR; i.e., Emotionality/Neuroticism, 
Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Openness to Experience, and Altruism. Thus 
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the only HEXACO (Ashton & Lee, 2005; 2009) dimension that predicted neither Perspective 
TakingAMFJR nor the broad Social function was the Honesty-Humility dimension.  
Also of interest to Hypothesis 3.6 was whether the personality effects for simulation-
based Perspective TakingAMFS versus those found for socially situated Perspective TakingAMFJR 
would coincide. Both Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective TakingAMFJR mapped onto the 
broad Social function, but were shown in supplementary analyses (see results of Hypothesis 3.1) 
to be independent functions from one another. Study 2 results showed that Perspective 
TakingAMFS and Perspective TakingAMFJR were positively predicted by Emotionality/Neuroticism, 
Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Openness to Experience, and Altruism. 
However, only simulation-based Perspective TakingAMFS was predicted by the inverse of the 
Honesty-Humility facet of Greed Avoidance—a preoccupation with social status (Lee & Ashton, 
2009). This inconsistency across Perspective TakingAMFS and Perspective TakingAMFJR may be a 
product of their contextual differences. For example, the social context of joint reminiscence—
within which Perspective TakingAMFJR subscale items are situated—may have elicited a stronger 
sense of social obligation and cooperation, which influenced rated frequencies of functional use 
of autobiographical memory content for items in the Perspective TakingAMFJR subscale. This may 
have resulted in the rated frequencies on Perspective TakingAMFJR being less aligned with the use 
of social situations to gain an advantage against a perceived social rival. Or there may have been 
something about the content of the two Perspective TakingAMFS subscale items that are not 
included in the Perspective TakingAMFJR subscale (i.e., “I use my own past experiences as 
examples of why others might do what they do”; and “I refer to my own past experiences when 
trying to figure out another’s behaviors”) that inadvertently led respondents to consider their 
rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical memory content for these items from a 
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“social competition” framework, which may explain why only Perspective TakingAMFS, and not 
Perspective TakingAMFJR, was predicted by the Greed-Avoidance facet.  
Personality and the AMFJR: The (Social) Relationship Maintenance Function. As was 
the case with Perspective TakingAMFJR, the personality effects for the AMFJR Relationship 
Maintenance function were fully inherited from the broad Social function, onto which 
Relationship Maintenance was found to map in the testing of Hypothesis 3.2.  
Personality and the AMFJR: The (Directive) Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral 
Control Function. As a broadly Directive function, it was expected that the personality effects 
on the AMFJR (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation) function of Teaching/Problem 
Solving/Behavioral Control would inherit those found for the Directive function of the TALE 
(Bluck & Alea, 2011). Results supported this prediction, with both the Teaching/Problem 
Solving/Behavioral Control and Directive functions being predicted by 
Emotionality/Neuroticism, Extraversion, Conscientiousness, Openness to Experience, and 
Altruism. As such, these findings provide additional support for the mapping of the 
Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control function onto the broad Directive function. 
Personality and the AMFJR: The (Directive) Emotional Regulation Function. As with 
the Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control function of the AMFJR (Ranson & Fitzgerald, 
in preparation), the personality effects of the broad Directive function of the TALE (Bluck & 
Alea, 2011), were fully inherited by the broadly Directive AMFJR function of Emotion 
Regulation. Study 2 results showed that Emotion Regulation was positively predicted by 
Emotionality/Neuroticism, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Openness to 
Experience, and Altruism.  
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Personality and the AMFJR: The (Self) SelfTALE Function. Finally, the personality 
effects that were found for the broad SelfTALE were found for SelfAMFJR. Rated frequency of 
functional use of autobiographical memory content for both SelfTALE and SelfAMFJR were 
predicted by Emotionality/Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to Experience, Altruism, and the 
inverse of Honesty-Humility. Thus the mapping of SelfAMFJR onto higher-order SelfTALE further 
supports the mapping established in the testing of Hypothesis 3.2. 
 Goal 3.1. Study 2 yielded two age effects: One for SelfTALE, and one for its subordinate 
AMFS function of Counterfactual Thinking and the broad Self function of the TALE (Bluck & 
Alea, 2011). Both effects indicated that rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical 
memory content declines as a function of age. That age inversely predicts the use of 
autobiographical memory content for SelfTALE replicates previous results. Bluck and Alea (2009) 
found that older adults tend to use autobiographical memory content for SelfTALE purposes less 
frequently than do younger adults, presumably because older adults have developed a stable self-
concept that, contrary to the self-concepts of younger adults, requires little continued input from 
autobiographical memory content.  
 These age effects also align with the mapping of the Counterfactual Thinking function 
onto broad SelfTALE that was found in the testing of Hypothesis 3.2. And although results also 
showed that the use of autobiographical memory content for SelfAMFJR—which also mapped onto 
SelfTALE—also declined with age, the age effect for SelfAMFJR was only marginally significant. 
This may have been due to slight differences in constructs of SelfAMFJR and SelfTALE, such that 
SelfAMFJR items are more concerned with self-identity than SelfTALE items, which are more 
oriented toward self-continuity (see Tables for 18 and 19 for AMFJR and TALE items, 
respectively). As such, the Counterfactual Thinking items may be more aligned with the SelfTALE 
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items (e.g., “how I have changed,” and whether “ I am still the same type of person as before”), 
than are the SelfAMFJR items (e.g., , “recognizing that (one) is part of a larger group,” or 
“reminding (one’s self) of who (one) was when younger,”)—especially given that 
counterfactuals are often used to reconcile past actions in order to maintain self-understanding 
and sustain a consistent sense of self (e.g., Roese & Morrison, 2009; Roese & Olson, 1993). 
 Although mapping of Counterfactual Thinking onto SelfTALE supports the idea that  
Counterfactual Thinking inherited the age effect from SelfTALE, there is recent related research 
that also supports this finding. For example, a study be De Brigard, Giovanello, Stewart, 
Lockrow, O’Brien, & Spreng (2016), yielded age effects between young and older healthy adults 
with respect to the generation of “likely” versus “unlikely” positive and negative 
autobiographical counterfactuals. Participants self-rated on a 1–7 scale the “likeliness” that their 
counterfactuals reflected details and outcomes that could have actually occurred, such that 
ratings of 1–3 constituted an “unlikely” counterfactual, and ratings of 5–7 reflected 
counterfactuals that were “likely.” Additionally, events were rated for their “internal” (main 
event/episodic properties) versus “external” (semantic/nonepisodic properties) (p. 5). Results 
showed that younger adults were more likely to generate both positive and negative 
autobiographical counterfactuals about “likely” events, whereas older adults were more likely to 
generate positive “unlikely” autobiographical counterfactuals. More importantly, older adults’ 
autobiographical counterfactuals were less likely than younger adults’ autobiographical 
counterfactuals to feature “internal” or episodic details, to indicate that younger adults use more 
episodic memory content than older adults when generating counterfactuals. This suggests that, 
because older adults compared to younger adults use less episodic memory content for their 
counterfactuals, and because episodic memory content is what is thought necessary to the “re-
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experience” of a past event (Abram et al., 2014; Markowitsch & Staniloiu, 2011; Piolino, 
Desgranges, & Eustache, 2009; Tulving, 2002b) so that it can be “reframed” counterfactually 
(Addis et al., 2009; De Brigard et al., 2013; De Brigard et al., 2015; Schacter, Benoit, De  
Brigard, & Szpunar, in press; Van Hoeck, Ma, Ampe, Vandekerckhove, & Van Overwalle, 
2013), older adults would, as Study 2 found, rate the frequency with which they use 
autobiographical memory content for counterfactual thinking lower than would younger adults.  
 Goal 3.2. Gender was found to predict the use of autobiographical memory content for 
the broad Social function of the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011), the Emotion Regulation function 
of the AMFJR (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation), and the Counterfactual Thinking function 
of the AMFS. Thus the argument for the heritability of individual difference effects is not 
supported for Goal 3.2, as neither the Emotion Regulation or Counterfactual Thinking functions 
were found to be broadly Social.  
 Nor do the results of the Study 2 gender effects tests replicate findings found elsewhere. 
Although the TALE (e.g., Bluck & Alea, 2009) has been tested for gender effects, none have 
been reported to date. However, the Study 2 gender effect found for Social was small (R2 = 
1.0%) which may have made it difficult to detect in comparatively underpowered studies. Yet, 
indirect evidence may offer possible explanations for this finding. For example, McMahon and 
Rhudick (1961) describe interpersonal reminiscing as an act of self-disclosure. In 2005, Igarashi, 
Takai, & Yoshida reported evidence that women are more motivated than men to foster and 
maintain social relationships, often through self-disclosure. As such, women may be more likely 
than men to self-disclose–—i.e., engage in “past-talk” about autobiographical memories for the 
purpose of fostering and maintaining social bonds and intimacy. By comparison, men are less 
likely than women to self-disclose, preferring instead to use social interaction as a way to 
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maintain social position or status (Igarashi, Takai, & Yoshida, 2005)—an objective of social 
collaboration that is not considered an objective of the Social function of the TALE.  
 Study 2 also found that men use autobiographical memory content with less frequency 
than women for the AMFJR function of Emotion Regulation. Although this effect was not found 
for the broadly Directive function onto which Emotion Regulation was show in in Study 2 to 
map, related research may support this effect. For example, brain evidence presented by 
MacRae, Ochsner, Mauss, Gabrieli, and Gross (2008) showed that, compared to women, men 
demonstrate an increase in the down-regulation of amygdala activity—which is associated with 
emotional response—and a decrease in prefrontal activity (p. 154)—which is associated with 
regulatory control. It was posited that men may therefore be more efficient regulators of emotion 
than women, such that men depend less on simulation-based, cognitive reappraisal-like (p. 148) 
strategies to bring emotions into check (p. 154). As such, men may rely less on the use of 
autobiographical memory content, as measured by the Emotion Regulation function, as a strategy 
for regulating emotions. Because such evidence is more conceptually aligned with the Emotion 
Regulation construct than to the constructs of the other broadly Directive functions—Prospection 
and Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control—such might explain why the effect was 
found for a first-order function but not its second-order “parent.”  
 Finally, Study 2 found that men use autobiographical memory with greater frequency 
than women for Counterfactual Thinking. The general consensus in the counterfactual thinking 
literature is that gender does not predict the frequency with which individuals generate 
counterfactuals (Roese & Summerville, 2005). However, the Study 2 effect was quite small (only 
0.2% of the variance in the function of Counterfactual Thinking was explained by gender); thus,  
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it may be that previous studies seeking the differential use of counterfactual thinking by men and 
women were sufficiently powered to find equivalently small effects.  
 Goal 3.3. The first objective of Goal 3.3 was to replicate the culture effects found by 
Ranson (2014), which showed that Caucasians used autobiographical memory content for the 
function of Conversation with greater frequency than did African-American/Blacks. 
Additionally, Ranson found that African-American/Blacks used autobiographical memory 
content with greater frequency than Caucasians for the function of Teaching/Problem 
Solving/Behavioral Control. However, these effects were small (with ethnicity accounting for 
approximately 2.0% of in the variance in each the Conversation function and Teaching/Problem 
Solving/Behavioral Control function). Thus, although Study 2 results replicated these same 
patterns of effects, statistical significance was not obtained because the African-American/Black 
sample was prohibitively small.  
 With respect to the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011), culture was predictive only of SelfTALE. 
Study 2 also found that this effect was inherited by it’s the SelfTALE subordinate functions of 
SelfAMFJR and Counterfactual Thinking. Specifically, results showed that the rated frequency of 
functional use of autobiographical memory content for SelfTALE, SelfAMFJR, and Counterfactual 
Thinking is higher for South Asians than Caucasians. Results also showed that South Asians use 
autobiographical memory content more frequently than African-American/Blacks for the two 
SelfTALE subordinate functions of SelfAMFJR and Counterfactual Thinking, but not for the parent 
function of SelfTALE. Such was the case for other Study 2 results that also showed that Caucasians 
use autobiographical memory with less frequency than South Asians for the AMFJR functions of 
Perspective TakingAMFJR, Relationship Maintenance, Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral 
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Control, and Emotion Regulation, but not for the broad Social or Directive functions onto which 
theses AMFJR functions map.  
 Although theses effects failed to fully comply with the idea of inheritance, related 
research in differences between collectivistic and individualistic cultures may elucidate why 
culture effects were found for these specific Self- and Social-oriented functions. Traditionally, 
South Asian culture has long been considered collectivistic—i.e., interdependent, with a focus on 
social interaction and cooperation (Chadda & Deb, 2013). However, in more recent years, South 
Asian culture has been characterized as a “mixed” culture (Hofstede, 1984) that exhibits 
characteristics more common in cultures that considered individualistic—independent, with a 
focus on autonomy and self-achievement (Triandis & Bhawuk, 1997). This may be due to the 
fact that South Asian culture is “vertically” collectivistic—i.e., it features greater disparity across 
its hierarchy of social classes and thus more social inequality than collectivist (or individualistic) 
cultures characterized as “horizontal” (Triandis & Bhawuk, 1997). As such, the family unit—
which tends to exist within the same social class—serves as the primary focus of South Asian 
cultures’ social structures (Chadda & Deb, 2013). With respect to autobiographical memory, 
individuals from collectivist cultures tend to recollect memories of social interactions more 
readily than do collectivist cultures (e.g., Jobson & O’Kearney; 2008; Wang, 2001), whereas 
individuals from individualistic cultures think and talk about their autobiographical memories 
with greater frequency than individuals from collectivist cultures (e.g., Fiske & Pillemer, 2006; 
Jobson & O’Kearney, 2008). Although Caucasians cultures (presuming Northern European 
cultures of origin) are characterized as more strongly individualistic than South Asian culture 
(Chadda & Deb, 2013), that Study 2 found South Asians to use autobiographical memory content 
with greater frequency than Caucasians for all six of the AMFJR’s functions. South Asians were 
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also found to use autobiographical memory content with greater frequency than individualistic 
African-American/Blacks for the AMFJR functions of Relationship Maintenance and Self. These 
cultural effects may be attributable the AMFJR’s social context of joint reminiscence, which is 
thought to elicit social and cultural influences on “past-talk” content and use (Kulkofsky & Koh, 
2009). While “past-talk” is thought to facilitate autobiographical memory use for the socially 
situated AMFJR functions, its influence may be pronounced for individuals from collectivist 
cultures. 
3.6 Conclusion 
 A number of replications and novel findings were yielded in the testing of Study 2 
hypotheses and goals. Because the current paper is the first to examine the simulation-based 
functions of Perspective Taking, Prospection, and Counterfactual Thinking, and because few 
autobiographical memory functions studies have investigated the effects as personality, age, 
gender, and culture, many Study 2 findings are unsupported by direct evidence from previous 
studies, but often aligned with evidence from related lines of inquiry to provide some insight. 
 As for the overall contributions, limitations, implications, and future directions of 
Chapters 1–3 findings and conclusions, such are the topics discussed in Chapter 4.  
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CHAPTER 4 INTEGRATION OF CHAPTERS 1, 2, and 3: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
4.1 General Summary 
 The springboard for the current paper was the detection of a new and previously 
unanticipated autobiographical memory function of perspective taking. Although the evidence 
for the perspective taking function was strong (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation), its novelty 
warranted theoretical substantiation and empirical replication. Chapter 1 of the current paper 
explored the theoretical justification of the perspective taking function by adapting an existing 
cognitive process model to explain how autobiographical memory content might be used in the 
service of perspective taking, thereby qualifying perspective taking as function of 
autobiographical memory. Simulation theory according to Goldman (2006) posits that 
perspective taking was made possible when “background information” drawn from long-term 
memory storage was imaginatively mixed simulated to generate the possible mental states of 
another. Long-term memory content could therefore be seen as “input” for simulation 
processing. Using theory, taxonomy, conceptual cognitive models, and empirical evidence from 
brain imaging studies, Chapter 1 argued that a specific form of long-term memory content 
serving as simulation “input” is autobiographical memory content.  
 A recent revision to simulation theory by Shanton and Goldman (2010) augmented the 
simulation process model to explain both perspective taking and another simulation-based 
phenomena, mental time travel. To complement these dual purposes for which simulation could 
be used, Shanton and Goldman proposed the existence of two simulation forms: interpersonal, 
which underlies other-directed perspective taking, and intrapersonal, which underlies self-
directed mental time travel. To illustrate how the specific form of long-term memory content 
used for interpersonal and intrapersonal simulation could be autobiographical, Chapter 1 
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proposed the Expanded Simulation Model—an extension of the revised simulation process 
model by Shanton and Goldman into which a conceptual model (the Self-Memory System by 
Conway, 2005, and Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) and a computational model (the Source 
Activation Confusion model by Reder et al., 2002, and Reder et al., 2009) were integrated in 
order to explain how autobiographical memory content could be activated and retrieved for 
perspective taking or mental time travel. To make the Expanded Simulation Model more 
amenable to empirical testing, Chapter 1 operationalized mental time travel as prospection (the 
use of autobiographical memory content to go forward in conceptual time to “pre-experiencing” 
the future) and counterfactual thinking (the use of autobiographical memory content to go back 
in conceptual time to “reframe” the past). Chapter 1 then argued that, if it could be empirically 
demonstrated that autobiographical memory content was used for perspective taking, 
prospection, and counterfactual thinking, such would be evidence that perspective taking, 
prospection, and counterfactual thinking are hypothetical functions of autobiographical memory.  
 The objectives of Chapters 2 and 3 concerned the empirical testing of select Chapter 1 
hypotheses. Chapter 2 reported Study 1, which detailed the validation of the Autobiographical 
Memory Functions of Simulation (AMFS) scale. Chapter 3 detailed Study 2, which employed the 
AMFS and existing measures intended to support Chapter 1 hypotheses. Chapter 4 provides a 
general discussion about the intellectual merit and broader impacts of the current paper. The 
confirmation of previous research; strengths and novel contributions; issues, limitations, and 
nonsignificant findings; and implications and future directions are specifically addressed. 
4.2 Confirmation and Corroboration of Previous Research    
Confirmation of Chapter 1 Hypotheses 
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 Study 2 was designed to empirically confirm the theoretically substantiated hypotheses of 
Chapter 1. Results of Study 2’s Hypotheses 3.1 (the nine-factor structure) and 3.2 (the mapping 
of the nine-function structure onto the broad functions of the TALE) provided evidence for 
Hypothesis 1.2 (autobiographical memory content is a form of long-term memory content that 
can be used for simulation-based perspective taking), and Hypothesis 1.5 (autobiographical 
memory content is a form of long-term memory content that can be used for simulation-based 
mental time travel). The rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical memory content 
for perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking as measured by the AMFS 
served to demonstrate that individuals do use autobiographical memory content for theses 
purposes. As such, the use of autobiographical memory content for these purposes renders them 
functions of autobiographical memory to support Hypothesis 1.6 (perspective taking and the 
mental time travel behaviors of prospection and counterfactual thinking are functions of 
autobiographical memory). Finally, results of Hypothesis 3.4—that Perspective TakingAMFS 
and Counterfactual Thinking were significant predictors of the simulation-based Cognitive 
Reappraisal dimension from the ERQ (Gross & John, 2003), whereas Prospection was not—
supported Hypothesis 1.7 (the autobiographical memory function of simulation-based 
perspective taking reflects interpersonal simulation; and the autobiographical memory functions 
of simulation-based prospection and counterfactual thinking reflect intrapersonal simulation). As 
such, results of the current paper add practical relevancy to what was as previously an untested 
conceptual supposition. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, results of Hypothesis 3.2 tests 
confirmed the replication of the Perspective TakingAMFJR function, an objective that was the 
initial catalyst for the current paper. 
Corroboration of Related Brain Evidence 
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 Because the current paper demonstrated, theoretically and empirically, that 
autobiographical episodic memory content could be used for the simulation-based functions of 
perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking, the current paper corroborates and 
provides a framework within which evidence from a variety of brain studies is unified. 
Neuroimaging research shows that the circuitry involved in autobiographical memory content 
retrieval (Buckner et al., 2008); mental simulation (e.g., Buckner, et al., 2008; Spreng & Mar, 
2012); perspectivity (e.g., Buckner & Carroll, 2006; Spreng et al., 2009; Spreng & Grady, 2010; 
Rabin et al., 2010), perspective taking (Dodell-Feder et al., 2014; Knox, 2010; Perry et al., 
2011); episodic simulation for prospection (Addis et al., 2009; De Brigard et al., 2013; De 
Brigard et al., 2016; Schacter, 2012; Schacter & Addis, 2007; Zheng et al., 2014), and 
counterfactual thinking (e.g., Addis et al., 2009; De Brigard et al., 2013; De Brigard & 
Giovanello, 2012; De Brigard et al., 2015; Schacter et al., in press; Van Hoeck et al., 2013) are 
underlain by shared neural circuitry largely within the default network (e.g., Andrews-Hanna, 
Smallwood, & Spreng, 2014). Not only does this research indicate that such capacities share 
neural real estate, the implicated neural substrates are known to feature overlapping 
functionality. The widely accepted interpretation of such neural collaboration is that these 
structures and processes arose simultaneously for the purposes of working symbiotically (e.g., 
Atance & O’Neill, 2001, 2005; Barsalou, 1988, 2003; Brown & Kulik, 1977; Suddendorf & 
Busby, 2003). Thus, the current paper’s finding that retrieved autobiographical memory content 
can be mentally simulated for the purpose of perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual 
thinking provides an example of how known interconnected and interdependent brain processes 
manifest as everyday observable human behaviors. 
Corroboration of Simulation Theory and Its Expansion 
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 By acquiring evidence that autobiographical memory content—a hypothesized form of 
long-term memory content (e.g., Cohen & Squire, 1980; Tulving, 1972)—is used for perspective 
taking, indirect support was yielded for the simulation process model of perspective taking 
according to simulation theory (Goldman, 2006). Simulation theory posits that background 
information from long-term memory storage is used as simulation “input” (see Figure 2), which 
is then mixed with imagination to generate possible mental states to be attributed to a target 
other. Because autobiographical memory is a form of long-term memory (e.g., Tulving, 1972), 
the current paper provides empirical evidence that long-term memory content is used as 
simulation input for perspective taking.  
 The current paper also provides empirical support for the recent extension of simulation 
theory (Shanton & Goldman, 2010), which was augmented to account for mental time travel. 
Although Shanton and Goldman propose simulation as the mechanism through which individuals 
travel back through conceptual time in order to “re-experience” episodic memory content (a 
phenomenon that they call “episodic memory”), or through which individuals travel forward 
through conceptual time in order to “pre-experience” the future based on episodic memory 
content (a phenomenon that they call “prospection”), the current paper hypothesized that 
individuals also travel back through conceptual time in order to “reframe” episodic memory 
content—a phenomenon known in the literature “counterfactual thinking.” The current paper 
also presented and discussed brain evidence that supports the inclusion of counterfactual thinking 
as a purpose for which episodic memory content is imaginatively simulated (e.g., Addis et al., 
2009; De Brigard et al., 2013; De Brigard & Giovanello, 2012; De Brigard et al., 2015; Schacter 
et al., in press; Van Hoeck et al., 2013), thereby extending even further the utility of simulation 
theory and the simulation process model.  
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Confirmation of Individual Differences in Rated Frequency of Functional Use of 
Autobiographical Memory 
 
 The current paper also confirmed a number of individual differences in personality, age, 
gender, and culture as reported in the literature with respect to the Social, SelfTALE, and Directive 
autobiographical memory functions of the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011). Study 2 confirmed 
previous findings that the broad Social function is predicted by Extraversion (Rasmussen & 
Berntsen, 2010; Bluck & Alea, 2009) and Openness to Experience (Rasmussen & Berntsen, 
2010; Bluck & Alea, 2009); that the broad Directive function is predicted by 
Emotionality/Neuroticism (Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010) and Openness to Experience 
(Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010); and that the Self function is predicted by 
Emotionality/Neuroticism (Cappeliez & O’Rourke, 2002; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010) and 
Openness to Experience (Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010). Such replications were important given 
that the reported effects of personality on rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical 
memory are not consistent across studies (Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010).  
 Study 2 also confirmed the age effect reported by Bluck and Alea (2009), whereby older 
adults use autobiographical memory content for SelfTALE with less frequency than younger 
adults. Additionally, Study 2 found this same effect for SelfAMFJR and Counterfactual Thinking—
both of which map onto SelfTALE—to support the current paper’s contention that first-order 
functions can inherit the individual differences of the second-order function to which they are 
empirically linked.  
 Finally, Study 2 replicated, albeit only marginally significantly, the pattern of two culture 
effects found in the validation of the AMFJR (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation). As was 
reported previously, Caucasians were found to use autobiographical memory content for the 
AMFJR function of Conversation with greater frequency than African-American/Blacks. 
181 
	
Likewise, results of Study 2 confirmed that African-American/Blacks use autobiographical 
memory with greater frequency than Caucasians for the AMFJR function of Teaching/Problem 
Solving/Behavioral Control. Although the effects were not significant, this was most likely due 
to the small sample size of the African-American/Black group obtained for Study 2. 
Chapter 4.3 Strengths and Novel Contributions 
Strengths 
 A major strength of the current paper is the rigor with which the statistical analyses of 
Study 1 and Study 2 were conducted. Whereas much research with ordinal-level data is 
improperly treated as continuous, the current paper employed several statistical methods and 
techniques designed to accurately assess Likert-type responses. Such an approach better ensures 
the acquisition of truthful results and therefore more credible and meaningful interpretations.  
 Another strength is the current paper’s multi-perspective approach to testing the viability 
of the autobiographical memory function of perspective taking, and ultimately the 
autobiographical memory functions of prospection and counterfactual thinking. From a 
theoretical standpoint, conceptual and computational models were adapted and integrated in 
support of the hypotheses that autobiographical memory is employed in ways that have not 
previously been considered by memory researchers. Brain evidence from various lines of 
research was presented and integrated in support of theory and as the basis of prediction. A 
reliable measurement instrument, the AMFS, was developed and validated for the purpose of 
empirically testing the current paper’s theoretical claims.  
Novel Contributions 
 Although the initial impetus for the current paper was the theoretical and empirical 
substantiation of Perspective TakingAMFJR, what emerged was the discovery and ultimate 
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verification of the two new and independent autobiographical memory functions of Prospection, 
and Counterfactual thinking. Study 2 also showed that the new functions mapped onto the broad 
TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011) functions such that Perspective TakingAMFS was broadly Social, 
Prospection was broadly Directive, and Counterfactual Thinking was broadly SelfTALE as 
predicted by theory and related findings.  
 The current study also introduced a new valid and reliable instrument for measuring the 
perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking functions of autobiographical 
memory. Because the functions measured using the Autobiographical Memory Functions of 
Simulation (AMFS) scale were shown to be independent in the presence of the functions 
measured by the Autobiographical Memory Functions of Joint Reminiscence (AMFJR) scale 
(Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation)—which also map onto the broad Social, Self, and 
Directive functions—the AMFS can be used alone or in conjunction with other autobiographical 
memory functions scales without loss of structural integrity. 
 Although previous research supports the argument that the context within which the items 
of an autobiographical memory scale are situated is vital to the detection and accurate assessment 
of the functions being measured (e.g., Kulkofsky & Koh, 2009), the current paper was the first 
known study to compare and contrast the subscales of two constructually identical, but 
differentially contextually situated, functions. The current study found that the “simulation-
based” Perspective TakingAMFS and the “socially situated” Perspective TakingAMFJR yield only 
moderately correlated response data, even across the two items shared by both scales. Because 
the presentation of Study 2 survey blocks were randomly ordered, the current study eliminated 
the risk that such effects would be confounded by order effects.  
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 As was recommended by Ranson and Fitzgerald (in preparation), associations found  
between the broad Social, SelfTALE, and Directive functions and the functions of the AMFJR 
were tested in a second-order structural equation model whereby the AMFJR functions were 
configured as first-order latents subordinate to the second-order TALE function to which they 
were associated per previous findings. Not only as the model recommended by Ranson and 
Fitzgerald confirmed, but a CFA incorporating the AMFS functions also yielded the predicted 
second-order model. Further support for the higher-order configurations was obtained through 
the “inheritance” of the individual difference effects by first-order AMFS and AMFJR functions 
from the second-order TALE function with which they were empirically linked. The current 
paper argued that, if the higher-order function was indicated by the lower-order function, then 
the effects of the broader higher-order function would be shared by the lower-order function, 
which represents more narrowly defined aspects of the broad function.  
 The current paper not only replicated a number of individual differences effects reported 
in the literature, but also yielded evidence for effects that have eluded detection in other studies. 
For example, Rasmussen and Berntsen (2010) reported that personality effects assessed on the 
broad functions of the TALE (Bluck et al., 2005; Bluck & Alea, 2011) were inconsistent with 
respect to Agreeableness and Conscientiousness. However, the current paper found that both 
Agreeableness and Conscientiousness positively predicted the Social and Directive functions, as 
well as Social’s subordinate functions of Perspective TakingAMFS, Perspective TakingAMFJR, and 
AMFJR Conversation and Relationship Maintenance, and the Directive’s subordinate functions 
of AMFS Prospection, and AMFJR Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control and Emotion 
Regulation. However, the effects yielded by the current paper are small—perhaps negligible—
and may therefore have limited utility to autobiographical memory functions research. If nothing 
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else, the reported effect sizes should assist researchers in determining the needed power to detect 
expected effects of this size, or help to justify why effects may be inconsistent across studies.  
 Finally, the current paper demonstrated the fitness and utility of the HEXACO-100 
(Ashton & Lee, 2004; 2009) for autobiographical memory research. Study 1 and 2 results 
showed that, for those HEXACO dimensions that align with traditional Big Five factors 
(Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Emotionality/Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Openness to 
Experience), effects found in previous studies were replicated. As such, the HEXACO was 
shown to be a faithful alternative to traditional Five Factor scales. Additionally, the HEXACO’s 
Honesty-Humility dimension and the interstitial facet of Altruism provided additional insight 
into the individual differences in rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical memory 
content. 
Chapter 4.4 Issues, Limitations, and Nonsignificant Findings 
Issues in Measurement and Analysis 
 The foremost issue of the current paper was the high inter-item correlations between the 
items of the AMFS’s Counterfactual Thinking subscale, which were yielded by the Study 2 data. 
This finding was unexpected, as it was not prefigured by Study 1 results. Before proceeding, the 
AMFS structure was re-verified with EFA65 using Study 2 data, as well as CFA. Although the 
CFA results revealed some attenuated fit indices and destabilized estimates, the least favorable 
outcomes were restricted to the Counterfactual Thinking subscale, and the overall models were 
not unduly compromised according to accepted guidelines. Thus analyses proceeded, and results 
were interpreted with caution.  
                                                
65 Upon discovery of the high inter-item correlations of the Counterfactual Thinking subscale, a principal axis 
factoring EFA was run using R-Factor (Basto & Pereira, 2012a) in SPSS (IBM Inc., 2015) so as to verify the AMFS 
structure. Despite the fact that the loading values of the Counterfactual Thinking items on its factor were high, 
overall results were commensurate with the EFA conducted for Study 1. 
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 The reason for the high inter-item correlations on the Counterfactual Thinking subscale in 
Study 2 is unknown. Potential causes include the possibility that, although not portended by 
Study 1 results, the Counterfactual Thinking subscale may be too conceptually narrow (Clark & 
Watson, 1995). Because individual differences in counterfactual thinking are rarely assessed 
(Ruiselová et al., 2009), there are no existing self-report counterfactual thinking scales from 
which potential Counterfactual Thinking items might have been adapted. Secondly, the Study 1 
survey included the qualitative mental time travel conditions, one of which concerned 
counterfactual thinking. Because Study 1 presented the mental time travel conditions before the 
AMFS scale, Study 1 respondents may have been inadvertently primed to respond to the AMFS 
items differently than was the case for Study 2, which did not include the mental time travel 
conditions. However, this explanation suggests that similar issues should have occurred with the 
AMFS subscale of Prospection, which was also preceded by a prospection mental time travel 
condition in Study 1. However, the Prospection subscale performed consistently across Studies 1 
and 2. Thirdly, the blocks of scale items were randomly presented in the Study 2 online survey, 
but were not for randomly ordered in Study 1. As such, Study 1 may have inadvertently induced 
order effects that would not have likewise occurred in Study 2. However, this too suggests that 
any such order effects would have likewise impacted the Perspective Taking and Prospection 
subscales, but did not. Finally, there may have been differences between the Study 1 and Study 2 
samples that influenced these results. Although the mean ages, age ranges, and gender split for 
Study 1 and Study 2 were equivalent, there were differences in ethnic/race representation. For 
example, the Study 1 sample was approximately 25% African-American/Black (which was also 
the case for Ranson & Fitzgerald, in preparation), but the African-American/Black group 
comprised less than 6% of the sample for Study 2.  
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 A second issue with Study 2 was that the complexity of the proposed CFA models 
prohibited the use of polychoric correlations with asymptotic covariance matrices, both of which 
are recommended for ordinal and MV nonnormal data, and which are necessary to produce the 
Satorra-Bentler adjusted chi-square. Although a workaround using the Bollen-Stine (Bollen & 
Stein,1992) bootstrap (2000 iterations) was recommended as an acceptable workaround in the 
literature (e.g., Byrne, 2000; Cheung & Lau, 2008; Hox, 1995; Ichikawa & Konishi, 1995; Yuan 
& Bentler, 2000; Yung & Bentler, 1996; Zhu, 1997), comparisons of CFA results for each of the 
three individual scales (AMFS, AMFJR, TALE) used to test the hypothesized models showed 
that, compared to estimates and fit indices yielded with the polychoric protocol, results were 
acceptably commensurate, but nonetheless less favorable (e.g., higher chi-square values using 
Bollen-Stine). As such, results were interpreted with caution. The current paper also emphasizes 
the importance of future research to replicate results with a statistical software package (e.g., 
EQS, Multivariate Software, 2014) capable of simultaneous polychoric matrix construction. 
Limitations 
 There are a number of assumptions made by the current paper that could, if unfounded, 
weaken, if not invalidate, results. One, it was assumed that respondents understood the use of 
autobiographical memory content for various behaviors to the extent that they could reasonably 
estimate their use of autobiographical memory content for those behaviors. In an attempt to 
garner support for this assumption, Study 1 included qualitative measures intended to support the 
assumption that respondents’ perceptions of their estimated use of autobiographical memory 
content is just that (i.e., how frequently they use autobiographical memory content for 
perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking), and not simply their estimates of 
the frequency with which they engage in the corresponding behavior (i.e., how frequently they 
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engage in perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking regardless of whether or 
not autobiographical memory content is used). Although these Study 1 data were not formally 
analyzed, responses were consistent with related research employing similar paradigms. 
However, without the corroboration of corresponding brain data (e.g., indicating that the areas of 
the brain responsible for autobiographical memory retrieval are activated during estimation of 
rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical memory content for any of the measured 
functions), this remains an empirically unsubstantiated assumption.  
 Additionally, the literature supports the assumption that episodic, more so than semantic, 
autobiographical memory content is used for the reminiscence behaviors measured by 
autobiographical memory functions scales (e.g., Tulving, 2002b), as well as mental simulation 
(e.g., Gaesser & Schacter, 2014), perspective taking (Shanton & Goldman, 2010), and mental 
time travel (e.g., Duval, Desgranges, de La Sayette, Belliard, & Eustache et al., 2012; Irish, 
Addis, Hodges, & Piguet, 2012; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002; Manning, Denkova, & 
Unterberger, 2013; Shanton & Goldman, 2010). As such, the current paper founded arguments 
on this assumption and supported these contentions with established theory. For example, 
Chapter 1 employed the SAC (Reder et al., 2002; Reder et al., 2009) to explain how episodic 
autobiographical memory content could be preferentially activated over semantic 
autobiographical memory content so that simulation for perspective taking or mental time travel 
could ensue. However, no current autobiographical memory functions scale can empirically 
verify that episodic memory content is preferentially used; thus if it were discovered that 
semantic memory content could be simulated as well as episodic memory content for the “re-
experience” of past events, a number of the current paper’s conclusions would be annulled. 
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 The current paper also assumes that the autobiographical memory functions proposed and 
verified herein exist fully independently of human-designed measurement procedures (e.g., 
Maul, 2013). However, much like the nature of light (“is it a wave or a particle”?), the 
autobiographical memory functions that emerge through the various self-report instruments may 
be shaped by the instrument itself. Given the differential use of autobiographical memory content 
for simulation-based Perspective TakingAMFS versus socially situated Perspective TakingAMFJR, 
rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical memory content for any purpose may be 
fully dependent on the measurement context within which it is grounded, whether intentional or 
not. However, at least at present, there appears to be no way to find autobiographical memory 
functions that are not first conceptualized, then explicitly sought.  
Nonsignificant Findings 
 As for nonsignificant findings, Study 2 was intentionally adequately powered to ensure 
that even small effects would be detected. This facilitated the current paper’s success in yielding 
effects that other studies have either failed to find or reported as inconsistent, most likely because 
other studies were underpowered. As such, the current paper’s nonsignificant effects were in 
most cases true null effects. For those effects that were significant, effect sizes were also 
reported so that researchers could draw their own conclusions about their relative importance.  
 In other cases, the current study did not include supplementary measures that may have 
yielded effects found in related research. For example, previous studies (Addis et al., 2009; Cole, 
Morrison, & Conway, 2013, Schacter, Gaesser, & Addis, 2013) have reported that older adults’ 
imagined future scenarios tend to feature more semantic versus episodic detail. This could have 
implications for rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical memory content for 
prospection, given that prospection is thought to rely primarily on episodic autobiographical 
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memory content (e.g., Tulving, 2002b; Shanton & Goldman, 2010). That Study 2 found no 
differential use of autobiographical memory content as a function of age for Prospection, could 
imply that any predominance of semantic detail used for older adults’ prospections has little to 
no impact on rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical memory for that purpose. 
However, because one of the limitations of the current study is that the AMFS—like any 
functions scale—cannot distinguish between the use of episodic versus semantic 
autobiographical memory content, it is not possible to draw a firm conclusion about any 
nonsignificant results for which episodic versus semantic detail may be a factor.  
 Although the majority of individual difference effects found for the Social, SelfTALE, and 
Directive functions were “inherited” by their corresponding subordinate functions, there were a 
few nonsignificant findings. For example, for personality, Perspective TakingAMFS inherited all 
of the Social TALE effects, but Perspective TakingAMFS was predicted by the inverse of the 
Honesty-Humility facet of Greed-Avoidance, whereas the broad Social function was not. 
Likewise, although results of Hypothesis 3.2 indicated that SelfAMFJR function mapped onto 
SelfTALE, results showed that, unlike SelfTALE, SelfAMFJR was not significantly predicted by age. 
However, in this case, the effect of age on SelfAMFJR was marginally significant (p = .062), and, 
like SelfTALE, showed the same decline in rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical 
memory over the lifespan. Therefore, the failure of the first-order functions to inherit the effects 
found for their higher-order broad functions may imply that, whereas some individual 
differences can be captured only at the broad, higher-order level, other individual differences can 
only be detected at the subordinate level where the constructs are more precisely defined.  
 Finally, that the current study did not include more measures that may have elucidated 
various findings and effects may be seen as a limitation. For example, variables such as 
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attachment and coping styles, or the incorporation of emotion manipulation techniques, would 
have provided additional data with which to parse the effects of emotional valence known to 
inform autobiographical memory content, its recall, and its use (for a review, see Holland & 
Kensinger, 2010). But given that the main objective of the current paper was to validate and 
examine the autobiographical memory functions of perspective taking, prospection, and 
counterfactual thinking, the current paper’s investigations were limited to those that would most 
thoroughly, yet resourcefully, serve that purpose. 
Chapter 4.5 Implications and Future Directions 
 From a research perspective, it is hoped that substantiating the existence of three new 
autobiographical memory functions of perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual 
thinking through theory and testing will prompt other researchers to consider potentially 
overlooked uses of autobiographical memory. From a clinical perspective, understanding how 
autobiographical memory content informs interpersonal and intrapersonal simulation can aid 
counselors and developers of interventions interested in addressing the source of maladaptive 
perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking strategies. Future studies should aim 
to replicate the findings of Study 2 and use its results as guidelines for further inquiry. Future 
studies should also develop ways to test elements of the Expanded Simulation Model other than 
the long-term memory component—either those that follow as proposed in simulation theory 
(Goldman, 2006; Shanton & Goldman, 2010) or those that were revealed when the long-term 
memory component was “unpacked” in Chapter 1. 
Chapter 1 also posits that the Expanded Simulation Model, by way of the SAC (Reder et 
al., 2002; Reder et al., 2009), accounts for research indicating that semantic and episodic 
autobiographical memory exist on a continuum that allows these memory forms to overlap 
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(Baddeley, 2001; Brewer, 1996; Burianova et al., 2010; Gilboa, 2004; Rajah & McIntosh, 2005; 
Tulving, 2001). And although episodic memory is thought essential to “re-experiencing,” “pre-
experiencing,” and “reframing” past scenarios (Abram et al., 2014; Markowitsch & Staniloiu, 
2011; Piolino et al., 2009; Tulving, 2002b), it is known that the retrieval of semantic 
autobiographical memory content can facilitate access to more specific episodic autobiographical 
memory content (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). In fact, recent research 
suggests that, with respect to prospection, autobiographical memory has a definitive “future” 
form comprised of episodic (imagining future scenarios) and semantic (imagining future self-
knowledge or general events) properties (Duval et al., 2012; Irish et al., 2012; Klein et al., 2002; 
Manning et al., 2013). However, with respect to autobiographical memory functions, neither the 
AMFS, nor the AMFJR, nor the TALE were designed to evaluate the differential use of past 
versus future episodic and semantic memory. As this is an expanding line of research that could 
bring clarity and cohesion to the current paper and other studies, future research should focus on 
developing paradigms that more thoroughly explore the extent to which episodic versus semantic 
content is used with respect to rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical memory 
content.  
 That the current paper yielded evidence of differential context effects for “simulation-
based” Perspective TakingAMFS and “socially situated” Perspective TakingAMFJR, should prompt 
researchers to consider other contexts from which other functions might emerge—that is, 
research might take a less global approach to the exploration of autobiographical memory 
functions in order to discern more situation-specific uses of autobiographical memory. Likewise, 
much like trends in personality research, researchers might take a holistic, process-based 
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approach to the conceptualization and exploration of autobiographical memory functions as a 
complement to the study of traditional, mechanistic functions. 
 Future autobiographical memory functions studies would be well served by including 
measures of emotion/affect. There is a wealth of literature corroborating the importance of 
emotion—at both state- and trait-levels—to the encoding and “re-experience” of 
autobiographical memory content. Results of the current paper imply that taking emotion into 
consideration would enrich our understanding of rated frequency of functional use of 
autobiographical memory, especially for those functions that manifest as behaviors known to 
have strong emotional components. For example, while the conclusion of the current paper is 
that Counterfactual Thinking is a function of autobiographical memory, the counterfactual 
thinking literature has surprisingly little to say about the use of memory information in the 
generation of counterfactuals, unlike research on reminiscence and prospection, for which the 
use of memory information is a main focus. Rather, the use of memory content with respect to 
counterfactual thinking is simply assumed. Instead, research in this area focuses on the emotional 
basis of counterfactual thinking, and in particular, whether the counterfactuals generated are 
upward (positive) or downward (negative) in emotional bias. Thus, such individual differences 
as older adults having been found to engage in more positive (upward) counterfactuals than 
younger adults (Mather & Carstensen, 2005), could be neither confirmed nor disconfirmed by 
the current paper because the current paper included no measures for discerning the emotional 
bias of the autobiographical memory content used for counterfactuals. Future studies should 
attempt to add emotion and other measures to their research designs in order to make full use of 
the findings from related literatures as support for the results of functions research. 
 The current paper also added to the literature on autobiographical memory and culture, 
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having yielded evidence for the differential use of autobiographical memory content within and 
between ethnic groups. Granted, the investigation of culture effects on autobiographical memory 
functions research is challenging, given the difficulties in obtaining subgroup samples large 
enough to sufficiently power a study in which such effects are likely to be small. However, 
cultural differences in the content (e.g., Ross & Wang, 2010), use (e.g., Ranson & Fitzgerald, in 
preparation), and cognitive processing (e.g., Ambady & Bharucha, 2009) of autobiographical 
memory suggest that this is a valid and important line of inquiry.  
 With respect to individual differences in general, memory research—including Studies 1 
and 2 of the current paper—have perhaps been negligent by not evaluating the sum total of 
variance attributed to individual differences. In retrospect, the inclusion of such analyses may 
have yielded more meaningful answers to questions concerning the role of individual differences 
in the rated frequency of autobiographical memory content for the functions under review. 
However, adding potentially informative, but essentially subordinate, analyses to the current 
paper would have been excessive for a study primarily focused on the validation of new 
autobiographical memory functions. Thus future autobiographical memory studies with a 
primary objective of testing individual differences should strongly consider the incorporation of 
such tests. 
 Contingently, future research should develop paradigms for testing each step of the 
simulation theory cognitive process, as well as the components of the Expanded Simulation 
Model. The current paper did not empirically test Chapter 1’s Hypothesis 1.1 (that mental 
simulation is the mechanism by which autobiographical memory content is used for perspective 
taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking), Hypothesis 1.3 (that the search and retrieval 
process for relevant autobiographical memory content for perspective taking, prospection, and 
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counterfactual thinking is as proposed by the Self-Memory System according to Conway and 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), or Hypothesis 1.4 (that the activation and retrieval of relevant 
autobiographical memory content for autobiographical memory content for perspective taking, 
prospection, and counterfactual thinking is as proposed by the Source Activation Confusion 
computational model according to Reder et al., 2002, and Reder et al., 2000), because such 
would require neuroimaging or other cognitive tests beyond the current study’s scope. However, 
it is important to test each stage of the simulation process, both upstream and downstream from 
the long-term memory component, in order to empirically validate and expand upon current 
theory.  
4.6 Conclusion 
 In the late 1980s, memory researcher Alan Baddeley asked, “What the hell is it for?”, and 
a new domain of autobiographical memory research was born. Research began to identify the 
everyday purposes for which humans use autobiographical memory; that is, the functions of 
autobiographical memory (Baddeley, 1988; Bluck & Alea, 2002, 2011; Neisser, 1982). The 
current paper aimed to add to that growing body of research by theoretically and empirically 
substantiating the autobiographical memory functions of perspective taking, prospection, and 
counterfactual thinking.  
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APPENDIX A 
Studies 1 & 2: Mechanical Turk Worker’s Agreement 
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APPENDIX B 
Studies 1 & 2: MTurk Synopsis Page  
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APPENDIX C 
Studies 1 & 2: Behavioral Research Information Sheet 
Title of Study 1: Autobiographical Memory Functions of Simulation 
Title of Study 2: The Role of Autobiographical Memory in Interpersonal and Intrapersonal 
Simulation: A Theoretical and Empirical Exploration 
 
 
Principal Investigator (PI):  Jana Ranson 
     Psychology 
     313-310-0041 
 
Funding Source:   Jana Ranson 
 
 
When we say “you” in this consent form, we mean you; “we” means the researchers and other 
staff.  
 
Purpose 
 
You are being asked to be in a research study of the characteristics associated with the 
recollection of past events and the imagining of future scenarios because you are at least 18 years 
of age and hold an active Mechanical Turk Worker’s account. This study is being conducted at 
Wayne State University.  The estimated number of study participants to be enrolled at Wayne 
State University is about 100.  Please read this form and ask any questions you may have 
before agreeing to be in the study. 
 
In this research study, we are interested in understanding the purposes for which people use 
autobiographical memory. Autobiographical memories are the memories of one’s personal past. 
They include factual information (e.g., “I went to the Bahamas when I was 12”) as well as the 
emotions, images, and details of events (e.g., “I remember feeling so happy when I saw my cat’s 
cute little black and white face for the first time.”) Autobiographical memories are important 
because, when considered over a lifetime, provide us with the story of who we are and give us a 
sense of “self.”  
 
Autobiographical memories are also used for a number of purposes, especially in social 
situations. For example, we share memories with others to feel closer (e.g., “remember how 
much fun we had on the roller coaster at the fair last year?”), to help problem solve (e.g., “when 
that happened to me as a teenager, I did… maybe that will work for you, too”), and to encourage 
conversation (e.g., “I love talking about old times with you; we always end up laughing!”).  
 
Research in this area is fairly new, so memory researchers continue to consider novel ways in 
which we might use autobiographical memory. We then create surveys and ask individuals like 
yourself to estimate how often, if at all, they do use autobiographical memories in those ways. 
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Study Procedures 
 
If you agree to take part in this research study, you will be asked to complete an online 
questionnaire regarding the purposes for which you use autobiographical memory in everyday 
situations. You will also be asked to provide general demographic information (age, gender, 
ethnicity), although you may choose to not provide that information. You will also be asked to 
complete a few survey questions regarding personality traits, emotional intelligence, self-
efficacy, and cognitive style. The study procedures are as follows: 
 
1. Once you have clicked the survey link in Mechanical Turk, you are directed to this online 
questionnaire. 
2. After reading this informed consent, you will be asked if you wish to participate. If you 
choose to participate, you will be instructed to click the ACCEPT button at the bottom of 
the informed consent page. Clicking the ACCEPT button begins the survey. If you 
choose not to participate, click the DECLINE button and you will be exited from the 
survey.  
3. Once you have finished answering the questions on a page, you will be instructed to click 
the NEXT button. At the bottom of every page is an EXIT button should you wish to quit 
the survey. You may quit the survey at any time. 
4. The online questionnaire will take approximately 4566 minutes to complete.  
5. Questions will consist of statements followed by a rating scale. For example, you may be 
asked to estimate how frequently you talk about the past with others to increase intimacy. 
You then rate how often you estimate you talk about the past for this reason on a scale of 
1 (not at all) to 6 (almost always). Information about the rating scale will be included at 
the top of each page. 
6. Participants’ identity is concealed from the researcher. The survey software will assign a 
random ID code to each participant’s survey.  
7. At the end of the survey, you will be given a completion code. You must enter this code 
in the space provided on the MTurk page where you accessed the survey link. Once you 
enter this code, your survey data will be submitted to the researcher. Once the researcher 
verifies that all attention checks were successfully passed, the researcher will release the 
$2.0067 compensation to the participant’s MTurk account. Note again that the researcher 
will only be able to release the compensation if the survey completion code is entered and 
submitted through MTurk. 
 
Benefits  
 
As a participant in this research study, there will be no direct benefit for you; however, 
information from this study may benefit other people now or in the future. 
 
                                                
66 This version of the Informed Consent has been modified from the original, which indicated that the survey would 
take about 30 minutes to complete. However, early MTurk metrics indicated that the survey was taking closer to 45 
minutes to complete. 
67Due to the additional 15 minutes beyond the original estimate of 30 minutes that participants were on average 
taking to complete the survey, the compensation was increased from the original value of $1.00 in Amazon credit to 
$2.00. 
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Risks 
 
There are no known risks at this time to participation in this study. 
 
Study Costs  
 
o Participation in this study will be of no cost to you. 
 
Compensation  
 
For taking part in this research study, you will be paid for your time and inconvenience. A total 
of $1.6068 will be paid to the participant’s MTurk Worker account after the researcher has 
verified that all attention checks were successfully passed in accordance with the MTurk 
Worker’s Agreement. 
 
Confidentiality 
 
All information collected about you during the course of this study will be kept confidential to 
the extent permitted by law. You will be identified in the research records by a code name or 
number. Information that identifies you personally will not be released without your written 
permission. However, the study sponsor, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Wayne State 
University, or federal agencies with appropriate regulatory oversight [e.g., Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP), Office of Civil Rights 
(OCR), etc.) may review your records. 
 
When the results of this research are published or discussed in conferences, no information will 
be included that would reveal your identity.  
 
Voluntary Participation/Withdrawal 
 
Taking part in this study is voluntary.  You have the right to choose not to take part in this study. 
You are free to only answer questions that you want to answer.  You are free to withdraw from 
participation in this study at any time.  Your decisions will not change any present or future 
relationship with Wayne State University or its affiliates, or other services you are entitled to 
receive. 
 
The PI may stop your participation in this study without your consent. The PI will make the 
decision and let you know if it is not possible for you to continue. The decision that is made is to 
protect your health and safety, or because you did not follow the instructions to take part in the 
study 
 
The data that you provide may be collected and used by Amazon as per its privacy agreement. 
Additionally, participation in this research is for residents of the United States over the age of 18; 
                                                
68 The compensation paid for Study 1 was $2.00 for a 45-minute survey plus 10% MTurk fee. Due to an increase in 
the MTurk Fee as of January 2016 from 10% to 40%, Study 2 participants earned $1.60 for a 30 minute survey. 
204 
	
if you are not a resident of the United States and/or under the age of 18, please do not complete 
this survey. 
 
Questions 
 
If you have any questions about this study now or in the future, you may contact Jana Ranson at 
eh9405@wayne.edu or Joseph Fitzgerald, PhD at 313-577-2811. If you have questions or 
concerns about your rights as a research participant, the Chair of the Institutional Review Board 
can be contacted at (313) 577-1628. If you are unable to contact the research staff, or if you want 
to talk to someone other than the research staff, you may also call the Wayne State Research 
Subject Advocate at (313) 577-1628 to discuss problems, obtain information, or offer input.  
 
Participation 
 
By completing this questionnaire, you are agreeing to participate in this study.  
 
The data that you provide may be collected and used by Amazon.com as per its privacy 
agreement. Additionally, participation in this research is for individuals over the age of 18; if you 
are under the age of 18, you may not complete this survey. 
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APPENDIX D 
Studies 1 & 2: Qualtrics Validation Code Assignment Page 
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APPENDIX E 
Studies 1 & 2: Formulae for CFA Computations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tucker-Lewis Index of Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI; TLI in AMOS)  
is an incremental fit index dependent on the average size of the correlations;  
i.e., the higher the correlations, the higher the NNFI. It is preferred over  
the Bentler-Bonnet Non-Nonormed Fit Index (NFI), which penalizes 
nonparsimonious models. To use the NNFI, the null model’s RMSEA  
should be ≥ .158 in order to be informative. NNFI values ≥ .90 are  
considered adequate; values ≥ .95 are considered excellent. Note that  
“null” model referred to in the formula is also known as the “independence” 
model (Kenny, 2015). 
 
 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) is another recommended incremental  
fit index based on the non-centrality measure. Like the NNFI, CFI values  
≥ .90 are considered adequate while values ≥ .95 are considered excellent.  
Also, like the NNFI, the CFI should not be used when the RMSEA of the  
null model is ≥ .158. Note that “null” model referred to in the formula  
is also known as the “independence” model (Kenny, 2015). 
 
 
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) Reliabilities (Jöreskog’s Rho) are  
not provided by LISREL, but can be computed using the formula below.  
Note that lambda (λ) = factor loading, and δ = standardized error variance  
(1 – λ). Reliabilities in the SEM context should be ≥ .70 to indicate acceptable 
internal validity (Werts, et al., 1978).  
 
 
 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) is a widely  
reported absolute fit index based on the non-centrality parameter.  
RMSEAs ≤ .08 are considered mediocre; ≤ .05 good, and ≤ .01 adequate.  
However, the RMSEA tends to be inflated with small samples and/or  
small degrees of freedom (df)—due to the tendency for greater sampling  
error in such models—so the RMSEA should be used as on of several  
indications of model suitability (Kenny, 2015).  
  
207 
	
APPENDIX F 
Study 2: Personality Facets of the AMFS 
 
 The following details the results of the simple linear regressions conducted for the 
purpose of exploring facet-level personality effects on the functions of the AMFS. As was done 
for the results of Hypothesis 3.6, which concerned only personality dimensions, reported results 
were limited to those that were significant at p < .05 or less. In addition, only effect sizes in the 
form of squared semi-partial coefficients (i.e., the amount of variance that the predictor uniquely 
explains in the outcome) were reported. Full results of the significant regression analyses (e.g., 
zero-order correlation coefficient, t-statistic, unstandardized regression coefficients, and p-value 
(* = .05, ** = .01, and *** = .001) are detailed in Table 37. 
Results 
Perspective Taking 
 Although Perspective TakingAMFS was not significantly predicted by the Honesty-
Humility dimension in either Study 1 or Study 2, Study 2 found that Perspective TakingAMFS was 
significantly predicted by the inverse of the Honesty-Humility facet concerning Greed-
Avoidance—i.e., desiring to display wealth and privilege (R2 = 3.9%). Of the 
Emotionality/Neuroticism facets, Perspective TakingAMFS was predicted by Anxiety—i.e., the 
tendency to dwell on minor issues (R2 = 0.9%), Dependence—i.e., a high need to seek 
encouragement and comfort (R2 = 3.4%), and Sentimentality—i.e., possessing a strong empathic 
sensitivity toward others (R2 = 6.0%).  
 All four facets of the Extraversion dimension were significant predictors of Perspective 
TakingAMFS: Social Self-Esteem—i.e., having high positive self regard (R2 = 1.0%), Social 
Boldness—i.e., a tendency toward high social confidence (R2 = 1.6%), Sociability—i.e., an 
affinity for social conversation and interaction (R2 = 5.0%), and Liveliness—i.e., a tendency 
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toward optimism and cheerfulness (R2 = 0.5% variance explained). Two facets belonging to 
Agreeableness significantly predicted Perspective TakingAMFS: Forgiveness—i.e., a willingness 
to trust and not hold grudges (R2 = 0.5%) and Gentleness—i.e., the tendency to be mild and 
lenient in dealings with others (R2 = 2.9%). Likewise, two facets from the Conscientiousness 
dimension were significant predictors: Diligence—i.e., possessing a strong work ethic and a 
desire to achieve (R2 = 3.0%) and Perfectionism—i.e., the tendency to be thorough and careful 
(R2 = 3.0%). Finally, all four facets of Openness to Experience significantly predicted 
Perspective TakingAMFS: Aesthetic Appreciation—i.e., possessing a high appreciation of beauty 
in art and nature (R2 = 1.2%), Inquisitiveness—i.e., tending to have a high curiosity in the natural 
and social sciences (R2 = 1.9%), Creativity—i.e., a strong desire to innovate and experiment (R2 
= 1.6%), and Unconventionality—i.e., tending to be nonconformist and open to the unfamiliar 
and eccentric (R2 = 5.1%). 
Prospection 
 A total of 16 facets were significant predictors of Prospection: From Honesty-Humility, 
the inverse of Greed-Avoidance (R2 = 1.5%). From Emotionality/Neuroticism, Anxiety (R2 = 
1.6%), Dependence (R2 = 1.2%), and Sentimentality (R2 = 1.6%). From Extraversion, Sociability 
(R2 = 1.6%). From Agreeableness, Gentleness (R2 = 0.6%), and the inverse of Flexibility—i.e., 
tending to be stubborn and argumentative (R2 = 0.6%). From Conscientiousness, Diligence (R2 = 
1.9%) and Perfection (R2 = 3.3%). Finally, all four facets from Openness to Experience were 
significant: Aesthetic Appreciation (R2 = 1.9%), Inquisitiveness (R2 = 2.8%), Creativity (R2 = 
3.1%), and Unconventionality (R2 = 3.5%). 
 Counterfactual Thinking  
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 Although the dimension of Openness to Experience was a significant predictor of the 
function of Counterfactual Thinking, two of its facets were: Creativity (R2 = 0.6% variance 
explained) and Unconventionality (R2 = 0.8%). Additionally, the inverse of all four Honesty-
Humility facets significantly predicted Counterfactual Thinking: Sincerity—i.e., a tendency to 
manipulate and inveigle (R2 = 1.9%), Fairness—i.e., a willingness to cheat or steal to get ahead 
(R2 1.5%), Greed-Avoidance (R2 = 3.9%), and Modesty (R2 = 0.7%). Two facets from 
Emotionality/Neuroticism were predictive: Anxiety (R2 = 3.4%) and Dependence (R2= 0.9%). 
From Extraversion, significantly predictive facets included the inverse of Social Self-Esteem—
i.e., a tendency to feel unpopular and possessing low social self-worth (R2 = 2.8%), Sociability 
(R2 = 1.2%), and the inverse of Liveliness—i.e., a lack of cheerfulness and a tendency to be 
nondynamic (R2 = 2.3%). Just as the inverse Agreeableness significantly predicted 
Counterfactual Thinking, so did the inverse of two of its facets: the inverse of Flexibility (R2 = 
1.1%), and the inverse of Patience—tending to be quick tempered (R2 = 0.6%). Finally, three 
facets from Conscientiousness were significant predictors: the inverse of Organization—a 
tendency toward sloppiness (R2 = 1.9%), Perfectionism (R2 = 0.7%), and the inverse of 
Prudence—i.e., the tendency toward impulsivity and disregard of consequences (R2 = 4.8%). A 
complete summary of significant simple regression results regarding AMFS dimensions and 
facets can be found in Table 37. 
Discussion 
Perspective TakingAMFS 
 Results showed that, in addition to being predicted by all six HEXACO (Ashton & Lee, 
2005, 2009) dimensions and the interstitial facet of Altruism, Perspective TakingAMFS was further 
predicted by all four Extraversion facets: Social Self-Esteem, Social Boldness, Liveliness, and 
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Sociability, with the latter yielding the largest effect. These findings align with the idea that 
people who use autobiographical memory content with the greatest frequency are likely 
motivated to not only socialize with others, but to understand others. This interpretation is 
supported by findings that, in addition to Openness to Experience, rated frequency of functional 
use of autobiographical memory content for Perspective TakingAMFS is also predicted by the 
Openness facets of Aesthetic Appreciation, Inquisitiveness, Creativity, and Unconventionality. 
Thus, such individuals are curious about others, and may creatively recombine own past 
experiences with imagination to infer other minds. Additionally, both Extraversion and Openness 
are associated with social self-efficacy (Cavanaugh, 2013), which is linked to behavioral 
perspective taking (e.g., Gehlbach et al., 2008). This may be account for the association between 
Perspective Taking, Conscientiousness, and the latter’s facets of Diligence and Perfection. These 
findings align with the idea that self-efficacy relates to thoughtful persistence of the meeting of 
goals (e.g., Judge et al., 2002), which, with respect to Perspective TakingAMFS, could be thought 
of as the careful application of one’s own experiences toward the inferring others’ mental states. 
Such implies that people who use autobiographical memory content for the purpose of 
Perspective TakingAMFS are also high in empathy. Per the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) by 
Davis (1980, 1983), perspective taking is defined as a form of “cognitive” (compared to 
“emotional”) empathy. Coupled with research showing that highly conscientious people are 
motivated to understanding ideas and people as accurately and thoroughly as possible (Howe, 
2012), results suggest that people high in Conscientiousness draw more upon personal past 
experience in their attempt to attain empathic accuracy in their attributions of others mental 
states. 
Prospection 
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 Study 2 also found that the Emotionality/Neuroticism facets of Anxiety, Dependence, and 
Sentimentality predicted the Prospection function. This may imply that, as research shows, 
anxious, neurotic individuals’ negative worldviews can bias perceptions of personal experiences 
such that the autobiographical memory content encoded into memory storage is subsequently 
similarly biased (e.g., Murray, Holland, Kensinger, 2013). Related research also shows that the 
recall of negatively biased emotions can modify affect at the state and trait levels (e.g., Murray et 
al., 2013). As such, downward-biased prospections may reflect either the emotional valence of 
the autobiographical memory content on which the prospection is based, the downward biasing 
of autobiographical memory content during the simulation of the imagined future scenario, or a 
combination of both. 
 That the dimension of Openness to Experience has been empirically linked to prospection 
(e.g., Allen et al., 2014; Prenda & Lachman, 2001) supports the Study 2 finding that both the 
Creativity and Inquisitiveness facets of Openness to Experience likewise predict rated frequency 
of functional use of autobiographical memory content for Prospection. The other two facets of 
Openness—Aesthetic Appreciation and Unconventionality—were also found to predict the 
Prospection function. Both facets are supported by research showing links between future 
thinking and divergent thinking—the ability to creatively generate and consider a number of 
possible solutions or outcomes (e.g., Furnham & Bachtiar, 2008; Gelade, 2002; George & Zhou, 
2001). Together these findings may align with research indicating that people low in Openness to 
Experience prefer the status quo (McCrae, 1996), with a tendency toward resistance to change 
(McCrae, 1987).  
 Study 2 results also that showed the Conscientiousness facets of Diligence and Perfection 
were predictive of Prospection, such that individuals high in these traits may be motivated to 
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accomplish goals by carefully weighing all possible (i.e., imagined) outcomes. As such, these 
findings may imply that the frequency with which Conscientious individuals use 
autobiographical memory content for prospection reflects either the deliberate and strategic 
voluntary recall of relevant autobiographical memory content, the thoughtful imaginative 
simulation of future scenarios, or both (e.g., Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008; Tulving 1983). 
 A slightly larger effect (~ 2.0%) was found for the Extraversion facet of Sociability 
than—the tendency to seek out social interaction and conversation (Lee & Ashton, 2009) than 
was found for the Extraversion dimension. The facet effect may corresponds to related research 
in which the relation between behavioral prospection and Extraversion was thought to 
specifically reflect a tendency in individuals motivated to imagine future scenarios toward 
“social gregariousness” (Fortunato & Furey, 2011, p. 21). This idea comes from brain research 
indicating that extraverts show a greater degree of cortical activity during creative, imagination-
based tasks (Fink & Neubauer, 2008) than do introverts, whose cortical activity is higher during 
mental reasoning tasks (e.g., Fink & Neubauer, 2008). Thus, as extraverts are more sociable, 
sociability predicts behavioral future thinking (Fortunato & Furey, 2009, 2011). 
 Study 2 also found that neither Agreeableness nor Honesty-Humility were predictive of 
Prospection; however, these dimensions’ associated facets were predictive. Study 2 found that 
rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical memory content for Prospection was 
inversely predicted by Flexibility. This finding suggests that people who tend to be 
uncompromising, uncooperative, and argumentative (Lee & Ashton, 2009) use autobiographical 
memory content with high frequency for the purpose of Prospection compared to people high in 
Flexibility, whose function use of autobiographical memory content for imagining future 
scenarios is low. This finding aligns with related research that also yielded a negative association 
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between the Agreeableness dimension and future thinking. Such studies claim that, because 
people high in Agreeableness prefer social harmony to rivalry, they are less motivated to engage 
in proactive future planning lest it might conflict with others’ future goals and agendas 
(Graziano, Hair, & Finch, 1997; Prenda & Lachman, 2001). As such, a high score in Flexibility 
may manifest as the kind of social complicity to which previous findings are attributed, and 
which may suggest an infrequent use of autobiographical memory content for the function of 
Prospection. This interpretation is further supported by the Study 2 findings that Prospection was 
positively predicted by the Agreeableness facet of Gentleness—i.e., a tendency to be lenient 
toward others (Lee & Ashton, 2009), as well as the interstitial facet of Altruism. Thus, 
individuals who are not motivated to use autobiographical memory content for the function of 
Prospection may prefer instead to “keep the peace,” either by yielding creative control of their 
future plans to others, or by granting others the authority to guide the future on their behalf. 
 Whereas the Honesty-Humility dimension was not predictive of Prospection in either 
Study1 or Study 2, its facet of Greed-Avoidance—i.e., a preoccupation with social status (Lee & 
Ashton, 2009)—was inversely predictive of Prospection. Similar to the implied meaning of this 
effect with respect to Perspective Taking, individuals not satisfied with the social status quo may 
be more motivated to imagine future scenarios involving progress, change, nonconformity, and 
the challenging of social norms. This may also tie in with Study 2 results that Openness to 
Experience predicts Prospection. People who are not resistant to—i.e., are open to—change, are 
more likely to consider the possibilities that change can bring (McCrae, 1987). 
Counterfactual Thinking 
 Study 2 results showed that, in addition to being predicted by the 
Emotionality/Neuroticism dimension, rated frequency of functional use of autobiographical 
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memory for Counterfactual Thinking was also predicted by the Emotionality/Neuroticism facets 
of Anxiety—a tendency toward preoccupation of and excessive worry over minor issues—and 
Dependence—a high need for social support and approval (Lee & Ashton, 2009). Although 
Study 2 did not includes measures yielding information about respondents’ trait procrastination 
or tendency toward upward or downward counterfactuals, the known personality effects suggest 
an alignment with the procrastination literature (e.g., Schouwenburg & Lay, 1995; Sirois, 2004) 
such that people who use autobiographical memory content frequently for the purpose of 
generating counterfactual thinking may do so to avoid the distressing consideration of what else 
might have been.  
Although Study 1 did not find Agreeableness or Conscientiousness to be predictive of 
Counterfactual Thinking, Study 2 results showed that the inverse of both were predictive. 
Indirect support comes from studies indicating that people low in Agreeableness are prone to 
negative emotionality and emotional intensity, which are associated with the generation of 
downward (e.g., Allen et al., 2014). This may explain additional Study 2 results showing that the 
Counterfactual Thinking function was predicted by the Agreeableness facets of Flexibility and 
Patience to imply that people who use autobiographical memory content with the greatest 
frequency for counterfactual thinking are argumentative, unyielding, and quick-tempered (Lee & 
Ashton, 2009). The Conscientiousness facets of Organization and Prudence inversely predicted 
the use of autobiographical memory content for Counterfactual Thinking, while a third 
Conscientiousness facet, Perfection, positively predicted Counterfactual Thinking. Although 
Perfectionism can be defined as desiring order and accuracy (Lee & Ashton, 2009), it may be 
that, given the other personality traits associated with the function of Counterfactual Thinking, 
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Perfectionism here may have neurotic overtones, such that the trait is a way of compensating for 
feelings of failure or inadequacy—i.e., an inferiority complex (e.g., Adler, 1930). 
  
216 
	
Table 1 
 
Chapter 1: Hypotheses and Corresponding Figures 
Hypothesis 1.1: The mechanism by which long-term memory content is 
used for the purpose of perspective taking is mental simulation as defined 
by simulation theory (Goldman, 2006; Goldman & Shanton, in press; 
Shanton & Goldman, 2010).  
Figures 1, 2 
Hypothesis 1.2: Autobiographical memory content in particular—rather 
than long-term memory in general—can be used as simulation output for 
simulation-based perspective taking. 
Figure 3 
Hypothesis 1.3: The “search and retrieval” procedure that operates 
“within” the long-term memory component could be explained by the 
self-memory system (SMS) as detailed in Conway (2005) and Conway 
and Pleydell-Pearce (2000). 
Figure 3 
Hypothesis 1.4: Simulation occurs in response to heightened neural 
activation of predominantly episodic memory content as predicted by the 
source activation confusion (SAC) model per Reder et al. (2002) and 
Reder et al. (2009). When used to support the “search and retrieval” of 
autobiographical memory content specifically as delineated by the SMS 
(Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), the SAC can explain 
how, at the neural level, autobiographical episodic memory content 
specifically, rather than episodic long-term memory content generally, 
can be used for simulation-based perspective taking. 
Figures 4, 5, 6 
Hypothesis 1.5: In addition to perspective taking, the Expanded 
Simulation Model can also be used to explain mental time travel 
(operationalized as reminiscence, prospection, and counterfactual 
thinking). 
Figure 7, 8 
Hypothesis 1.6: Because perspective taking, prospection, and 
counterfactual thinking are purposes for which autobiographical memory 
is used, then perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking 
are functions of autobiographical memory.  
Figure 8 
Hypothesis 1.7: The autobiographical memory function of perspective 
taking reflects interpersonal simulation, whereas the autobiographical 
memory functions of prospection and counterfactual thinking reflect 
intrapersonal simulation (Shanton & Goldman, 2010). 
Figure 8 
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Table 2 
 
Study 1: Demographics 
  
Gender Frequency (Percent) 
    1. Male 50 (45.50%) 
 2. Female 60 (54.50%) 
 3. Prefer not to answer 0 (0.00%) 
 
Race/Ethnicity   
 1. Caucasian 64 (58.2%) 
 2. African American/Black 29 (26.4%) 
 3. American Indian/Native American 7 (6.4%) 
 4. Other 3 (2.7%) 
 5. Asian 2 (1.80%) 
 6. Multiracial 2 (1.80%) 
 7. Arab 1 (0.90%) 
 8. Hawaiian/Pacific Islander 1 (0.90%) 
 9. Prefer not to answer 1 (0.90%) 
 10. Hispanic 0 (0.00%) 
    
    
 
Age Mean (SD) 
 1. Select option in years (18 through 65+) 39.06 (12.96) 
 2. Prefer not to answer N/A 
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Table 3 
 
Studies 1 & 2: Autobiographical Memory Functions of Simulation (AMFS) Scale 
Perspective Taking (Interpersonal Simulation) 
1.* I think about my own past experiences to help me understand others. 
2.* I think about my own past to help me better understand what another is thinking or feeling. 
3. I use my own past experiences as examples of why others might do what they do. 
4. I refer to my own past experiences when trying to figure out another’s behaviors. 
Prospection (Intrapersonal Simulation) 
5. I think about my own past experiences when imagining how an upcoming event might or might not unfold. 
6. I think about my own past experiences when I believe that doing so can help guide my future. 
7. I think about my own past experiences to help me predict what will occur in the future. 
Counterfactual thinking (Intrapersonal Simulation) 
8. I spend time imagining specific past events with different details or outcomes than what actually occurred. 
9. I spend time imagining what I would do differently if I could travel back in time to a specific event. 
10. I spend time imagining what would have happened in the past if certain circumstances had been different 
11.✓ I spend time reading survey questions so carefully that I will follow the instruction here to choose the number two rating option. 
 
*Items are adapted from the CRS-A function of Perspective Taking.  
✓Attention check item. Respondents who do not answer correctly are booted out of the survey. 
 
Note. Respondents are presented with the statement, “The next section features a series of 
statements about the reasons why you might think about the past. On a scale of 1 to 6 (1 = 
Almost Never, 6 = Almost Always), please rate how frequently you engage in each of the 
following recollection-related behaviors and activities.”   
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Table 4 
 
Studies 1 & 2: Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ)  
Cognitive Reappraisal 
1. I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation I’m in. 
2. When I want to feel less negative emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about the situation. 
3.  When I want to feel more positive emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about the situation. 
4. When I want to feel more positive emotion (such as joy or amusement), I change what I’m 
thinking about. 
5. When I want to feel less negative emotion (such as sadness or anger), I change what I’m thinking 
about. 
6. When I’m faced with a stressful situation, I make myself think about it in a way that helps me 
stay calm. 
Expressive Suppression 
7. I control my emotions by not expressing them. 
8.  When I am feeling negative emotions, I make sure not to express them. 
9. I keep my emotions to myself. 
10. When I am feeling positive emotions, I am careful not to express them. 
 
Note. Per Gross and John (2003). Respondents were presented with the following instruction: 
“We would like to ask you some questions about your emotional life, in particular, how you 
control (that is, regulate and manage) your emotions. The questions below involve two distinct 
aspects of your emotional life. One is your emotional experience, or what you feel like inside. 
The other is your emotional expression, or how you show your emotions in the way you talk, 
gesture, or behave. Although some of the following questions may seem similar to one another, 
they differ in important ways.” Respondents were then asked to rate how strongly they agreed (or 
disagreed) with each statement on a 6-point scale (1 = Strongly Disagree; 6 = Strongly Agree).  
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Table 5 
Studies 1: HEXACO 60-Item Personality Inventory 
   Honesty-Humility 
   Sincerity 
30. I wouldn't use flattery to get a raise or promotion at work, even if I thought it would succeed. 
54R. If I want something from someone, I will laugh at that person's worst jokes. 
78. I wouldn't pretend to like someone just to get that person to do favors for me. 
Fairness 
12R. If I knew that I could never get caught, I would be willing to steal a million dollars. 
60. I would never accept a bribe, even if it were very large. 
84R. I’d be tempted to use counterfeit money, if I were sure I could get away with it. 
Greed-Avoidance 
18. Having a lot of money is not especially important to me. 
90R. I would get a lot of pleasure from owning expensive luxury goods. 
Modesty 
72R. I think that I am entitled to more respect than the average person is. 
96R. I want people to know that I am an important person of high status. 
Emotionality/Neuroticism 
Fearfulness 
5. I would feel afraid if I had to travel in bad weather conditions. 
53. When it comes to physical danger, I am very fearful. 
77R. Even in an emergency I wouldn't feel like panicking. 
Anxiety 
11. I sometimes can't help worrying about little things. 
35R. I worry a lot less than most people do. 
Dependence 
17. When I suffer from a painful experience, I need someone to make me feel comfortable. 
41R. I can handle difficult situations without needing emotional support from anyone else. 
Sentimentality 
23. I feel like crying when I see other people crying. 
71. I feel strong emotions when someone close to me is going away for a long time. 
95R. I remain unemotional even in situations where most people get very sentimental. 
Extraversion 
Social Self-Esteem 
4. I feel reasonably satisfied with myself overall. 
52R. I feel that I am an unpopular person. 
76R. I sometimes feel that I am a worthless person. 
Social Boldness 
10R. I rarely express my opinions in group meetings. 
34 In social situations, I'm usually the one who makes the first move. 
58. When I'm in a group of people, I'm often the one who speaks on behalf of the group. 
Sociability 
64. I prefer jobs that involve active social interaction to those that involve working alone. 
88. The first thing that I always do in a new place is to make friends. 
Liveliness 
46. On most days, I feel cheerful and optimistic. 
94R. Most people are more upbeat and dynamic than I generally am. 
  
 (continued next page) 
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Agreeableness 
Forgiveness 
3.  I rarely hold a grudge, even against people who have badly wronged me. 
27. My attitude toward people who have treated me badly is "forgive and forget". 
Gentleness 
9R. People sometimes tell me that I am too critical of others. 
57. I tend to be lenient in judging other people. 
81. Even when people make a lot of mistakes, I rarely say anything negative. 
Flexibility 
15R. People sometimes tell me that I'm too stubborn. 
39. I am usually quite flexible in my opinions when people disagree with me. 
63R. When people tell me that I’m wrong, my first reaction is to argue with them. 
Patience 
21R. People think of me as someone who has a quick temper. 
69 Most people tend to get angry more quickly than I do. 
Conscientiousness 
Organization 
26. I plan ahead and organize things, to avoid scrambling at the last minute. 
74R. When working, I sometimes have difficulties due to being disorganized. 
Diligence 
32. I often push myself very hard when trying to achieve a goal. 
80R. I do only the minimum amount of work needed to get by.  
Perfectionism 
38R. When working on something, I don't pay much attention to small details. 
62. I always try to be accurate in my work, even at the expense of time. 
86. People often call me a perfectionist. 
Prudence 
20R. I make decisions based on the feeling of the moment rather than on careful thought. 
44R. I make a lot of mistakes because I don't think before I act. 
92R. I prefer to do whatever comes to mind, rather than stick to a plan. 
Openness to Experience 
Aesthetic Appreciation 
1R. I would be quite bored by a visit to an art gallery. 
49. If I had the opportunity, I would like to attend a classical music concert. 
Inquisitiveness 
7.  I'm interested in learning about the history and politics of other countries. 
79R. I’ve never really enjoyed looking through an encyclopedia. 
Creativity 
37. I would enjoy creating a work of art, such as a novel, a song, or a painting. 
61. People have often told me that I have a good imagination. 
85R. I don't think of myself as the artistic or creative type. 
Unconventionality 
19R. I think that paying attention to radical ideas is a waste of time. 
43. I like people who have unconventional views. 
91R. I find it boring to discuss philosophy. 
99.✓ People who fail to select option five for this item will be removed from this survey. 
 
“R” denotes reverse-scored item 
✓Attention check item. Respondents who do not answer correctly are booted out of the survey. 
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Note. Per Ashton & Lee (2005). Respondents were presented with the instruction, “The 
following section addresses various personality traits. On a 1 to 6 scale (1 = Strongly Disagree; 6 
= Strongly Agree), please rate the extent to which you agree (or disagree) with each statement as 
it describes your personality: Please click the NEXT button to continue.” Items above are 
numbered in accordance with the HEXACO inventory, but were presented to respondents in 
random order. Dimensions are denoted with boldface. Facets are denoted with italics. 
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Table 6 
 
Study 1: Content Examples from Mental Time Travel Conditions and Self-Descriptors 
 
Note. The above examples reflect a random sample of five cases who provided at least five 
autobiographical memory elements.  
 
*The list features the first five autobiographical memory (AM) content elements out of a possible 
12. 
 REMINISCENCE COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING PROSPECTION 
Current 
Self 
Past 
Episode 
Past  
Self 
Actual 
Past  
Episode 
Actual  
Past  
Self 
Re- 
constructed  
Past  
Episode 
Re-
constructed  
Past  
Self 
Future  
Episode 
Future 
Self 
AM  
Elements* 
Active in a 
good mood; 
ready to work; 
enthusiastic;  
happy  
Graduating 
from 
college; 
family was 
proud I 
worked so 
hard! 
Smart;  
brisk; 
intelligent; 
multitasker; 
struggling 
Coworker tried 
to take credit 
for my idea. I 
didn't know 
what to say and 
let her get away 
with it. 
Irritated;  
tense;  
enthusiastic; 
restless;  
eager 
Spoke up and 
said it was my 
idea but 
everyone 
looked at me 
like I was the 
one lying. 
Calm;  
ashamed;  
felt foolish; 
careless;  
rushed 
In staff 
meeting I 
bring up my 
idea and 
everyone 
loves it. 
Coworker is 
mad but 
that's okay. 
Content;  
at peace; 
satisfied;  
happy;  
grateful 
Conference 
room, 
wood table, 
black suit, 
ponytail, 
notepad 
Tired;  
eager;  
curious; 
worried; 
irritable 
Yesterday 
my cat just 
helped me 
feel better 
by purring in 
my lap. 
Warm and 
so cute. 
Content; 
relaxed; 
savoring; 
happy; 
peaceful 
Cat knocked 
over the plant 
and dirt was 
everywhere. I 
got mad and 
yelled at her. 
Irate;  
helpless;  
hurt;  
impatient;  
ashamed 
Instead of 
getting mad I 
just cleaned it 
up and realized 
the cat wasn't 
doing it to 
make me mad. 
Calm;  
strong;  
rational; 
empathetic; 
articulate 
I'm in the 
wedding 
dress from 
the 
magazine. 
It's blush 
and I'm 
holding 
orchids. 
Peaceful;  
happy;  
content;  
relaxed;  
joyful 
Blush dress, 
orchids, 
Mark, 
Our Savior 
altar, 
family 
American; 
mother; 
Christian; 
singer;  
online  
gamer 
The day my 
daughter  
was born 
was the 
happiest day 
ever. I 
hoped I'd be 
as good a 
mother as 
my mom. 
Mother; 
daughter; 
peaceful;  
loving; 
appreciative 
Homeless 
person asked 
me for money. 
I got mad and 
was afraid if I 
stopped I 
would be 
mugged 
Upset;  
afraid;  
anxious;  
angry;  
resentful 
This time as a 
Christian I 
asked how I 
could help. He 
was very 
thankful. 
Relieved; 
strong; 
influential; 
caring;  
wise 
I am reading 
Psalm 23 at 
sister's 
wedding. I 
don't get 
nervous and 
sound 
stupid. 
Attendant;  
joyful;  
calm;  
peaceful; 
articulate 
My 
confirmation 
bible, 
bookmark 
from Dad,  
our church, 
sister, 
sunshine 
Great;  
busy;  
happy;  
crazy;  
engineer 
My trip to 
France in 
college was 
first time I 
felt grown 
up. Met a 
cousin's 
family who 
made me 
feel very 
welcome. 
Nostalgic; 
adult; 
female; 
family-
oriented; 
traveler 
Tina's party 
where I was in 
a mad mood 
and people 
didn't like me 
Lonely;  
crazy;  
negative;  
active;  
hesitant 
I imagined I 
was friendly 
and outgoing 
and people 
liked me 
Friendly;  
crazy;  
positive; 
hesitant;  
active 
10 year class 
reunion. I'm 
successful 
and having a 
good time. 
Britney is 
there. 
Great;  
engineer;  
good;  
social;  
patriot 
American 
Legion, 
Britney, 
Jacob, Lexus, 
songs from 
mid 2000s 
Lazy; 
apprehensive; 
bored;  
hungry; 
frustrated 
Track meet 
in high 
school. 
Expectations 
were high. I 
didn't 
perform well 
Teenager; 
student; 
insecure; 
athletic; 
unsatisfied 
Too scared to 
try out for 
cheerleading 
but thought I 
was just as 
good an athlete 
Shy;  
uncertain; 
impertinent; 
socially  
awkward;  
quiet 
 
Tried out and 
won and felt 
popular 
Risk-taker; 
curious; 
encouraged; 
optimistic;  
self- 
confident 
Working as 
a bb coach 
in cali where 
kids like me 
Nervous;  
self-
assured; 
realistic;  
aware; 
apprehen-
sive 
Black track 
pants, USC 
lanyard, 
sound of the 
ball in the 
gym, wood 
floor, 
bleachers 
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Table 7 
 
Study 1: AMFS Factor & Item Descriptives, Communalities, and MSAs per EPAF1 
 
 Item Number Mean (SD) UV ZSkew UV ZKurtosis Communalities MSA Values  
       
 Perspective Taking 3.97 (1.08)     
 Item 1 4.05 (1.32) –2.30* –0.51 .62 .84 
 Item 2 3.87 (1.28) –1.31 –0.85 .57 .75 
 Item 3 3.74 (1.30) –1.87 –1.15 .46 .89 
 Item 4 4.25 (1.39) –2.51* –0.79 .77 .72 
       
 Prospection  4.05 (1.06)     
 Item 5 4.04 (1.27) –3.04** –0.16 .40 .86 
 Item 6 4.27 (1.32) –3.53*** +0.43 .48 .77 
 Item 7 3.85 (1.29) –1.88 –0.74 .73 .74 
       
 Counterfactual Thinking  3.70 (1.33)     
 Item 8 3.21 (1.59) +0.96 –2.40* .52 .66 
 Item 9 3.96 (1.51) –1.79 –1.74 .91 .60 
 Item 10 3.94 (1.59) –1.12 –2.26* .64 .73 
 
Note. N = 110 for all items. *p ≤ .05 (Z ≥ |1.96|), **p ≤ .01 (Z ≥ |2.58|), ***p ≤ .001 (Z ≥ |3.29|). 
 
Bolded values reflect the factor means (standard deviations).  
 
For item content, see Table 3. 
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Table 8 
 
Study 1: EPAF1: AMFS Factor Correlations 
 
 
 
PTS PRO CFT 
PT  .85   
PRO  .17 .76  
CFT  .56 .22 .84 
 
Note. PTS = Perspective Taking (simulation based); PRO = Prospection; CFT = Counterfactual 
Thinking. 
 
Bolded values denote correlations ≥ |.32|; i.e., that at least approximately 10% of the variance is 
shared between those two factors. 
 
Italicized values denote the ordinal alpha reliability coefficient per factor (shown on the 
diagonal). 
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Table 9 
 
Study 1: EPAF1: AMFS Sorted Pattern Matrix Using Geomin Q-Q Oblique Rotation 
 Item PTS PRO CFT  
 1 .73    
 2 .78    
 3 .67    
 4 .75    
 5  .51   
 6  .65   
 7  .86   
 8   .58  
 9   .92  
 10   .72  
 
Note. PTS = Perspective Taking (simulation based); PRO = Prospection; CFT = Counterfactual 
Thinking. Factor loadings ≥ .30 were considered salient (Osborne & Costello, 2004) and 
statistically significant (Kline, 2002). Loadings ≤ .40 were considered nonsalient and n.s., thus 
were suppressed.  
 
For item content, see Table 3. 
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Table 10 
 
Study 1: EPAF2: AMFS Rotated Factor Matrix Using Varimax Orthogonal Rotation 
 Item PTS PRO CFT  
 1 .73    
 2 .73    
 3 .63    
 4 .78    
 5  .51   
 6  .62   
 7  .79   
 8   .64  
 9   .94  
 10   .76  
 
Note. PTS = Perspective Taking (simulation based); PRO = Prospection; CFT = Counterfactual 
Thinking. Factor loadings ≤ .40 were suppressed. 
 
For item content, see Table 3. 
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Table 11 
 
Study 1: CFA AMFS Factor Means (SDs) and Squared Multiple Correlations 
 
 Item Number Mean (SD) Multiple Squared Correlations 
       
 Perspective Taking 3.97 (1.08)     
 Item 1 4.05 (1.32) .65 
 Item 2 3.87 (1.28) .51 
 Item 3 3.74 (1.30) .46 
 Item 4 4.25 (1.39) .75 
       
 Prospection  4.05 (1.06)     
 Item 5 4.04 (1.27) .47 
 Item 6 4.27 (1.32) .48 
 Item 7 3.85 (1.29) .58 
       
 Counterfactual Thinking  3.70 (1.33)     
 Item 8 3.21 (1.59) .60 
 Item 9 3.96 (1.51) .64 
 Item 10 3.94 (1.59) .69 
 
Note. For item content, see Table 3. 
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Table 12 
 
Study 1: CFA: AMFS Factor Correlations 
 
 
 
PTS PRO CFT 
PTS  .91   
PRO  .67*** .86  
CFT  .35** .49*** .94 
 
Note. PTS = Perspective Taking (simulation based); PRO = Prospection; CFT = Counterfactual 
Thinking.  
 
Italicized values denote the ordinal alpha reliability coefficient per factor (shown on the 
diagonal). 
 
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001.  
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Table 13 
 
Study 1: CFA: AMFS Loadings Using RULS and Factors Allowed to Correlate 
 Item PTS PRO CFT  
 1 .80***    
 2 .72***    
 3 .68***    
 4 .86***    
 5  .68***   
 6  .70***   
 7  .77***   
 8   .77***  
 9   .80***  
 10   .83***  
 
Note. PTS = Perspective Taking (simulation based); PRO = Prospection; CFT = Counterfactual 
Thinking. For item content, see Table 3. 
 
Note: *p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001.  
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Table 14 
 
Study 1: Correlations Between AMFS Scale Scores and ERQ Scale Scores 
 
 
 
Cognitive Reappraisal Expressive Suppression 
PTS  .38*** .13 
PRO  .35*** .08 
CFT  .49*** –.01 
 
Note. PTS = Perspective Taking (simulation based); PRO = Prospection; CFT = Counterfactual 
Thinking.  
 
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001. 
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Table 15 
 
Study 1: Functional Relations Between AMFS Functions and ERQ Dimensions: Cognitive 
Reappraisal (Representing Simulation-Based Behavior) and Expressive Suppression 
(Representing Social Behavior) 
 
 PTS  PRO  CFT 
  r b t p sr2%  r b t p sr2%  r b t p sr2% 
                   
CR  .38 1.14 2.28 * 3.4%  .35 .46 .88 n.s. .05%  .49 1.66 4.44 *** 12.9% 
 
 
Note. CR = Cognitive Reappraisal; PTS = Perspective Taking (simulation based); PRO = 
Prospection; CFT = Counterfactual Thinking. 
 
r = zero-order correlation; b = unstandardized regression coefficient; t = t-test statistic, sr2% = 
unique variance explained based on squared multiple correlation; df for t = 106. 
 
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001.  
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Table 16 
 
Study 1: Correlations Between AMFS Scale Scores and HEXACO Scale Scores 
 
 
 
HH EMO EXT AGR CSC OPN 
PTS  –.56 –.28** .22* .13 .26** .36*** 
PRO  .14 .22* .06 .11 .33*** .44*** 
CFT  –.34*** .37*** –.21* –.09 –.10 .09 
 
Note. PTS = Perspective Taking (simulation based); PRO = Prospection; CFT = Counterfactual 
Thinking; HH = Honesty-Humility; EMO = Emotionality/Neuroticism; EXT = Extraversion; 
AGR = Agreeableness; CSC = Conscientiousness; OPN = Openness to New Experiences. 
 
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001.   
234 
	
Table 17 
 
Study 2: HEXACO 100-Item Personality Inventory 
   Honesty-Humility 
   Sincerity 
6R.  If I want something from a person I dislike, I will act very nicely toward that person in order to get it. 
30*. I wouldn't use flattery to get a raise or promotion at work, even if I thought it would succeed. 
54R*. If I want something from someone, I will laugh at that person's worst jokes. 
78*. I wouldn't pretend to like someone just to get that person to do favors for me. 
Fairness 
12R*. If I knew that I could never get caught, I would be willing to steal a million dollars. 
36R. I would be tempted to buy stolen property if I were financially tight. 
60*. I would never accept a bribe, even if it were very large. 
84R*. I’d be tempted to use counterfeit money, if I were sure I could get away with it. 
Greed-Avoidance 
18*. Having a lot of money is not especially important to me. 
42R. I would like to live in a very expensive, high-class neighborhood. 
66R. I would like to be seen driving around in a very expensive car. 
90R*. I would get a lot of pleasure from owning expensive luxury goods. 
Modesty 
24. I am an ordinary person who is no better than others. 
48. I wouldn’t want people to treat me as though I were superior to them. 
72R*. I think that I am entitled to more respect than the average person is. 
96R*. I want people to know that I am an important person of high status. 
Emotionality/Neuroticism 
Fearfulness 
5*. I would feel afraid if I had to travel in bad weather conditions. 
29R. I don’t mind doing jobs that involve dangerous work. 
53*. When it comes to physical danger, I am very fearful. 
77R*. Even in an emergency I wouldn't feel like panicking. 
Anxiety 
11*. I sometimes can't help worrying about little things. 
35R*. I worry a lot less than most people do. 
59R. I rarely, if ever, have trouble sleeping due to stress or anxiety. 
83. I get very anxious when waiting to hear about an important decision. 
Dependence 
17*. When I suffer from a painful experience, I need someone to make me feel comfortable. 
41R*. I can handle difficult situations without needing emotional support from anyone else. 
65. Whenever I feel worried about something, I want to share my concern with another person. 
89R. I rarely discuss my problems with other people. 
Sentimentality 
23*. I feel like crying when I see other people crying. 
47. When someone I know well is unhappy, I can almost feel that person's pain myself. 
71*. I feel strong emotions when someone close to me is going away for a long time. 
95R*. I remain unemotional even in situations where most people get very sentimental. 
Extraversion 
Social Self-Esteem 
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4*. I feel reasonably satisfied with myself overall. 
28. I think that most people like some aspects of my personality. 
52R*. I feel that I am an unpopular person. 
76R*. I sometimes feel that I am a worthless person. 
Social Boldness 
10R*. I rarely express my opinions in group meetings. 
34* In social situations, I'm usually the one who makes the first move. 
58*. When I'm in a group of people, I'm often the one who speaks on behalf of the group. 
82R. I tend to feel quite self-conscious when speaking in front of a group of people. 
Sociability 
16R. I avoid making "small talk" with people. 
40. I enjoy having lots of people around to talk with. 
64*. I prefer jobs that involve active social interaction to those that involve working alone. 
88*. The first thing that I always do in a new place is to make friends. 
Liveliness 
22. I am energetic nearly all the time. 
46*. On most days, I feel cheerful and optimistic. 
70R. People often tell me that I should try to cheer up. 
94R*. Most people are more upbeat and dynamic than I generally am. 
Agreeableness 
Forgiveness 
3*.  I rarely hold a grudge, even against people who have badly wronged me. 
27*. My attitude toward people who have treated me badly is "forgive and forget". 
51R. If someone has cheated me once, I will always feel suspicious of that person. 
75R. I find it hard to fully forgive someone who has done something mean to me. 
Gentleness 
9R*. People sometimes tell me that I am too critical of others. 
33. I generally accept people’s faults without complaining about them. 
57*. I tend to be lenient in judging other people. 
81*. Even when people make a lot of mistakes, I rarely say anything negative. 
Flexibility 
15R*. People sometimes tell me that I'm too stubborn. 
39*. I am usually quite flexible in my opinions when people disagree with me. 
63R*. When people tell me that I’m wrong, my first reaction is to argue with them. 
87R. I find it hard to compromise with people when I really think I’m right. 
Patience 
21R*. People think of me as someone who has a quick temper. 
45. I rarely feel anger, even when people treat me quite badly. 
69* Most people tend to get angry more quickly than I do. 
93R. I find it hard to keep my temper when people insult me. 
Conscientiousness 
Organization 
2.  I clean my office or home quite frequently. 
26*. I plan ahead and organize things, to avoid scrambling at the last minute. 
50R. People often joke with me about the messiness of my room or desk. 
74R*. When working, I sometimes have difficulties due to being disorganized. 
Diligence 
8. When working, I often set ambitious goals for myself. 
32*. I often push myself very hard when trying to achieve a goal. 
56R. Often when I set a goal, I end up quitting without having reached it. 
80R*. I do only the minimum amount of work needed to get by.  
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Perfectionism 
14. I often check my work over repeatedly to find any mistakes. 
38R*. When working on something, I don't pay much attention to small details. 
62*. I always try to be accurate in my work, even at the expense of time. 
86*. People often call me a perfectionist. 
Prudence 
20R*. I make decisions based on the feeling of the moment rather than on careful thought. 
44R*. I make a lot of mistakes because I don't think before I act. 
68. I don’t allow my impulses to govern my behavior. 
92R*. I prefer to do whatever comes to mind, rather than stick to a plan. 
Openness to Experience 
Aesthetic Appreciation 
1R*. I would be quite bored by a visit to an art gallery. 
25R. I wouldn't spend my time reading a book of poetry. 
49*. If I had the opportunity, I would like to attend a classical music concert. 
73. Sometimes I like to just watch the wind as it blows through the trees. 
Inquisitiveness 
7*.  I'm interested in learning about the history and politics of other countries. 
31. I enjoy looking at maps of different places. 
55R. I would be very bored by a book about the history of science and technology.   
79R*. I’ve never really enjoyed looking through an encyclopedia. 
Creativity 
13R. I would like a job that requires following a routine rather than being creative.  
37*. I would enjoy creating a work of art, such as a novel, a song, or a painting. 
61*. People have often told me that I have a good imagination. 
85R*. I don't think of myself as the artistic or creative type. 
Unconventionality 
19R*. I think that paying attention to radical ideas is a waste of time. 
43*. I like people who have unconventional views. 
67. I think of myself as a somewhat eccentric person. 
91R*. I find it boring to discuss philosophy. 
Altruism 
97. I have sympathy for people who are less fortunate than I am. 
98. I try to give generously to those in need. 
99R. It wouldn’t bother me to harm someone I didn’t like. 
100R. People see me as a hard-hearted person. 
101.✓ People who fail to select option five for this item will be removed from this survey. 
 
“R” denotes reverse-scored item 
✓Attention check item. Respondents who do not answer correctly are booted out of the survey. 
*Items included in the 60-item index 
 
Note. Respondents will be presented with the instruction, “The following section addresses 
various personality traits. On a 1 to 6 scale (1 = Strongly Disagree; 6 = Strongly Agree), please 
rate the extent to which you agree (or disagree) with each statement as it describes your 
personality: Please click the NEXT button to continue.” Items above are numbered in accordance 
with the HEXACO inventory (Ashton & Lee, 2005), but will be presented to respondents in 
random order. Dimensions are denoted with boldface. Facets are denoted with italics.  
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Table 18 
Study 2: Autobiographical Memory Functions of Joint Reminiscence (AMFJR) Scale 
Conversation (Social) 
1. Give us something to talk about. 
2. Entertain myself with stories of past experiences. 
3. Entertain others with stories of past experiences. 
4. Share my life experiences with others. 
5. Have fun. 
6. Bond with others. 
 Perspective Taking (Social) 
7. Help me understand others. 
8. Help me understand what others are thinking or feeling. 
Relationship Maintenance (Social) 
9. Remind myself that I am loved/that the other is loved. 
10. Help myself feel close to family members. 
11. Help myself understand family members better. 
12. Help myself remember friends or family members. 
13. Repair relations between myself and friends or family members. 
14. Help resolve disputes between myself and friends or family members. 
15. Help myself understand friends better. 
16. Help myself feel close to friends. 
Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control (Directive) 
17. Emphasize the consequences of negative behavior. 
18. Clarify moral lessons. 
19. Bring to mind appropriate or preferred behavior. 
20. Explain ongoing activities. 
21. Prepare myself or others for an upcoming event. 
22. Help myself or others problem solve. 
23. So that I or another avoids repeating a past mistake at some later date. 
24. To see how my or another’s strengths can help solve a present problem. 
25. Help lessen my or another’s negative emotions. 
Emotion Regulation (Directive) 
26. Emphasize or clarify appropriate emotional responses. 
27. Help me or another control emotions. 
28. Help me cope with stressful or upsetting situations. 
29. Help me make sense of my or another’s emotions. 
30. Help me or another process an emotional experience. 
31. Help me or another understand how to feel. 
Self Identity (Self) 
32. Help me feel good about myself. 
33. Build or maintain my sense of self. 
34. Build a unique individual identity for myself. 
35. Help me to feel or recognize that I am part of a larger group. 
36. Remind myself of what I was like when I was younger. 
 
Note. Per Kulkofsky & Koh (2009) and adapted by Ranson & Fitzgerald (in preparation). 
Respondents are presented with the instruction, “We are interested in how and why people 
engage in past-talk. Past-talk is conversation about events that you have experienced with the 
person(s) you are speaking to or that you have experienced but your conversational partner(s) 
have not. Please keep past-talk conversations in mind when rating how often you engage in each 
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of the situations below using a 1 to 6 scale (1 = Almost never; 6 = Almost always). Please click 
the NEXT button to continue.” On the next page, the items follow the stem statement,  
“I engage in past-talk with another or others in order to...” 
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Table 19 
 
Study 2: Thinking About Life Experiences (TALE) Scale  
Social Function 
1. When I hope to also find what another personal is like. 
2. When I want to develop some more intimacy in a relationship. 
3. When I want to develop a closer relationship with someone. 
4. When I want to maintain a friendship by sharing memories with friends. 
5. When I hope to also learn more about another person’s life. 
Directive Function 
6. When I want to remember something that someone else said or did that might help me now. 
7. When I believe that thinking about the past can help guide my future. 
8. When I want to try to learn from my past mistakes. 
9. When I need to make a life choice and I am uncertain which path to take. 
10. When I want to remember a lesson I learned in the past. 
Self Function 
11. When I want to feel that I am the same person that I was before. 
12. When I am concerned about whether I am still the same type of person that I was earlier. 
13. When I am concerned about whether my values have changed over time. 
14. When I am concerned about whether my beliefs have changed over time. 
15. When I want to understand how I have changed from who I was before. 
 
Note. Per Bluck & Alea (2011). Respondents are presented with the instruction, “Sometimes 
people think back over their life or talk to other people about their life: It may be about things 
that happened quite a long time ago or more recently. We are not interested in your memory for a 
particular event, but more generally in how you bring together and connect the different events 
and periods of your life. Please rate how often you do the following on a 1 to 6 scale (1 = Almost 
Never; 6 = Almost Always). Please click the NEXT button to continue.” On the following page, 
the items follow the stem statement, “I think back over or talk about my life or certain periods of 
my life...” 
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Table 20 
 
Study 2: Demographics 
  
Gender Frequency (Percent) 
    1. Male 450 (49.8%) 
 2. Female 449 (49.7%) 
 3. Transgender 3 (0.3%) 
 4. Prefer not to answer 1 (0.1%) 
 
Race/Ethnicity   
 1. Caucasian 584 (64.7%) 
 2. South Asian 157 (17.4%) 
 3. African-American/Black 51 (5.6%) 
 4. East Asian 43 (4.8%) 
 5. Hispanic 35 (3.9%) 
 6. Other 14 (1.6%) 
 7. Multiracial 10 (1.1%) 
 8. Arab/Middle Eastern 2 (0.2%) 
 9. Prefer not to answer 7 (0.8%) 
    
    
 
Age Mean (SD) 
 1. Select option in years (18 through 66+) 34.92 (11.21) 
 2. Prefer not to answer N/A 
    
    
 Groups Frequency (Percent) 
  18–24 144 (15.9%) 
  25–34 382 (42.4%) 
  35–44 206 (22.9%) 
  45–54 103 (11.4%) 
  55–64 54 (6.0%) 
  65 + > 14 (1.5%) 
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Table 21 
 
Study 2: Scale Score Descriptives: AMFS, ERQ, HEXACO, AMFJR, and TALE 
 
 Scale/Dimension Mean (SD) UV ZSkew UV ZKurtosis 
     
AMFS    
 Perspective Taking 4.31 (1.02) –8.70*** +3.20** 
 Prospection  4.36 (0.96) –8.05*** +4.21*** 
 Counterfactual Thinking  4.07 (1.26) –6.52*** –2.36** 
ERQ    
 Cognitive Reappraisal 4.25 (0.97) –6.65*** +2.33* 
 Expressive Suppression 3.36 (1.20) –1.02 –4.23*** 
HEXACO    
 Honesty-Humility 4.10 (0.87) –0.98 –2.94** 
 Emotionality/Neuroticism 3.78 (0.77) –1.60 +1.67 
 Extraversion 3.74 (0.88) –2.99** –0.23 
 Agreeableness 3.54 (0.81) –1.90 +2.24* 
 Conscientiousness 4.31 (0.74) –1.84 –0.40 
 Openness to Experience 4.18 (0.81) –2.37* –1.69 
 Altruism 4.48 (0.93) –6.05*** +0.52 
AMFJR    
 Conversation 4.50 (1.01) –11.40*** +6.37*** 
 Perspective Taking 4.19 (1.18) –8.57*** +1.37 
 Relationship Maintenance 4.12 (1.02) –6.65*** +2.24* 
 Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control 4.09 (0.93) –7.46*** +3.40*** 
 Emotion Regulation 4.01 (1.05) –7.06*** +1.59 
 Self 3.92 (1.07) –6.56*** +0.31 
TALE    
 Social 4.30 (1.04) –8.62*** +2.55* 
 Directive 4.49 (0.98) –10.09*** +6.12*** 
 Self 3.95 (1.22) –5.99*** –1.76 
 
Note. N = 110 for all items. Bolded values reflect the factor means (standard deviations). For 
item content, see Table 3. 
 
*p ≤ .05 (Z ≥ |1.96|), **p ≤ .01 (Z ≥ |2.58|), ***p ≤ .001 (Z ≥ |3.29|). 
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Table 22 
 
Study 2: Inter-Item Correlations for the Functions of the AMFS, AMFJR, and TALE 
 
AMFS: Perspective Taking (PTS), Prospection (PRO), Counterfactual Thinking (CFT)  
 PTS01 PTS02 PTS03 PTS04 PRO05 PROS06 PRO07 CFT08 CFT09 CFT10 
PTS01           
PTS02 .64          
PTS03 .62 .60         
PTS04 .66 .68 .59        
PRO05 .42 .42 .42 .44       
PRO06 .49 .51 .47 .46 .42      
PRO07 .41 .41 .42 .41 .51 .46     
CFT08 .21 .23 .22 .25 .28 .22 .23    
CFT09 .20 .20 .21 .21 .28 .21 .28 .79   
CFT10 .22 .21 .24 .25 .29 .23 .24 .87 .89  
 
 
AMFJR: Conversation (C), Perspective Taking (PTJR), Relationship Maintenance (R)   
 C01 C02 C03 C04 C05 C06 PJR07 PJR08 R09 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 R15 R16 
                 
C01                 
C02 .50                
C03 .51 .63               
C04 .41 .44 .58              
C05 .52 .56 .51 .40             
C06 .44 .44 .51 .52 .46            
PJR07 .22 .28 .31 .37 .27 .37           
PJR08 .22 .30 .35 .37 .25 .39 .64          
R09 .23 .33 .31 .35 .32 .39 .48 .46         
R10 .29 .32 .34 .36 .37 .43 .36 .37 .51        
R11 .23 .27 .27 .32 .24 .35 .53 .54 .51 .60       
R12 .41 .42 .39 .39 .37 .34 .27 .31 .45 .57 .44      
R13 .21 .27 .24 .27 .26 .36 .43 .44 .46 .48 .51 .41     
R14 .21 .26 .24 .32 .29 .33 .44 .45 .46 .44 .47 .34 .60    
R15 .25 .33 .31 .39 .29 .39 .63 .58 .49 .42 .57 .37 .46 .52   
R16 .42 .40 .40 .42 .47 .56 .44 .42 .47 .52 .43 .42 .40 .41 .53  
T17 .14 .19 .20 .26 .14 .21 .38 .37 .34 .24 .35 .25 .32 .41 .37 .24 
T18 .17 .21 .20 .25 .19 .22 .43 .42 .43 .34 .41 .31 .40 .46 .42 .28 
T19 .23 .26 .25 .30 .24 .28 .48 .47 .45 .35 .43 .31 .41 .49 .48 .36 
T20 .31 .29 .33 .34 .34 .34 .42 .43 .35 .35 .37 .34 .40 .43 .41 .38 
T21 .26 .24 .25 .29 .33 .29 .41 .43 .38 .31 .39 .33 .39 .44 .45 .31 
T22 .27 .23 .27 .35 .24 .35 .47 .45 .35 .29 .33 .30 .33 .38 .38 .25 
T23 .20 .26 .29 .30 .18 .28 .40 .43 .35 .38 .46 .31 .41 .44 .46 .37 
T24 .22 .24 .28 .32 .24 .32 .54 .53 .43 .34 .40 .28 .41 .44 .46 .34 
T25 .18 .22 .22 .30 .22 .32 .43 .44 .40 .30 .32 .28 .33 .36 .39 .34 
E26 .21 .26 .24 .31 .22 .33 .51 .56 .48 .37 .48 .31 .44 .44 .51 .42 
E27 .17 .22 .17 .22 .19 .27 .48 .47 .44 .37 .39 .28 .43 .46 .50 .39 
E28 .18 .28 .23 .32 .20 .35 .48 .47 .45 .32 .42 .30 .46 .46 .50 .34 
E29 .23 .27 .29 .39 .19 .38 .61 .61 .48 .39 .53 .31 .48 .49 .63 .44 
E30 .25 .26 .31 .41 .19 .38 .55 .56 .43 .38 .46 .32 .40 .40 .51 .42 
E31 .24 .29 .24 .37 .24 .34 .57 .58 .50 .42 .50 .34 .45 .49 .57 .41 
SJR32 .32 .40 .32 .33 .43 .33 .35 .37 .45 .43 .38 .35 .36 .39 .40 .46 
SJR33 .31 .36 .31 .36 .35 .35 .45 .42 .50 .43 .43 .42 .36 .38 .43 .42 
SJR34 .24 .33 .26 .30 .32 .28 .37 .37 .40 .34 .36 .35 .31 .31 .41 .36 
SJR35 .26 .25 .26 .31 .33 .35 .45 .39 .48 .45 .43 .35 .43 .41 .45 .46 
SJR36 .31 .45 .38 .35 .36 .28 .33 .33 .41 .36 .37 .46 .30 .31 .35 .33 
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AMFJR: Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control (TPB), Emotion Regulation (ER)  
 T17 T18 T19 T20 T21 T22 T23 T24 T25 E26 E27 E28 E29 E30 E31 
                
C01 .14 .17 .23 .31 .26 .27 .20 .22 .18 .21 .17 .18 .23 .25 .24 
C02 .19 .21 .26 .29 .24 .23 .26 .24 .22 .26 .22 .27 .27 .26 .29 
C03 .20 .20 .25 .33 .25 .27 .29 .28 .22 .24 .17 .23 .29 .31 .24 
C04 .26 .25 .30 .34 .28 .35 .30 .32 .30 .31 .22 .32 .39 .41 .37 
C05 .14 .19 .24 .34 .33 .24 .18 .24 .22 .22 .19 .20 .19 .19 .24 
C06 .21 .22 .28 .34 .29 .35 .28 .32 .32 .33 .27 .35 .38 .39 .34 
PJR07 .38 .43 .48 .42 .41 .47 .40 .54 .43 .50 .48 .48 .62 .55 .57 
PJR08 .37 .42 .47 .43 .43 .45 .43 .53 .44 .56 .47 .47 .61 .56 .58 
R09 .34 .43 .45 .35 .38 .35 .35 .43 .40 .48 .44 .45 .48 .43 .50 
R10 .24 .34 .35 .30 .35 .31 .29 .38 .34 .37 .37 .32 .39 .38 .42 
R11 .35 .41 .43 .32 .37 .39 .33 .46 .40 .48 .39 .42 .53 .46 .50 
R12 .25 .31 .31 .28 .40 .33 .30 .31 .28 .30 .28 .30 .31 .32 .34 
R13 .33 .40 .41 .33 .43 .39 .33 .41 .41 .44 .43 .46 .48 .40 .45 
R14 .41 .46 .49 .36 .41 .44 .38 .44 .45 .44 .46 .46 .49 .40 .49 
R15 .37 .42 .48 .39 .38 .45 .38 .46 .46 .51 .50 .51 .63 .51 .57 
R16 .24 .28 .36 .34 .38 .31 .25 .37 .34 .42 .40 .34 .44 .42 .41 
T17                
T18 .52               
T19 .46 .53              
T20 .36 .41 .45             
T21 .46 .47 .43 .44            
T22 .42 .46 .46 .45 .44           
T23 .45 .49 .46 .32 .40 .47          
T24 .36 .36 .44 .43 .43 .54 .47         
T25 .32 .36 .41 .37 .38 .41 .38 .43        
E26 .44 .48 .57 .42 .43 .42 .40 .48 .47       
E27 .39 .46 .46 .38 .46 .40 .32 .42 .47 .57      
E28 .41 .43 .47 .37 .35 .47 .41 .46 .48 .48 .50     
E29 .45 .50 .53 .39 .37 .49 .45 .51 .47 .57 .53 .53    
E30 .37 .42 .44 .37 .36 .42 .39 .48 .42 .51 .48 .51 .61   
E31 .39 .48 .52 .39 .40 .46 .42 .51 .45 .57 .53 .52 .64 .57  
SJR32 .25 .31 .43 .34 .39 .30 .26 .36 .32 .40 .43 .38 .38 .39 .39 
SJR33 .29 .40 .51 .41 .43 .38 .30 .42 .37 .48 .47 .45 .47 .45 .48 
SJR34 .29 37 .44 .37 .38 .32 .27 .35 .34 .41 .41 .38 .39 .35 .43 
SJR35 .32 .36 .43 .38 .39 .39 .22 .39 .36 .43 .48 .41 .45 .41 .45 
SJR36 .28 .33 .35 .25 .25 .28 .35 .31 .27 .33 .28 .30 .34 .32 .35 
AMFJR: Self (SJR) 
 SJR32 SJR33 SJR34 SJR35 SJR36           
                
C01 .32 .31 .24 .26 .31           
C02 .40 .36 .33 .25 .46           
C03 .32 .31 .26 .26 .38           
C04 .33 .36 .30 .31 .35           
C05 .43 .35 .32 .33 .36           
C06 .38 .35 .28 .35 .26           
PJR07 .35 .45 .37 .45 .33           
PJR08 .37 .42 .37 .39 .33           
R09 .45 .50 .40 .48 .41           
R10 .43 .43 .34 .46 .36           
R11 .38 .43 .36 .43 .37           
R12 .35 .42 .35 .35 .46           
R13 .36 .36 .31 .43 .30           
R14 .39 .38 .31 .41 .31           
R15 .40 .43 .41 .45 .35           
R16 .46 .42 .36 .46 .33           
T17 .25 .29 .29 .32 .28           
T18 .31 .40 .37 .36 .33           
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T19 .43 .51 .44 .43 .35           
T20 .39 .43 .38 .39 .25           
T21 .30 .38 .32 .39 .28           
T22 .26 .30 .27 .22 .35           
T23 .36 .42 .35 .39 .31           
T24 .32 .37 .34 .39 .27           
T25 .34 .41 .37 .38 .25           
E26 .40 .48 .41 .43 .33           
E27 .43 .47 .41 .48 .28           
E28 .38 .48 .38 .41 .30           
E29 .38 .47 .39 .45 .34           
E30 .39 .45 .35 .41 .32           
E31 .39 .48 .43 .45 .35           
SJR32                
SJR33 .58               
SJR34 .45 .59              
SJR35 .48 .49 .42             
SJR36 .40 .44 .33 .34            
 
 
TALE: Social (SC), Directive (D), Self (ST)  
 SC01 SC02 SC03 SC04 SC05 D06 D07 D08 D09 D10 ST11 ST12 ST13 ST14 ST15 
                
SC01                
SC02 .46               
SC03 .51 .66              
SC04 .45 .49 .57             
SC05 .62 .48 .52 .47            
D06 .38 .32 .40 .37 .40           
D07 .37 .31 .37 .30 .37 .52          
D08 .30 .25 .28 .20 .30 .51 .54         
D09 .35 .27 .31 .27 .31 .49 .50 .50        
D10 .33 .27 .29 .25 .34 .54 .52 .67 .49       
ST11 .38 .33 .31 .29 .31 .35 .37 .33 .36 .33      
ST12 .34 .26 .29 .26 .29 .37 .39 .39 .38 .43 .66     
ST13 .33 .26 .26 .20 .28 .41 .45 .44 .42 .44 .55 .67    
ST14 .35 .29 .26 .20 .30 .40 .40 .41 .40 .41 .57 .69 .74   
ST15 .36 .31 .33 .26 .34 .45 .51 .50 .41 .52 .47 .57 .64 .61  
Note. Bold denotes inter-item correlations within the function.  
 
For item content, see Tables 3, 18, and 19. 
 
All correlations significant at p < .001.  
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Table 23 
 
Study 2: Individual CFA Fit Indices and Diagnostics for AMFS, AMFJR, and TALE 
 
 
 
AMFS 
 
AMFJR  TALE 
Satorra-Bentler χ2 (df)  74.74 (32)***  1662.82 (579)***  354.24 (87)*** 
Independence model χ2 (df)  7116.03 (45)  21065.36 (630)  8492.10 (105) 
Hotelier’s Critical N  314.54  191.11  154.08 
SB-adjusted RMSEA  .038  .046  .058 
SB-adjusted NNFI  .991  .942  .962 
SB-adjusted CFI  .985  .914  .950 
SMC range  .49–.92  .39–.68  .46–.73 
SMC average  .69  .53  .61 
Factor loadings range  .70–.98  .62–.83  .68–.85 
MV skew Z-score  21.90***  75.40***  35.43*** 
MV kurtosis Z-score  18.93***  44.47***  28.91*** 
Relative MV kurtosis  1.29  1.36  1.39 
Condition Number  11.05  8.89  6.10 
SEM factor reliability range  .93–.99  .83–.91  .91–.95 
 
Note. MV skew, MV kurtosis, and relative MV kurtosis were computed on data designated as 
continuous. 
 
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001. 
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Table 24 
 
Study 2: Individual CFA Factor Correlations 
 
AMFS PTS PRO CFT    
PTS  .95      
PRO  .82*** .86     
CFT  .31*** .40*** .99    
        
AMFJR  CONVO PTJR RM TPB ER SELFJR 
CONVO  .89      
PTJR  .56*** .96     
RM  .70*** .83*** .87    
TPB  .58*** .86*** .84*** .83   
ER  .54*** .92*** .89*** .91*** .92  
SELFJR  .70*** .72*** .86*** .80*** .82*** .85 
        
TALE  SOC DIR SELFT    
SOC  .91      
DIR  .64*** .91     
SELFT  .55*** .75*** .95    
 
Note. PTS = Perspective Taking (simulation based); PRO = Prospection; CFT = Counterfactual 
Thinking; CONVO = Conversation (Social); PTJR = Perspective Taking (socially situated: 
Social); RM = Relationship Maintenance (Social); TPB = Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral 
Control (Directive); ER = Emotion Control (Directive); SELFJR = Self (socially situated; Self); 
SOC = Social; DIR = Directive; SELFT = Self (TALE). 
 
Bolded values denote correlations ≥ |.32|; i.e., that at least approximately 10% of the variance is 
shared between those two factors. 
 
Italicized values denote the ordinal alpha reliability coefficient per factor (shown on the 
diagonal). 
 
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001. 
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Table 25 
 
Study 2: Comparisons Between Select LISREL and AMOS Estimates and Fit Indices for 
Individual CFAs Run on the AMFS, AMFJR, and TALE 
 
  AMFS  AMFJR  TALE 
      χ2 Test Statistic       
LISREL§  74.74 (32) ***  1662.82 (579)***  354.24 (87)*** 
AMOS  67.13 (32)***  2343.55 (579)***  354.70 (87)*** 
       RMSEA       
LISREL§  .038  .046  .058 
AMOS  .035  .048  .058 
       NNFI       
LISREL§  .991  .942  .962 
AMOS  .991  .904  .929 
       CFI       
LISREL§  .985  .914  .950 
AMOS  .983  .872  .915 
       SMC range       
LISREL   .49–.92  .39–.68  .46–.73 
AMOS  .45–.93  .36–.69  .45–.71 
       SMC average       
LISREL  .69  .53  .61 
AMOS  .65  .51  .56 
       Factor loadings range***       
LISREL  .70–.98  .62–.83  .68–.85 
AMOS  .67–.98  .57–.80  .67–.84 
       SEM factor reliability range       
LISREL  .93–.99  .83–.91  .91–.95 
AMOS  .93–.99  .78–.94  .89–.94 
 
Note. AMOS denotes NNFI as TLI (Tucker-Lewis Non-normed Fit Index).  
 
§For LISREL, value denotes the computed value using the Satorra-Bentler chi-square; for 
AMOS, value denotes the computed value using the ML Ratio chi-square. 
 
All factor loadings in LISREL and AMOS were significant at the p < .001 level. 
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Study 2: CFA of 8-Factor Model: First- and Second-Order Standardized Regression Weights, 
Squared Multiple Correlations, and SEM Reliabilities  
ITEM PTS&JR PRO CFT CON RM TPB ER SELF 2ND  SMCs REL 
AMFS01 .78          .61  
AMFS02 .78          .61  
AMFS03 .73          .53  
AMFS04 .80          .59  
JR07 .64          .41  
JR08 .65          .42  
AMFS05  .66         .43  
AMFS06  .66         .44  
AMFS07  .73         .53  
AMFS08   .88        .78  
AMFS09   .90        .81  
AMFS10   .99        .98  
JR01    .66       .43  
JR02    .74       .55  
JR03    .79       .62  
JR04    .68       .46  
JR05    .69       .47  
JR06    .68       .46  
JR09     .70      .50  
JR10     .69      .48  
JR11     .74      .54  
JR12     .59      .35  
JR13     .68      .47  
JR14     .69      .47  
JR15     .74      .55  
JR16     .65      .43  
JR17      .62     .38  
JR18      .69     .47  
JR19      .72     .52  
JR20      .60     .36  
JR21      .63     .39  
JR22      .69     .47  
JR23      .63     .39  
JR24      .71     .51  
JR25      .62     .39  
JR26       .74    .55  
JR27       .69    .48  
JR28       .69    .47  
JR29       .80    .64  
JR30       .72    .52  
JR31       .78    .61  
JR32        .70   .49  
JR33        .79   .63  
JR34        .67   .45  
JR35        .67   .44  
JR36        .56   .31  
PT         .75  .57 .87 
PRO         .63  .40 .82 
CFT         .32  .10 .99 
CON         .62  .39 .85 
RM         .91  .82 .83 
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TPB         .93  .86 .78 
ER         .95  .90 .89 
SELF         .85  .73 .82 
 
Note. PTS&JR = Perspective Taking (simulation based + socially situated); PRO = Prospection; 
CFT = Counterfactual Thinking; CON = Conversation; RM = Relationship Maintenance; TPB = 
Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control; ER = Emotion Regulation; SELFJR = Self 
(socially situated). For item content, see Tables 3 and 18.  
 
For item content, see Tables 3 and 18. 
 
All regression weights significant at p ≤ .001.  
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Table 27 
 
Study 2: Bivariate Correlations Between the Functions of the AMFS and AMFJR 
 AMFS  AMFJR 
 PTS PRO CFT  CON PTJR RM TPB ER SELFJR 
PTS           
PRO .64          
CFT .27 .32         
           
CON .33 .34 .17        
PTJR .54 .39 .19  .44      
RM .44 .40 .23  .59 .67     
TPB .53 .48 .25  .47 .69 .71    
ER .52 .43 .28  .44 .75 .75 .79   
SELFJR .38 .38 .27  .57 .56 .72 .66 .68  
Note. PTS = Perspective Taking (simulation based); PRO = Prospection; CFT = Counterfactual 
Thinking; CON = Conversation; PTJR = Perspective Taking (socially situated); RM = 
Relationship Maintenance; TPB = Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control; ER = Emotion 
Regulation; SELF = Self (socially situated).  
 
Coefficient in bold is correlation between simulation-based and socially situated Perspective 
Taking functions.  
 
All correlations significant at p < .001. 
 
  
251 
	
Table 28 
 
Study 2: The Use of Autobiographical Memory for Simulation-Based Versus Socially        
Situated Perspective Taking: Functional Relations and Correlations 
PTS  PTJR  
  r b t p sr2%   r b t p sr2%  ZDBP 
                
CR  .29 .19 5.40 *** 2.9%   .26 .13 4.14 *** 1.7%  .69 
           
ES  .24 .13 2.40  * 0.6%   .33 .36 7.59 *** 5.6%  2.08** 
 
 
 
Testing Difference between Correlation Coefficients 
 
 r1 ρ (rho) ZDBP p-value 
AMFJR(2) × AMFS(4)  .54*** .51*** .88 .190 
     
AMFJR(2) × AMFS(2) .51*** .48*** .84 .200 
     
AMFJR(2) × AMFS(2)  .51*** -- 
.88 .190 
AMFJR(2) × AMFS(4) .54*** -- 
 
 
Testing Differential Use of Autobiographical Memory Content for AMFS vs. AMFJR 
Perspective Taking Subscales 
 
     
 MJR (SD) MS (SD) Z p-value 
AMFJR(2) vs. AMFS(4)  4.19 (1.18) 4.31 (1.02) –3.26 < .001 
     
AMFJR(2) vs. AMFS(2) 4.19 (1.18) 4.05 (1.26) –4.85 < .001 
Note. CR = Cognitive Reappraisal; ES = Expressive Suppression; PTS = Perspective Taking 
(simulation based); PTJR = Perspective Taking (socially situated); AMFS(2) = Scale score for the 
two items that directly correspond to the two items from the AMFJR; MJR = Mean of AMFJR 
Perspective Taking subscale; MS = Mean of AMFS Perspective Taking Subscale 
 
r = zero-order correlation; b = unstandardized regression coefficient; t = t-test statistic, sr2% = 
unique variance explained based on the squared semi-partial correlation; df for t = 899. 
 
ZDBP = Z-score yielded in one-tailed significance test of difference between proportions 
(Preacher, 2002); ZT = Z-score yielded in two-tailed significance test of differences between 
mean ranks 
 
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001. 
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Table 29 
 
Study 2: CFA of 9-Factor Model: First- and Second-Order Standardized Regression Weights, 
Squared Multiple Correlations, and SEM Reliabilities  
ITEM PTS PRO CFT CON PTJR RM TPB ER SELFJR 2ND  SMCs REL 
AMFS01 .82           .66  
AMFS02 .82           .67  
AMFS03 .74           .55  
AMFS04 .81           .66  
AMFS05  .65          .43  
AMFS06  .66          .44  
AMFS07  .73          .53  
AMFS08   .88         .77  
AMFS09   .90         .81  
AMFS10   .99         .98  
JR01    .66        .43  
JR02    .74        .55  
JR03    .79        .62  
JR04    .68        .46  
JR05    .69        .47  
JR06    .68        .46  
JR07     .80       .63  
JR08     .80       .64  
JR09      .70      .49  
JR10      .68      .47  
JR11      .74      .55  
JR12      .59      .34  
JR13      .68      .47  
JR14      .69      .47  
JR15      .75      .56  
JR16      .65      .43  
JR17       .62     .38  
JR18       .68     .47  
JR19       .72     .51  
JR20       .60     .36  
JR21       .63     .39  
JR22       .69     .47  
JR23       .63     .39  
JR24       .72     .52  
JR25       .62     .39  
JR26        .74    .54  
JR27        .69    .48  
JR28        .68    .47  
JR29        .80    .64  
JR30        .72    .52  
JR31        .78    .61  
JR32         .70   .49  
JR33         .80   .63  
JR34         .67   .45  
JR35         .67   .44  
JR36         .55   .31  
PTS          .64  .41 .94 
PRO          .62  .38 .82 
CFT          .31  .10 .99 
CON          .62  .38 .85 
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PTJR          .92  .85 .94 
RM          .91  .82 .83 
TPB          .93  .86 .78 
ER          .96  .92 .89 
SELFJR          .84  .70 .82 
 
Note. PTS = Perspective Taking (simulation based); PRO = Prospection; CFT = Counterfactual 
Thinking; PTJR = Perspective Taking (socially situated); CON = Conversation; RM = 
Relationship Maintenance; TPB = Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control; ER = Emotion 
Regulation; SELFJR = Self (socially situated). For item content, see Tables 3 and 18.  
 
2ND = Second-order standardized regression coefficients; SMCs = Squared multiple 
correlations; REL = SEM reliabilities. 
 
For item content, see Tables 3, 18, and 19. 
 
All regression weights significant at p ≤ .001.  
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Table 30 
 
Study 2: CFA of AMFJR Mapped onto the TALE: First- and Second-Order Standardized 
Regression Weights, Squared Multiple Correlations, Factor Correlations, and SEM  
Reliabilities  
ITEM CON PTJR RM TPB ER SELFJR SOC DIR SELFT 2ND  SMCs REL 
JR01 .65           .42  
JR02 .73           .53  
JR03 .78           .62  
JR04 .69           .48  
JR05 .68           .47  
JR06 .69           .47  
JR07  .79          .62  
JR08  .81          .66  
JR09   .70         .49  
JR10   .70         .49  
JR11   .73         .53  
JR12   .61         .37  
JR13   .68         .46  
JR14   .69         .45  
JR15   .74         .54  
JR16   .68         .46  
JR17    .63        .40  
JR18    .69        .47  
JR19    .71        .50  
JR20    .58        .33  
JR21    .61        .37  
JR22    .70        .49  
JR23    .65        .42  
JR24    .72        .52  
JR25    .61        .37  
JR26     .74       .55  
JR27     .69       .48  
JR28     .70       .49  
JR29     .80       .63  
JR30     .72       .52  
JR31     .78       .60  
JR32      .71      .50  
JR33      .81      .65  
JR34      .67      .45  
JR35      .64      .41  
JR36      .57      .32  
TALE01       .71     .50  
TALE02       .64     .41  
TALE03       .72     .51  
TALE04       .64     .41  
TALE05       .70     .48  
TALE06        .67    .44  
TALE07        .67    .45  
TALE08        .68    .46  
TALE09        .63    .39  
TALE10        .68    .47  
TALE11         .72   .51  
TALE12         .81   .66  
TALE13         .83   .68  
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TALE14         .74   .69  
TALE15         .92   .55  
CON          .73  .53 .85 
PTJR          .87  .74 .94 
RM          .89  .79 .83 
TPB          .92  .85 .78 
ER          .91  .83 .89 
SELFJR          .71  .50 .82 
SOC             .99 
DIR     .85        .99 
SELFT     .64 .77       .99 
 
Note. CON = AMFJR Conversation; PTJR = AMFJR Perspective Taking; RM = AMFJR 
Relationship Maintenance; TPB = AMFJR Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control; ER = 
AMFJR Emotion Regulation; SELFJR = AMFJR Self; SOC =  TALE Social; DIR = TALE 
Directive; SELFT = TALE Self. For item content, see Tables 18 and 19.  
 
2ND = Second-order standardized regression coefficients; SMCs = Squared multiple 
correlations; REL = SEM reliabilities. 
 
For item content, see Tables 18 and 19. 
 
All regression weights significant at p ≤ .001.  
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Table 31 
 
Study 2: CFA of AMFS Mapped onto the TALE: First- and Second-Order Standardized 
Regression Weights, Squared Multiple Correlations, Factor Correlations, and SEM Reliabilities  
ITEM PTS PRO CFT SOC DIR SELFT 2ND  SMCs REL 
AMFS01 .81        .66  
AMFS02 .82        .68  
AMFS03 .74        .55  
AMFS04 .82        .67  
AMFS05  .66       .43  
AMFS06  .69       .48  
AMFS07  .69       .48  
AMFS08   .88      .78  
AMFS09   .90      .81  
AMFS10   .99      .98  
TALE01    .72     .52  
TALE02    .71     .50  
TALE03    .78     .61  
TALE04    .66     .44  
TALE05    .73     .53  
TALE06     .71    .50  
TALE07     .74    .55  
TALE08     .74    .55  
TALE09     .69    .45  
TALE10     .76    .58  
TALE11      .70   .49  
TALE12      .82   .67  
TALE13      .84   .71  
TALE14      .84   .71  
TALE15      .74   .55  
PTS       .59  .34 .94 
PRO       .62  .38 .82 
CFT       .36  .13 .99 
SOC          .99 
DIR    .65      .99 
SELFT    .52 .71     .99 
2ND Order          .84 
 
Note. PTS = AMFS Perspective Taking; PRO = AMFS Prospection; CFT = AMFS 
Counterfactual Thinking; SOC =  TALE Social; DIR = TALE Directive; SELFT = TALE Self. 
For item content, see Tables 3 and 19.  
 
2ND = Second-order standardized regression coefficients; SMCs = Squared multiple 
correlations; REL = SEM reliabilities. 
 
For item content, see Tables 3 and 19. 
 
All regression weights significant at p ≤ .001.  
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Table 32 
 
Study 2: CFA of AMFJR and AMFS Mapped onto the TALE: First- and Second-Order 
Standardized Regression Weights, Squared Multiple Correlations, Factor Correlations, and 
SEM Reliabilities  
ITEM PTS PRO CFT CON PTJR RM TPB ER SELFJR SOC DIR SELFT 2ND  SMCs REL 
AMFS01 .82              .66  
AMFS02 .82              .68  
AMFS03 .74              .55  
AMFS04 .81              .66  
AMFS05  .68             .43  
AMFS06  .68             .46  
AMFS07  .71             .50  
AMFS08   .88            .78  
AMFS09   .90            .81  
AMFS10   .99            .98  
JR01    .65           .42  
JR02    .73           .54  
JR03    .79           .62  
JR04    .69           .48  
JR05    .68           .47  
JR06    .69           .47  
JR07     .79          .62  
JR08     .81          .66  
JR09      .70         .49  
JR10      .70         .49  
JR11      .73         .53  
JR12      .60         .36  
JR13      .68         .46  
JR14      .67         .45  
JR15      .74         .55  
JR16      .68         .46  
JR17       .63        .40  
JR18       .69        .47  
JR19       .71        .50  
JR20       .58        .34  
JR21       .61        .37  
JR22       .70        .49  
JR23       .65        .41  
JR24       .72        .52  
JR25       .61        .37  
JR26        .74       .55  
JR27        .69       .48  
JR28        .70       .48  
JR29        .80       .64  
JR30        .72       .52  
JR31        .78       .60  
JR32         .71      .50  
JR33         .81      .63  
JR34         .67      .45  
JR35         .64      .41  
JR36         .57      .32  
TALE01          .71     .50  
TALE02          .63     .40  
TALE03          .71     .50  
TALE04          .63     .39  
TALE05          .69     .48  
TALE06           .66    .48  
TALE07           .68    .46  
TALE08           .67    .45  
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TALE09           .62    .40  
TALE10           .68    .46  
TALE11            .72   .52  
TALE12            .81   .66  
TALE13            .82   .68  
TALE14            .83   .69  
TALE15            .74   .55  
PTS             .64  .41 .94 
PRO             .64  .41 .82 
CFT             .37  .13 .99 
CON             .71  .51 .85 
PTJR             .88  .78 .94 
RM             .88  .78 .83 
TPB             .92  .85 .78 
ER             .91  .83 .87 
SELFJR             .71  .50 .82 
SOC                 
DIR          .87       
SELFT          .65 .77      
 
Note. Note: PTS =AMFS Perspective Taking; PRO = AMFS Prospection; CFT = AMFS 
Counterfactual Thinking; CON = AMFJR Conversation; PTJR = AMFJR Perspective Taking; 
RM = AMFJR Relationship Maintenance; TPB = AMRJR Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral 
Control; ER = AMFJR Emotion Regulation; SELFJR = AMFJR Self; SOC =  TALE Social; DIR 
= TALE Directive; SELFT = TALE Self. For item content, see Tables 3, 18, and 19.  
 
2ND = Second-order standardized regression coefficients; SMCs = Squared multiple 
correlations; REL = SEM reliabilities. 
 
For item content, see Tables 3, 18, and 19. 
 
All regression weights significant at p ≤ .001.  
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Table 33 
 
Study 2: Correlations Between AMFS Scale Scores and EQR Scale Scores 
 
 
 
Cognitive Reappraisal Expressive Suppression ZDBP 
Perspective Taking (simulation based)  .29*** .24*** 1.14 
Prospection  .24*** .20*** .89 
Counterfactual Thinking  .15*** .12*** 1.08 
 
Note. ZDBP = Z-score yielded in one-tailed significance test of difference between proportions 
(Preacher, 2002). 
 
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001. 
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Table 34 
 
Study 2: Functional Relations Between AMFS Functions and ERQ Dimension of Cognitive 
Reappraisal (Representing Simulation-Based Behavior) 
 
 PTS  PRO  CFT 
  r b t p sr2%  r b t p sr2%  r b t p sr2% 
                   
CR  .29 .21 5.31 *** 2.86%  .26 .07 1.67 n.s. .28%  .15 .06 2.11 * .45% 
 
Note. CR = Cognitive Reappraisal; PTS = Perspective Taking (simulation based); PRO = 
Prospection; CFT = Counterfactual Thinking. 
 
r = zero-order correlation; b = unstandardized regression coefficient; t = t-test statistic, sr2% = 
unique variance explained based on the squared semi-partial correlation; df for t = 899). 
 
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001. 
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Table 35 
 
Study 2: Correlations Between AMFJR Emotion Regulation Scale Score and ERQ Scale Scores 
 
  Cognitive Reappraisal Expressive Suppression ZDBP 
Emotion Regulation  .26*** .45*** 4.64*** 
 
Note. ZDBP = Z-score yielded in one-tailed significance test of difference between proportions 
(Preacher, 2002). 
 
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001.  
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Table 36 
 
Study 2: Significant Use of Autobiographical Memory for TALE Functions as Predicted by 
HEXACO Personality Traits (Dimensions Only) 
 R b t p R2% 
Social      
 Emotionality/Neuroticism .25 .37 7.69 *** 6.2% 
 Extraversion .23 .28 7.20 *** 5.4% 
 Agreeableness .09 .11 2.59 ** 0.7% 
 Conscientiousness .13 .19 4.03 *** 1.8% 
 Openness to Experience .22 .28 6.71 *** 4.6% 
 Altruism .22 .25 6.90 *** 4.9% 
Directive       
 Emotionality/Neuroticism .26 .33 8.10 *** 6.8% 
 Extraversion .18 .20 5.48 *** 3.2% 
 Agreeableness .08 .10 4.00 *** 1.7% 
 Conscientiousness .20 .28 5.98 *** 3.8% 
 Openness to Experience .19 .23 5.91 *** 3.7% 
 Altruism .26 .27 8.15 *** 6.9% 
Self      
 Honesty-Humility –.11 –.15 –3.29 ** 1.2% 
 Emotionality/Neuroticism .26 .41 8.06 *** 6.7% 
 Extraversion .09 .12 2.67 ** .8% 
 Openness to Experience .11 .16 3.21 ** 1.1% 
 Altruism .10 .13 3.00 ** 1.0% 
Note. R = zero-order correlation; b = unstandardized regression coefficient; t = t-test statistic, 
R2% = variance explained; df for t = 901. 
 
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001. 
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Table 37 
 
Study 2: Significant Use of Autobiographical Memory for AMFS Functions as Predicted by 
HEXACO Personality Traits (Dimensions and Facets) 
 R b t p R2% 
Perspective Taking      
 Honesty-Humility -- -- -- -- -- 
    Greed-Avoidance –.12 –.09 –3.47 ** 1.3% 
 Emotionality/Neuroticism .20 .19 6.06 *** 3.9% 
    Anxiety .10 .09 2.93 ** .9% 
    Dependence .19 .18 5.67 *** 3.4% 
    Sentimentality .25 .24 7.61 *** 6.0% 
 Extraversion .24 .18 4.28 *** 2.7% 
    Social Self Esteem .10 .10 3.06 ** 1.0% 
    Social Boldness .13 .12 3.83 *** 1.6% 
    Sociability .22 .19 6.90 *** 5.0% 
    Liveliness .07 .07 2.15 * .5% 
 Agreeableness .07 .09 2.17 * .5% 
    Forgiveness .07 .07 2.08 * .5% 
    Gentleness .17 .18 5.17 *** 2.9% 
 Conscientiousness .12 .16 3.54 *** 1.4%  
    Diligence .17 .18 5.27 *** 3.0% 
    Perfection .17 .20 5.24 *** 3.0% 
 Openness to Experience .19 .24 5.92 *** 3.7% 
    Aesthetic Appreciate .11 .10 3.32 ** 1.2% 
    Inquisitive .14 .12 4.21 *** 1.9% 
    Creativity .13 .12 3.77 *** 1.6% 
    Unconventionality .23 .25 6.99 *** 5.1% 
 Altruism .16 .17 4.77 *** 2.5% 
Prospection      
 Honesty-Humility –.07 –.08 –2.22 * .5% 
    Greed Avoidance –.12 –.09 –3.75 *** 1.5% 
 Emotionality/Neuroticism .16 .20 4.79 *** 2.5% 
    Anxiety .13 .11 3.83 *** 1.6% 
    Dependence .11 .10 3.32 ** 1.2% 
    Sentimentality .18 .16 5.38 *** 3.1% 
 Extraversion .08 .09 2.40 * .6% 
    Sociability .13 .10 3.88 *** 1.6% 
 Agreeableness -- -- -- -- -- 
    Gentleness .08 .08 2.43 * .6% 
    Flexibility –.07 –.07 –2.10 * .5% 
 Conscientiousness .08 .11 2.53 * .7% 
    Diligence .14 .14 4.14 *** 1.9% 
    Perfection .18 .20 5.55 *** 3.3% 
 Openness to Experience .22 .26 6.74 *** 4.8% 
    Aesthetic Appreciate .14 .12 4.21 *** 1.9% 
    Inquisitive .17 .14 5.07 *** 2.8% 
    Creativity .18 .16 5.34 *** 3.1% 
    Unconventionality .19 .20 5.74 *** 3.5% 
 Altruism .09 .09 2.66 ** .8% 
Counterfactual Thinking      
 Honesty-Humility –.19 –.28 –5.87 *** 3.7% 
    Sincerity –.14 –.16 –4.17 *** 1.9% 
    Fairness –.12 –.12 –3.74 *** 1.5% 
    Greed-Avoidance –.20 –.19 –6.11 *** 3.9% 
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    Modesty –.08 –.10 –2.53 * .7% 
 Emotionality/Neuroticism .13 .21 3.80 *** 1.6% 
    Anxiety .19 .21 5.65 *** 3.4% 
    Dependence .10 .12 2.91 ** .9% 
 Extraversion –.07 –.11 –2.21 * .5% 
    Social Self-Esteem –.17 –.20 –5.05 *** 2.8% 
    Sociability .11 .12 3.26 ** 1.2% 
    Liveliness –.15 –.18 –4.57 *** 2.3% 
 Agreeableness –.07 –.11 –2.04 * .5% 
    Flexibility –.10 –.13 –3.14 ** 1.1% 
    Patience –.08 –.09 –2.30 * .6% 
 Conscientiousness –.11 –.19 –3.44 ** 1.3% 
    Organization –.14 –.16 –4.20 *** 1.9% 
    Perfection .08 .12 2.46 * .7% 
    Prudence –.22 –.28 –6.75 *** 4.8% 
Note. R = zero-order correlation; b = unstandardized regression coefficient; t = t-test statistic, 
R2% = variance explained; df for t = 901). 
 
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001. 
 
  
265 
	
Table 38 
 
Study 2: Significant Use of Autobiographical Memory for AMFJR Functions as Predicted by 
HEXACO Personality Traits (Dimensions Only) 
 R b t p R2% 
Conversation (Social)      
 Emotionality/Neuroticism .19 .25 5.93 *** 3.7% 
 Extraversion .24 .28 7.49 *** 5.9% 
 Conscientiousness .18 .24 5.37 *** 3.1% 
 Openness to Experience .19 .23 5.65 *** 3.4% 
 Altruism .21 .23 6.59 *** 4.6% 
Perspective Taking (Social)      
 Emotionality/Neuroticism .20 .30 6.10 *** 4.0% 
 Extraversion .24 .32 7.51 *** 5.9% 
 Agreeableness .13 .19 4.00 *** 1.7% 
 Conscientiousness .16 .25 4.79 *** 2.5% 
 Openness to Experience .22 .31 6.66 *** 4.7% 
 Altruism .20 .25 6.08 *** 3.9% 
Relationship Maintenance (Social)      
 Emotionality/Neuroticism .31 .41 9.88 *** 9.8% 
 Extraversion .32 .37 10.05 *** 10.0% 
 Agreeableness .12 .15 3.51 *** 1.3% 
 Conscientiousness .14 .19 4.18 *** 1.9% 
 Openness to Experience .17 .21 5.17 *** 2.9% 
 Altruism .24 .27 7.57 *** 6.0% 
Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control (Directive)     
 Emotionality/Neuroticism .22 .27 6.56 *** 4.8% 
 Extraversion .25 .26 7.71 *** 6.2% 
 Agreeableness .07 .08 2.07 * .5% 
 Conscientiousness .17 .22 5.21 *** 2.9% 
 Openness to Experience .18 .21 5.58 *** 3.3% 
 Altruism .19 .19 5.84 *** 3.6% 
Emotion Regulation (Directive)      
 Emotionality/Neuroticism .33 .45 10.52 *** 10.9% 
 Extraversion .21 .26 6.59 *** 4.6% 
 Agreeableness .09 .11 2.66 ** .8% 
 Conscientiousness .12 .17 3.64 *** 1.4% 
 Openness to Experience .19 .25 5.80 *** 3.6% 
 Altruism .23 .26 7.08 *** 5.3% 
Self       
 Honesty-Humility –.16 –.20 –4.86 *** 2.6% 
 Emotionality/Neuroticism .22 .31 6.82 *** 4.9% 
 Extraversion .23 .29 7.12 *** 5.2% 
 Openness to Experience .17 .22 5.14 *** 2.8% 
 Altruism .09 .10 2.57 ** .7% 
Note. R = zero-order; b = unstandardized regression coefficient; R2% = variance explained; df for 
t = 901. 
 
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001. 
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Table 39 
 
Study 2: Significant Use of Autobiographical Memory for TALE, AMFS, and AMFJR Functions 
as Predicted by Age and Gender (Female = Reference Group) 
 R b t p R2% 
Age      
 TALE Self .09 –.01 –2.70 ** 0.8% 
 AMFS Counterfactual Thinking .13  –.02 –3.95 *** 1.7% 
       
       
Gender (Male = 1; Female = 0)      
 TALE Social .10 –.21 –2.97 ** 1.0% 
 AMFS Counterfactual Thinking  .10 .25 3.04 ** 0.2% 
 AMFJR Emotion Regulation .07 –.15 –2.12 * 0.5% 
Note. R = zero-order correlation; b = unstandardized regression coefficient; t = t-test statistic, 
R2% = variance explained; df for t = 901. 
 
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001. 
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Table 40  
 
Study 2: Significant Differences in the Use of Autobiographical Memory for TALE, AMFS, and 
AMFJR Functions by Ethnicity: Caucasian, African-American/Black and South Asian  
 χ2(2)KW ZMWU MRC MRAAB MRSA r 
TALE Self 41.33***      
 Caucasian v AA/B  n.s.     
 AA/B v South Asian  n.s.     
 Caucasian v South Asian  –6.45* 344.75  468.66 .237 
AMFS CFT 17.00***      
 Caucasian v AA/B  n.s.     
 AA/B v South Asian  –2.82*  84.00 111.16 .195 
 Caucasian v South Asian  –3.94* 355.01  430.46 .145 
AMFJR Self 45.29***      
 Caucasian v AA/B  n.s.     
 AA/B v South Asian  –3.56*  78.50 112.95 .247 
 Caucasian v South Asian  –6.70* 343.75  472.37 .246 
AMFJR PT 23.08***      
 Caucasian v AA/B  n.s.     
 AA/B v South Asian  n.s.     
 Caucasian v South Asian  –4.49* 352.07  441.41 .172 
AMFJR RM 34.13***      
 Caucasian v AA/B  n.s.     
 AA/B v South Asian  –2.93*  83.06 111.46 .204 
 Caucasian v South Asian  –5.84* 347.22  459.46 .214 
AMFJR TPB 31.68***      
 Caucasian v AA/B  n.s.     
 AA/B v South Asian  n.s.     
 Caucasian v South Asian  –5.64* 348.04  456.40 .207 
AMFJR ER 25.64***      
 Caucasian v AA/B  n.s.     
 AA/B v South Asian  n.s.     
 Caucasian v South Asian  –4.97* 350.76  446.29 .183 
 
Note. χ2(2)KW = Kruskal-Wallis chi-square (df = 2 for all KW models); ZMWU = Z-statistics for 
Mann-Whitney U pairwise post-hoc tests; M = mean scale score for group; r% = variance 
explained, where r = |Z|/√N (Field, 2005). For the Caucasian v African-American/Black 
comparisons, N = 635; for African-American/Black v South Asian, N = 208; for Caucasian v 
South Asian, N = 741. 
 
AA/B = African-American/Black; CFT = Counterfactual Thinking; PT = Perspective Taking; 
RM = Relationship Maintenance; TPB = Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control; ER = 
Emotion Regulation. 
 
For all Kruskal-Wallis χ2 tests: *p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001; for all Mann-Whitney U 
pairwise post-hoc tests: *p ≤ .0167 (α = .05/3).  
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Figure 1. Low-level mind reading according to simulation theory (Goldman, 2006). Simulation 
is automatic; stimuli elicit the mirror neuron system rather than long-term memory. The output is 
an attribution, but one of emotion only. It is likely that low-level mind reading occurs concurrent 
with high-level mind reading if the mirror neuron system is elicited by the target other. 
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Figure 2. High-level mind reading per simulation theory (Goldman, 2006). The goal of re-
experiencing the past in order to infer another mind activates long-term memory content 
(“background information”) that serves that goal. The retrieved memories serve as simulation 
process input, which triggers the “imaginative simulation”* process. Shanton and Goldman 
characterize perspective taking as “other-directed”; therefore, the simulation form used for 
perspective taking is interpersonal simulation. 
 
 
 
 
*Goldman (2006) and Shanton and Goldman (2010) refer to this process as “simulation 
proper.” 
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Figure 3. An integrated view of the traditional taxonomies of long-term memory as they apply to 
the long-term memory component of the simulation process. Broadly, long-term memory is 
thought to be either declarative or nondeclarative (Cohen & Squire, 1980; depicted in yellow). 
Declarative is comprised of semantic and episodic memory (Tulving, 1972; depicted in blue). 
Later theories favored the view that semantic and episodic memories are not discrete systems but 
extremes of a continuum (Conway, 2005; Fitzgerald & Broadbridge, 2012; Greenberg & 
Verfaellie, 2010; Kihlstrom, 1984; Rubin, 2012). Declarative and nondeclarative can overlap 
(depicted below with curved arrows) if doing so serves the goal for which the memory 
information is retrieved (Gilboa, 2004).  
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Figure 4. The source activation confusion computational model or SAC (Reder et al., 2002; 
Reder et al., 2009) adapted for the current paper. In keeping with traditional long-term memory 
taxonomies (Tulving, 1972), the SAC features nodes for concept (semantic) and episode 
(episodic) information. When memory content need only be re-experienced for its semantic 
properties, the node preferentially activated is a concept node. This activation results in the 
assessment process of recognition, which produces the output of identification, knowing, or 
believing. Memory content that leads to recognition processing does not instigate simulation. 
When memory content needs to be re-experienced for its event and context properties the node 
preferentially activated and episode node. The ensuing assessment process is thus recollection, 
which results in remembering. Memory content that leads to remembering is submitted as input 
for simulation. If the activation of a node and its bindings (connections) are strong enough, 
spreading activation can occur. Because one type of node is activated preferentially, activation of 
attendant nodes is subordinate. This explains how concept information is included in episodic 
memories and vice versa, and also accounts for the instigation (or not) of simulation. Lines 
extending from the general context node represent the contextual “fan” that occurs when the 
general context is common to multiple episodes. 
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Figure 5. The proposed Expanded Simulation Model (adapted from Shanton & Goldman, 2010) 
when a goal necessitates predominantly semantic autobiographical memory content. The 
diagram shows that “unpacking” the long-term memory component reveals the self-memory 
system (SMS) (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), and the source activation 
confusion (SAC) model (Reder et al., 2009). An goal to produce a behavioral outcome such as 
“identification,” “knowing,” or “believing,” prompts the activation of a relevant self-concept 
stored in the SMS. This prompts the SMS’s “search and retrieval” procedure to activate the 
associated semantic autobiographical memory content. At the neural level, the semantic 
autobiographical memory content is stored in a concept node. The predominant activation of a 
concept node results in the assessment process of recognition, which yields the behavioral 
outcomes of identification, knowing, or believing. Because such behavioral outcomes do not 
require the use of imagination, simulation does not occur. 
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Figure 6. The proposed Expanded Simulation Model for perspective taking, which was adapted 
from Goldman (2006) and Shanton & Goldman (2010). The “unpacking” of the long-term 
memory component reveals the components of the Self-Memory System (SMS) (Conway, 2005; 
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), and the Source Activation Confusion (SAC) model (Reder et 
al., 2009). The current paper hypothesizes that a form of long-term memory content used for 
perspective taking is autobiographical episodic memory content. This content is extracted upon 
the setting of a perspective-taking goal, which then prompts the activation of the corresponding 
self-concept stored in the SMS (depicted in pink). This triggers the SMS’s “search and retrieval” 
procedure to activate the autobiographical episodic memory content at the neural level. Per the 
SAC (depicted in blue), this content is stored in an episode node. The illustration shows that, 
although episodic (and contextual) memory content is predominantly activated in response to a 
perspective-taking goal, any associated semantic memory content can be activated as well. The 
predominant activation of an autobiographical memory episode node prompts the assessment 
process of recollection, which requires the use of imaginative simulation (depicted in light 
green). The behavioral outcome is the inferring of another’s mind; i.e., perspective taking. 
Shanton and Goldman characterize perspective taking as “other-directed”; therefore, the form of 
simulation used for perspective taking is intrapersonal simulation.  
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Figure 7. A possible simulation process model for mental time travel as adapted from Shanton 
and Goldman (2010). As with high-level mind reading (perspective taking), long-term memory 
content (“background information”) serves as simulation input. The current paper operationalizes 
mental time travel as the behavioral outcomes of reminiscence (“re-experiencing” the past by 
retrieving and subjectively reliving predominantly episodic memory content), prospection (“pre-
experiencing” the future by retrieving and imaginatively employing predominantly episodic 
memory content for the purpose of subjectively envisioning potential scenarios), and 
counterfactual thinking (“reframing” the past by retrieving and imaginatively employing 
predominantly episodic memory content for the purpose of subjectively changing or augmenting 
a past event). Shanton and Goldman characterize mental time travel as “self-directed”; therefore, 
the simulation form used for mental time travel is intrapersonal simulation.  
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Figure 8. The complete proposed Expanded Simulation Model, which was adapted from 
Goldman (2006) and Shanton & Goldman (2010), and incorporates the components of the Self-
Memory System (SMS) (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) and the Source 
Activation Confusion (SAC) model (Reder et al., 2009). The path that leads to perspective taking 
reflects interpersonal simulation processing, while the past leading to the mental time travel 
behavioral outcomes reflects intrapersonal simulation processing. 
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Figure 9. The model of autobiographical functions as validated by Ranson & Fitzgerald (in 
preparation). All functions emerged from the broad three-function model of Self, Social, and 
Directive (e.g., Neisser, 1982; Tulving, 2002b). Consistent with the model by Kulkofsky and 
Koh (2009) that the Ranson and Fitzgerald study attempted to replicate with a diverse adult 
sample, the Directive function split into the subfunctions of Teaching/Problem-
Solving/Behavioral Control and Emotion Regulation, and the subfunctions of Conversation and 
Relationship Maintenance emerged from the Social function. Although the current paper found 
evidence that two Relationship Maintenance items were actually tapping into the use of 
autobiographical memory for perspective taking (PT), no other study has reported a PT function. 
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Figure 10. Graphic representations of Study 1’s EPAF1 extraction diagnostics. The fit to 
comparison data test (a) supported a three-factor structure as hypothesized, as did the Kaiser 
eigenvalue rule (b). However, the parallel analysis (PA), optimal coordinates (OC), and 
acceleration factor (AF), all shown (b), as well as the scree plot (c) were inconclusive, predicting 
2–3 factors. Note that AC is reflects the optimal number of factors minus 1; thus the number of 
factors it recommended was two. 
 
 
a.        b. 
 
 
c. 
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Figure 11. Study 1 EPAF1 factor diagram illustrates the loading strength and patterns when 
applying geomin Q-Q oblique rotation. 
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Figure 12. Study 1 EPAF1 factor diagram illustrates the loading strength and patterns when 
applying varimax orthogonal rotation. 
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Figure 13. Study 1 path diagram per the SEM-CFA of EPAF1. Loadings are standardized 
estimates. All were significant and positive. 
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Figure 14. The hypothesized eight-function structure when the AMFS and AMFJR (Ranson & 
Fitzgerald, in preparation) scales are combined. As predicted by the theoretical Expanded 
Simulation Model, the three “simulation-based” AMFS functions of Prospection (PRO) and 
Counterfactual Thinking (CFT) will be shown in CFA to be independent and unique 
autobiographical memory functions in the presence of the “socially situated” AMFJR functions 
of Conversation (CON), Relationship Maintenance (RM), Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral 
Control (TPB), Emotion Regulation (ER), and Self (S). However,  in the hypothesized eight-
function model, the Perspective Taking function comprises the Perspective Taking subscales of 
the AMFS and AMFJR. 
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Figure 15: The expected relations between the functions of the AMFS and AMFJR, and the 
TALE’s three broad Social, Self, and Directive functions (Bluck & Alea, 2011). CRS-A (aka 
AMFJR; Ranson & Fitzgerald, in press) validation showed that Conversation (CON), 
Perspective Taking (PT), and Relationship Maintenance (RM) mapped onto the broad Social 
function; Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control (TPB) and Emotion Regulation (ER) 
mapped on to the broad Directive function; and Self (S) mapped onto the broad Self function. 
Study 2 hypotheses state that, although the AMFS PT function is characterized as a simulation-
based function, it will also map onto the TALE Social function because it reflects interpersonal 
simulation, which is driven by social goals (see Chapter 1, Hypothesis 1.7). It is also 
hypothesized that the Prospection (PRO) and Counterfactual Thinking (CFT) functions will map 
onto the TALE Self function because they reflect intrapersonal simulation, which is driven by 
self goals (see Chapter 1, Hypothesis 1.7). Because the Directive function has been shown to 
concern the guiding of present and future thoughts and actions (Williams et al., 2008), the PRO 
and CFT functions may also map onto the TALE’s Directive function. 
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Figure 16: Results of the power analysis for Study 2’s most complex model, which includes 61 
observed variables (10 AMFS, 36 AMFJR, 15 TALE) and 11 latent variables (3 AMFS, 6 
AMFJR, 3 TALE). Estimating a conservative effect size of .10, the recommended sample is at 
least 766. The target sample size is 900. Online sample size calculator by Soper (2006).  
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Figure 17: Results of the power analysis for a general multiple regression analysis using two 
predictors. The analysis was run using G*Power (Erdfelder et al. 1996). 
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Figure 18. The nine-function structure that emerged when testing Hypothesis 3.1 using a second-
order SEM CFA approach. Results showed that the AMFS function of Perspective Taking (PTS) 
and the AMFJR function of Perspective Taking (PTJR) were independent functions from one 
another, such that findings suggest there is a “simulation-based” function of Perspective Taking 
and a “socially situated” function of Perspective Taking. Results also confirmed that the AMFS 
“simulation-based” functions of Perspective Taking (PTS), Prospection (PRO), and 
Counterfactual Thinking (CFT) are independent and unique autobiographical functions in the 
presence of the “socially situated” AMFJR functions of Conversation (CON), Perspective Taking 
(PTJR) Relationship Maintenance (RM), Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control (TPB), 
Emotion Regulation (ER), and Self (SELFJR).  
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Figure 19. The Hypothesis 3.2 replication of the associations between the broad Social (SOCT), 
Directive (DIRT), and Self (SELFT) functions of the TALE and the socially situated functions of 
the AMFJR as previously reported by Ranson and Fitzgerald (in preparation). As expected, 
results of the second-order CFA showed that the AMFJR functions of Conversation (CON), 
Perspective Taking (PTJR), and Relationship Maintenance (RM) mapped onto the TALE’s broad 
Social function; the AMFJR Teaching/Problem Solving/Behavioral Control (TPB) function 
mapped onto the TALE’s broad Directive function, and the AMFJR’s Self (SELFJR) function 
mapped onto the TALE’s broad Self function. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
287 
	
Figure 20. Results of the Hypothesis 3.2 test for associations between the simulation-based 
functions of the AMFS and the broad functions of the TALE supported the model shown below. 
As expected, the AMFS Perspective Taking (PTS) function mapped onto the TALE’s broad 
Social (SOCT) function. However, because there was theoretical evidence that the AMFS mental 
time travel functions of Prospection (PRO) and Counterfactual Thinking (CFT) could be broadly 
Directive (DIRT), Self (SELFT), or some combination of both, specific mappings were not 
predicted. Results of the nine-function, second order CFA showed that the AMFS Prospection 
function mapped onto the TALE’s broad Directive function, whereas the AMFS Counterfactual 
Thinking function mapped onto the TALE’s broad Self (SELFT) function. 
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Figure 21. Results of the Hypothesis 3.2 test of whether the results of the AMFJR-TALE CFA 
and AMFS-TALE CFA would hold when examined as a single model. Results supported the 
mappings found for the individual Hypothesis 3.2 CFAs. Specifically, the functions that mapped 
onto the TALE’s broad Social (SOCT) function were the AMFS Perspective Taking (PTS), and 
the AMFJR Conversation (CON), Perspective Taking (PTJR), and Relationship Maintenance 
(RM functions. The functions that mapped onto the TALE’s broad Directive (DIRT) function 
were the AMFS Prospection (PRO) function, and the AMFJR Teaching/Problem 
Solving/Behavioral Control (TBP) and Emotion Regulation (ER) functions. The functions that 
mapped onto the TALE’s broad Self (SELFT) function were the AMFS Counterfactual Thinking 
(CFT) function and the AMFJR Self (SELFJR) function. 
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 Recent research seeking an expanded view of everyday autobiographical memory 
functions found evidence for a new function: perspective taking (Ranson & Fitzgerald, in 
preparation)—which is the inferring of others’ mental states (Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997; 
Ickes, 2003). Because no other study has implicated the social behavior of perspective taking as 
a purpose for which autobiographical memory is used, Chapter 1 of the current paper proposes a 
conceptual cognitive process model developed to provide a theoretical explanation. The resultant 
Expanded Simulation Model was adapted for use in the current paper from the cognitive process 
model detailed in simulation theory (Goldman, 2006; Shanton & Goldman, 2010). The Expanded 
Simulation Model illustrates how, through the mechanism of mental simulation, autobiographical 
memory specifically, rather than long-term memory generally, can be used to inform perspective 
taking—thus theoretically substantiating perspective taking as a function of autobiographical 
memory.  
 Chapter 1 of the current paper details the “unpacking” of the simulation theory process 
model’s superficially defined long-term memory component to show how autobiographical 
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memory content is activated, retrieved, and incorporated in simulation for perspective taking. 
Also aligned with a recent extension to simulation theory by Shanton and Goldman (2010), the 
Expanded Simulation Model can be used to explain how autobiographical memory specifically 
informs mental time travel—the mental traveling of oneself through conceptual time (Schacter & 
Addis, 2007). As such, the Expanded Simulation Model, in keeping with Shanton and 
Goldman’s revised model, can account for the two ensuing forms of simulation: interpersonal 
and intrapersonal. That is, because perspective taking is other-directed, it is underlain by 
autobiographical memory-informed interpersonal simulation, whereas self-directed nature of 
mental time travel is underlain by autobiographical memory-informed intrapersonal simulation. 
Two empirical studies were designed to test the claims of Chapter 1. Study 1 (Chapter 2) 
validated a newly developed instrument for measuring the frequency with which individuals use 
autobiographical memory for perspective taking and two mental time travel functions: 
prospection (imagining future scenarios) (Schacter & Addis, 2007) and counterfactual thinking 
(reconstructing the past to imagine an details or an outcome that did not actually occur) (Roese & 
Olson, 1995).  
 Results of exploratory principal axis factoring for ordinal data, as well as confirmatory 
factor analysis using a structural equation model approach, yielded evidence that the 10-item 
Autobiographical Memory Functions of Simulation (AMFS) scale reliably measured the 
functions of perspective taking, prospection, and counterfactual thinking. Study 2 (Chapter 3) 
used the validated AMFS scale to evaluate the functions of perspective taking, prospection, and 
counterfactual thinking in the presence of, and in comparison to, other known autobiographical 
memory functions to glean a better understanding of their viability as independent functions. 
Results supported the independence of the AMFS functions. Further, evidence recommended the 
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characterization of the AMFS function of Perspective Taking as “simulation-based,” whereas the 
AMFJR Perspective Taking function instead reflected rated frequency of functional use of 
autobiographical memory for socially situated Perspective Taking. Also discussed were mapping 
of the AMFS and AMFJR functions onto the broad functions of the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011), 
as well as personality, age, gender, and culture effects. 
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